First, Russia's monetary system.

(1) Bank of Russia

The Bank of Russia is the central bank of the Russian Federation. The Bank of Russia was established in July 1990, and its predecessor was the Bank of the Russian Republic, the central bank of the Soviet Union. According to the Russian Constitution, the responsibility of Russian banks is to ensure currency stability and issue currency. According to the law of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the specific duties of Russian banks mainly include: formulating monetary policy; Issue currency and manage currency circulation; As the lender of last resort of credit institutions, manage the refinancing system; Formulate Russian settlement rules; Formulate bank management rules; Manager's vault; Managing the international reserves of Russian banks; Responsible for the market access and exit management of credit institutions; Supervise credit institutions and banking groups; To examine and approve the issuance of securities by credit institutions; Organizing the implementation of foreign exchange management; Analyze and forecast Russian economic situation, especially currency, foreign exchange, finance and prices, and release relevant information and statistical data.

The Bank of Russia has a banking committee to manage the operation of the bank. Its functional departments include: Economic Comprehensive Department, Research Information Department, Cash Circulation Department, Payment System Management and Monitoring Department, Settlement Management Department, Accounting Reporting Department, Credit Institution Licensing Department, Banking Supervision Department, Credit Institution Inspection Department, Market Operation Department, Market Service Department, Financial Monitoring and Foreign Exchange Management Department, Balance of Payments Department, Budget System Accounting Service Department, Legal Department, External and Public Relations Department, Information System Department and Banking Supervision Department. Bank of Russia has 79 regional branches in different regions.

All the capital and property of Russian banks are owned by the Russian Federation, but according to the Russian Constitution and the Law of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Russian banks exercise their functions and powers independently of the federal government and local governments. Neither the Russian government nor the Russian bank is responsible for each other's debts. The Bank of Russia is responsible to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. The President of the Bank of Russia is appointed and removed by the State Duma on the proposal of the Russian President, and the members of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia are appointed by the State Duma on the proposal of the Russian President (subject to the consent of the President). The State Duma may request the Audit Office of the Russian Federation to audit the business of Russian banks. Russian banks are required to report the annual report and the implementation of monetary policy to the State Duma.

(2) Russian currency

The name of Russian currency is ruble. There are seven denominations of Russian paper money: 5 rubles, 10 rubles, 50 rubles, 100 rubles, 500 rubles, 1000 rubles and 5000 rubles; There are seven denominations of coins: 1, 5, 1 0,50,1,2,5.

Second, Russia's monetary policy

(A) monetary policy objectives

In recent years, the goal of Russian monetary policy is to reduce inflation rate and maintain monetary stability. In 2006, the specific target of monetary policy formulated by the Russian central bank was that the increase of consumer prices would not exceed 8.5% and the core inflation rate would be between 7% and 8%.

(B) monetary policy tools

1, open market operation

The main ways for Russian banks to operate in the open market include issuing central bank bonds, buying and selling federal government bonds, repurchase operations and currency swaps.

2. Deposit operation

According to paragraphs 4 and 46 of the Law of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Russian banks can regulate the liquidity of the banking sector by obtaining deposits from credit institutions. At present, there are two ways for Russian banks to conduct deposit business: fixed interest rate and auction interest rate. Fixed-rate deposit operation is conducted every day, and deposit auction is conducted every Thursday. Credit institutions can make deposit auction quotations to Russian banks through regional branches of Russian banks, Reuters trading system and MICEX.

3. Raise funds again

According to the law of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Bank of Russia, as the lender of last resort, is responsible for organizing the refinancing system and formulating the procedures and conditions for refinancing. According to the types of loan collateral and loan conditions, Russian bank refinancing can be divided into two types. The first is to refinance with the bonds on the Russian financial list as collateral, and the mortgage bonds can be traded in the market. The second is refinancing, in which the agreed bills are used as collateral, with creditor's rights or guaranteed by credit institutions. The refinancing of Russian banks can be divided into daytime loans, overnight loans, one-week loans, two-week loans and loans with longer term, but the loan term generally does not exceed 180 days.

4. Deposit reserve

The Law of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation clearly stipulates that the deposit reserve is one of the tools of Russian monetary policy, and all bank credit institutions must abide by the deposit reserve regulations after obtaining the business license issued by the Russian bank. Russian banks do not pay interest on deposit reserves. The decision to adjust the deposit reserve ratio was made by the board of directors of the Bank of Russia, which manages the deposit reserve of credit institutions on a monthly basis.

(C) the transparency of monetary policy

The Russian central bank discloses the relevant information of monetary policy decision-making and implementation in the following ways: 1. The Report on Monetary Situation and Monetary Policy is published once a quarter; 2. Publish the annual report of the Russian central bank every year, analyze the economic and financial situation in Russia, and announce the implementation of monetary policy; 3. Formulate monetary policy guidelines, explain the objectives and tools of monetary policy and the application of monetary policy tools; 4. Regularly publish bank statistical bulletins, and publish indicators such as deposit operation, refinancing and deposit reserve; 5. Publish information such as refinancing interest rate and deposit reserve ratio in Russian bank official website.

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China and Russia are both transitional economies, and the sustained economic growth since the transition has attracted people's attention. Many scholars have compared many aspects of economic transformation between China and Russia, but few people have made a comparative study of monetary policies in the process of economic transformation between the two countries. Compared with mature market economy countries, China and Russia still face many special problems in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, such as lack of experience in implementing monetary policy under market economy conditions, lack of understanding of the operation of market economy, lack of developed financial markets and mature monetary policy tools. Therefore, how to formulate and effectively implement monetary policy has always been the main challenge faced by the central banks of China and Russia.

In the whole development history and practice of monetary policy, the research topics mainly focus on two aspects: one is to study what impact monetary policy will have on the real economy, and the other is to study what kind of monetary policy is optimal. In view of the first question, the theoretical circle has basically reached a consensus that monetary policy only has an impact on the real economy in the short term, and its long-term effect is mainly reflected in the impact on prices (Taylor, 1995), so the main responsibility of modern central banks should be to prevent inflation and the resulting unstable fluctuations in the economic cycle (mccallum, 200 1). For the second question, research has been going on and there has been no satisfactory answer. In order to solve the design problem of optimal monetary policy, the first question faced by decision makers is "should we choose rule-based monetary policy or discretionary monetary policy?" Which method is more conducive to the realization of policy objectives. " The problem of time inconsistency ended the debate on monetary policy rules and camera selection. This theory holds that monetary policy rules are superior to camera choice (Svensson, 1997). However, economists still have different views on how to apply the rules. One view is that the rules only need to specify the goals that the central bank needs to achieve, and do not need to limit the tools adopted by the central bank and the adjustment methods of tools, thus achieving the purpose of limiting the discretion of the monetary authorities. Such rules are called target rules, including exchange rate target rules, interest rate target rules, money supply target rules, inflation target rules, nominal income target rules and price level target rules (Svensson, 1999). Another point of view is that the rules should not only stipulate the goal that the central bank must achieve, but also stipulate the policy tools and the ways in which the tools can achieve this goal. Such rules are called instrumental rules, including Friedman rule, Mackler rule and Taylor rule (Friedman,1963; Taylor,1993; Mccallum, 2000). In recent years, the study of monetary policy rules has become the latest development in the field of monetary economics, and the applicability and comparative study of various monetary policy rules has become a hot issue in this field (Ffisch and Staudinger, 2003). Of course, the above studies are mainly based on developed countries and mature market economies, and there are relatively few related studies on transitional countries and emerging market economies, let alone comparative studies on China-Russia monetary policy.

The research of China scholars is mainly the introduction and application of western theories. Reflected in: First, study the discretionary monetary policy. In the empirical test, Liu Jinquan and Yun Hang (2004) believe that there is indeed a mixed phenomenon of regularity and camera selectivity in China's monetary policy. In addition to the long-term price stability goal, monetary policy also takes into account short-term demand management and actual output adjustment; Liu Bin (2003) calculated and compared the social welfare of the optimal monetary policy rules under three conditions: full commitment, Taylor rule and discretionary decision, and pointed out that Taylor rule can provide guidance for the operation of China's monetary policy. Second, the applicability of various monetary policy rules in China. Xie Ping and Luo Xiong (2002) used historical analysis and response function to test Taylor rule for the first time. The estimation results show that China's monetary policy is unstable and does not follow the traditional Taylor rule. Song Yuhua et al. (2007) tested the validity of Mackler's law, and found that when the money circulation speed tends to be stable and the money multiplier gradually increases, the influence of M0 on the real economy increases, which creates conditions for the central bank to implement Mackler's law to regulate macroeconomic operation. Zhang Yishan and Zhang Daiqiang constructed a forward-looking monetary policy response function suitable for China's national conditions on the basis of Taylor and other western scholars' research on monetary policy response function. The results show that the response function can well describe the specific trends of interbank lending rate, deposit and loan interest rate and their spreads, but China's monetary policy is inherently unstable.

Generally speaking, the research and application of monetary policy rules in developed countries have become increasingly mature, but whether these monetary policy rules are applicable to transitional countries and emerging market economies is still a controversial issue. Because countries with economies in transition often lack developed financial markets, monetary policy based on interest rates still faces many institutional problems. In addition, there are also great problems in model setting and data collection, so few people have studied the monetary policy rules of transitional countries so far. This paper aims to make a comparative study of the monetary policy objectives of China and Russia from two aspects. On the one hand, it is to enrich the theoretical research of monetary policy in transition countries, on the other hand, it is hoped that such research will provide new theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy in transition countries, and provide decision-making reference for the ultimate goal of rational choice of monetary policy in transition countries.

The structure of this paper is as follows: The second part reviews the main experiences of China and Russian in implementing monetary policy in recent years; The third part evaluates and compares the implementation effect of China-Russia monetary policy objectives, and makes an empirical test of China-Russia monetary policy objectives under the condition of open economy by using Taylor rule; The last part is the conclusion and policy suggestions.

Second, briefly review the monetary policies of China and Russia.

(A) the main experience of China's monetary policy

Since 1984, the People's Bank of China began to independently exercise the functions of the central bank, China's monetary policy has undergone a transformation from direct regulation to indirect regulation, and finally determined the monetary policy framework of "keeping the currency stable and promoting economic growth as the ultimate goal and taking the money supply as the intermediate goal".

During the period from1984 to1993, although there was no clear monetary policy goal in law, China mainly followed the goal of "giving priority to economic growth" in practice. In the process of monetary policy implementation, the deliberate pursuit of high-speed economic growth has led to the long-term pressure of excessive demand for China's economic development. In the case of economic growth first, the central bank is often forced to relax monetary policy. Driven by credit expansion, the inflation rate rises rapidly, and then the central bank must adopt a tight monetary policy. The alternation of loose and tight monetary policy makes it difficult to grasp the strength and timing of monetary policy. As a result, it has neither stabilized prices nor promoted steady economic growth, and the effectiveness of monetary policy has been greatly weakened.

From 65438 to 0993, the People's Bank of China strengthened its macro-control ability, and the financial control goal began to transition from direct goal to indirect goal. From 65438 to 0994, the People's Bank of China gradually reduced its control over the credit scale of commercial banks. In September, the People's Bank of China defined and published China's money supply indicators at the levels of M0, M 1 and M2 for the first time according to the liquidity situation, which indicated that the money supply began to become the intermediate target of monetary policy. 1995, the People's Bank of China announced that the money supply would be one of the regulatory targets of monetary policy, and the annual monetary supply regulatory targets were announced from 1996. 1997 after the Asian financial crisis, the People's Bank of China gradually strengthened the implementation of monetary policy. 1 99865438+1October1,the People's Bank of China officially canceled the credit scale control, started to take the money supply as the sole intermediary target, established an indirect monetary control mechanism based on open market operation, statutory deposit reserve ratio and rediscount, and gradually improved China's monetary policy system.

At the same time, the state has also accelerated the legislative work related to monetary policy. 199365438+On February 25th, the State Council issued the Decision on Financial System Reform, clearly pointing out that the ultimate goal of the monetary policy of the People's Bank of China is to "keep the currency stable and promote economic growth". This shows that the ultimate goal of China's monetary policy since 1994 is to give priority to stabilizing the currency and promote economic growth on the basis of stabilizing the currency. On March 1995 and 18, this goal was formally written into the Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China in the form of legislation.

At present, although China's monetary policy objectives have been determined in the form of legislation, they still have the attribute of multiple objectives at the specific operational level. "Maintaining monetary stability" actually includes the dual goals of "maintaining inflation stability" and "maintaining exchange rate stability", and the goal of "promoting economic growth" actually has three goals. For the People's Bank of China, which of these three goals comes first is still an unsolved problem. Therefore, strictly speaking, there is no clear ultimate goal of China's monetary policy at present.

Judging from the actual operation of the People's Bank of China, "maintaining inflation stability" and "maintaining exchange rate stability" have actually become the ultimate goals pursued by the People's Bank of China. Since 1992, the China municipal government has publicly released the inflation rate target in the annual government work report, which has also become the target of the monetary policy implementation of the People's Bank of China. In addition, since the exchange rate integration from 65438 to 0994, especially after the Southeast Asian financial crisis, stabilizing the exchange rate has actually become the main goal pursued by the People's Bank of China. Since 1994, the RMB has been pegged to the US dollar, and the RMB exchange rate has always fluctuated within a narrow range. Taking the annual average exchange rate as an example, the deviation of exchange rate at the end of 1994 was 1.6%, which was reduced from 1995 to within 65438+. Therefore, it can also be said that from 1994 to July 2005, "maintaining inflation stability" and "maintaining exchange rate stability" have been the ultimate goals pursued by the People's Bank of China.

On July 2, 2005, the People's Bank of China announced that it would start to implement a managed floating exchange rate system based on market supply and demand and with reference to a basket of currencies. The RMB exchange rate is no longer pegged to a single dollar, thus forming a more flexible RMB exchange rate mechanism. As of June 16, 2008, the exchange rate of USD against RMB has been adjusted from then 1 to 0 yuan RMB 8. 165438 to now 1 to RMB 6.90, with a cumulative appreciation of 17.54%. With the expansion of the floating range of RMB exchange rate, China's monetary policy is facing a new transformation.

(B) the main experience of Russian monetary policy

Great changes have taken place in Russia's monetary policy during the whole economic transition period. According to official documents, the guiding principle of Russia's current monetary policy is the monetary policy framework of "maintaining the stability of the ruble as the primary goal and taking the money supply as the intermediate goal".

During the period from 1992 to 1995, the fiscal deficit has been the primary problem that troubled the Russian central bank, and the main purpose of monetary policy is to finance the government budget deficit. Due to the huge fiscal deficit and the lack of developed domestic bond market for financing, the Russian central bank must provide financing for these deficits. Since the second half of 1993, the increase in government expenditure and the decrease in taxes have further increased the government's fiscal deficit, and the central bank's loans to the government have also increased accordingly. During the period of 1994, the government's fiscal deficit reached the highest point, and the loan financing required by the central bank reached twice the monetary base at the end of 1993. The fiscal deficit has brought serious monetary problems to Russia, leading to high-level and highly volatile inflation, and government borrowing has become the main source of high inflation (Marek et al., 2002). Despite these difficulties, the Russian central bank began to develop monetary policy tools, including directly controlling loans and establishing a deposit reserve system. However, in the early days, most of these tools were ineffective, mainly because the central bank has always followed a passive monetary management stance.

From June 1995 to June 1998 before the financial crisis, Russia's monetary policy began to turn to the policy goal of stabilizing the exchange rate. 1in April 1995, Russia promulgated a new central bank law, which legally gave the central bank a certain degree of independence to implement monetary policy. 1On July 6, 1995, the Russian central bank and the federal government jointly determined the "foreign exchange corridor" policy of pegging to the US dollar. Since then, the ruble exchange rate is no longer completely determined by market supply and demand, but only fluctuates within a certain range. If it exceeds the prescribed limit, it will cause the intervention of the central bank. In the first three years after the implementation of the foreign exchange corridor policy, the ruble exchange rate was relatively stable and inflation remained at a low level. 1996 and 1997, the lower tax revenue and higher interest expense enlarged the government's fiscal deficit, reaching 8.25% of GDP at the end of 1997. Faced with severe financial problems, the government has to raise funds for the budget deficit by expanding the scale of bond issuance, and at the same time open the domestic bond market to foreign investors. Although the sale of high-yield bonds can improve the government's liquidity, it has brought tremendous pressure on the ruble exchange rate. In order to prevent the devaluation of the ruble, the Russian central bank can only raise the refinancing rate, so as to keep the interest rate at a high level and ensure the exchange rate fluctuates within a fixed range. 1997165438+10, Russia raised the refinancing rate from 12% to 28% for the first time; In February 1998, the refinancing rate was raised to 42% again; In May 1998, the refinancing rate was raised to 150%. Such a high interest rate is unbearable for the finance department. 1998 17 In August, the Russian government was forced to declare domestic debt default, the currency depreciated, and the financial crisis broke out inevitably.

1After the financial crisis in August, 1998, due to the lack of funds at home and abroad, Russia began to implement an expansionary monetary policy and used monetary expansion to make up for the budget deficit. From August 1998 to February 1999, Russia began to implement a managed floating exchange rate system, during which the ruble depreciated by 70%. To the surprise of many people, this financial crisis has become a turning point in the Russian economy. From 65438 to 0999, Russia's financial situation began to improve, and its macro-economy also improved. The main goal of the Russian central bank's monetary policy has also shifted from focusing on exchange rates to focusing on prices.

After 2002, the Russian Central Bank faced a very favorable external environment, and the export of major commodities increased substantially. In addition to the increase in income from oil-related products, Russian enterprises have also obtained a large number of loans from abroad. Due to the increasing confidence in Russia's economic growth and the high profitability of the oil exploration sector, a large number of foreign direct investments have been attracted. With the continuous improvement of the macro-economy, the appreciation of the ruble has also begun to accelerate. The appreciation of the ruble has brought a serious problem to the central bank: with the depreciation of the dollar, the loan portfolio and private deposits have gradually shifted from the dollar to the ruble, and the ruble has replaced the dollar. Therefore, since 2002, the Russian central bank began to actively intervene in the exchange rate between the ruble and the US dollar in the foreign exchange market, and actively purchased foreign exchange to absorb the excess liquidity brought about by the increase in the supply of the US dollar.

In 2003, the exchange rate of the ruble against the US dollar rebounded for the first time since 12. In that year, the nominal exchange rate of the ruble against the US dollar appreciated by 8. 1%, and the real effective exchange rate appreciated by 4. 1%. Currency appreciation has achieved remarkable results in stabilizing prices. In 2003, Russia's inflation rate was consistent with the set target for the first time. However, after 2004, Russia adopted the exchange rate policy of implicit intervention. As a result, although the appreciation of the ruble was controlled, the inflation rate remained high.

Third, the evaluation and empirical analysis of the implementation effect of China-Russia monetary policy objectives.

From the above brief review, we can see that China and Russia have basically adopted the same monetary policy framework, that is, "taking the stability of the currency as the goal and the money supply as the intermediary goal?" Monetary policy framework. So, what is the implementation effect of this monetary policy framework? The following will use the latest data of the two countries in recent years to make a preliminary evaluation and empirical test on the implementation performance of the monetary policies of the two countries.

(A) the performance evaluation of China-Russia monetary policy objectives

Table 1 lists the main objectives of China's monetary policy in recent years and its implementation. It is not difficult to find that except for a few years (1998 and 1999), China's economic growth target has been successfully achieved in most years. Of course, this result is not entirely the result of monetary policy, but the result of a series of comprehensive policy measures including money, finance, land and industry (Zhang Yishan and Zhang Daiqiang, 2007).

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