Is it useful to call the police if my ICBC card was suddenly deducted 4,500 yuan by the loan platform?

It is useful. The police will investigate your ICBC card to find out the operator of the loan platform. He also asked the operator of the loan platform why he was suddenly deducted 4,500 yuan from the loan platform. If it was illegal, the police would seize the loan platform and recover the stolen money in accordance with the law.

Case Study to Identify Scams and Reveal the Tricks of Loan Fraud!

The so-called loan fraud refers to the borrower or the internal staff of the credit institution who fabricates facts and conceals the truth to obtain credit. Institutional loans. With the economic downturn and industry competition intensifying, various loan fraud cases are emerging one after another. Through some typical loan fraud cases, I hope it can provide inspiration and reference for you to identify fraudulent loans.

Case 1 - A loan officer in Yulin, Guangxi was arrested for using the names of 143 villagers to defraud 8 million in loans

Main issues: employee moral hazard and fake loans

Recent Multiple media reported that a loan officer from a financial institution in Luchuan County, Yulin City, Guangxi, used the names of 143 villagers to defraud the financial institution of more than 8 million yuan in loans for his own use. Recently, the Luchuan County Procuratorate approved the arrest of the suspect on suspicion of loan fraud. According to media reports, the criminal suspect Zhong lost money due to his participation in "". In order to raise funds to continue participating in gambling, he had the bad idea of ??defrauding loans. During the two years from 2013 to 2015, on the pretext of helping villagers who had previously applied for loans to refinance the loan procedures, Zhong defrauded villagers to sign signatures in loan procedures that were not their own will, and privately opened villagers' accounts so that he could receive the loans himself.

Zhong used the identity cards, copies of household registers and other materials that the villagers had kept on file when applying for loans, and without the villagers' knowledge, applied for a loan in the name of the villager and used it for his own gambling. Subsequently, some villagers gradually discovered that their deposits had been inexplicably diverted by financial institutions, and even owed hundreds of thousands of dollars. Only then did the fact that Zhong had committed loan fraud surface.

According to media reports, as of February 2016, when the case occurred, *** Zhong used the names of 143 villagers to defraud loans of more than 8 million yuan, a small part of which was used to repay the fraudulent loans. of loans.

Case 2 - Cousins ??conspired to defraud the bank of 600,000 yuan

The main issues were employee moral hazard and internal and external collusion

In February 2015, a certain person in Yuncheng The person in charge of the bank reported the case to the Economic Investigation Brigade of the Yuncheng County Public Security Bureau, saying that the head of one of its branches, Xu Moumou, had lent more than 600,000 yuan but has not yet recovered it. He was suspected of illegal lending and requested investigation and punishment. After receiving the report, the Economic Investigation Brigade quickly set up a task force to investigate. It was found that Xu took advantage of his job position and his right to approve and issue loans, colluded with his cousin Li, and issued loans of more than 600,000 yuan in violation of regulations, all of which were used for him and his cousin. On the management of the business jointly opened by Li Moumou. Due to poor management and bankruptcy of the company, all the loans of more than 600,000 yuan were lost. In March 2015, Xu Moumou was arrested, and in November of the same year, Xu Moumou was sentenced. After the incident, Li Moumou has been absconding from other places, and the public security organs have repeatedly pursued him without success. On April 15, the detective police of the task force received reliable information and found his traces in Zhengzhou, Henan. On April 16, the task force immediately rushed to Zhengzhou and, with the cooperation of the local police, arrested Li Moumou in a hotel. After interrogation, Li Moumou truthfully confessed the facts of the crime.

After investigation, in 2014, Li Moumou discussed with his cousin Xu Moumou and took advantage of Xu Moumou's convenient conditions in the bank to get a loan to start a business. The two conspired to appoint Li Moumou as the legal person of the enterprise, and then Li Moumou applied for it, and found Zhang Moumou, Li Moumou, Liu Moumou and other relatives and friends as guarantees, and loaned more than 600,000 yuan in three installments for business operations. As a result, not only did it not make any money due to poor management, but it also lost all the funds raised from multiple parties. At present, Li Moumou has been criminally detained, and the case is under further trial.

Case 3 - Yantai sea cucumber farmers were detained for fraudulently borrowing 26 million yuan to expand their business scale

Involved in the problem of false information and collective loans

According to news reports Wang, a sea cucumber farmer in Penglai, Yantai, was criminally detained by the Yantai Development Zone police on March 18 this year for the crime of fraudulently obtaining loans. Wang runs a sea cucumber business. The business was originally doing well, but a large amount of capital was needed to expand the scale of the business. In order to obtain a bank loan, Wang provided false materials and made false statements to the bank, defrauding the bank of 26 million yuan in loans.

Wang is a sea cucumber farmer in Yantai. He has made some money from sea cucumber farming in recent years. He wants to carry out large-scale farming in Baohai, Fujian waters. Due to lack of investment funds, he thought of borrowing from a bank. At exactly this time, a joint-stock bank in Yantai City launched a loan business for aquaculture farmers. The bank's loan business is a "three-three joint guarantee" type, that is, three entities that meet the loan conditions can serve as each other's guarantors. , after passing the review, the three parties can each receive a loan of 3 million yuan. After the loan is successful, the three parties can collectively obtain a capital of 9 million yuan.

Wang felt that the bank's business could just solve his urgent needs, but after comparing the conditions, he lacked a guarantor if he wanted to get a loan, so Wang thought of his relatives at home.

Wang used the WeChat account he created to find his relatives and asked them to sign and fingerprint the relevant documents. In this way, he forged the documents required for the loan. Unexpectedly, Wang's false materials passed the bank's review and the loan was successfully approved.

Wang obtained three groups of loans in the form of "three-three joint guarantees", two groups of 9 million yuan and one group of 8 million yuan, totaling 26 million yuan. A large amount of funds were used by Wang to expand his scale, and his breeding stalls in the southern seas subsequently spread.

However, since 2013, the sea cucumber processing industry has continued to be in a downturn, and Wang’s sea cucumber farming and processing business has become precarious.

After Wang obtained a loan from the bank, he was able to repay the loan on time in the first few years. However, starting from the second half of 2014, Wang was no longer able to repay the bank loan. In desperation, the bank reported the case to the development zone police. After the police accepted the application, through investigation, they found that the information used by Wang to apply for a loan contained false information about many loan customers, and the funds were pooled and used. The relevant personnel were suspected of defrauding the loan.

On March 17, 2016, the Development Zone Bureau decided to issue a criminal detention warrant to the main suspect Wang, and arrested him at his residence the next day. Wang may be held criminally responsible for providing false information to obtain loans.

Case 4 - A man committed bank loan fraud to fulfill his "luxury car dream" and was eventually sentenced for contract crimes

The main problems were inability to repay and providing false real estate certificates and income certificates< /p>

According to news reports, Xiao Liuyin from Daqing watched his buddies buy cars. In order to save face, he signed a special credit card car loan with a bank through a friend’s introduction even though he knew he had no ability to repay. During the signing of the installment business contract, Xiao Liu provided false real estate certificates and income certificates, defrauded the guarantee provided by a certain financing guarantee company, obtained nearly 200,000 bank car purchase funds, and used the money to buy a car.

Because Xiao Liu did not receive repayment for several consecutive installments, and after investigation, the whereabouts of the car Xiao Liu bought were also unknown, so the bank chose to call the police. Xiao Liu was subsequently captured by the public security organs. In the end, Xiao Liu was tried by Longfeng District and held that Xiao Liu provided false credit certificates and concealed the truth when signing a contract with the bank even though he knew he had no ability to repay. His behavior constituted a contract, and he was sentenced to 4 years and 11 months. , and fined 10,000 yuan.

Case 5 - Three men in Weifang were caught for forging property and fraudulently borrowing 2.7 million yuan and refusing to return it

Involving issues such as false driving licenses, real estate certificates, land certificates, and process loopholes

Fu, Ma and Zhang were doing stainless steel business in Linqu County, Weifang City, Shandong Province. In 2011, a man named Fu came to them and asked them if they needed a loan, saying that he had "connections" that could help. They handle the formalities. Since there was no property to mortgage, the three of them forged property certificates such as vehicle driving licenses, real estate certificates, and land certificates and gave them to Fu Moumou, asking him to apply for a loan.

Fu Moumou has worked in the credit department of a bank before and is very familiar with the loan process. He has several acquaintances in the industry and knows which link the bank has loopholes in lax control. The three people handed over false property certificates to Fu Moumou, and each also paid him an agency fee of 20,000 yuan. Fu helped Zhang with a loan of 700,000 yuan, and Fu and Ma each received a loan of 1 million yuan, with a term of one year, and agreed with the three of them that he would repay 700,000 yuan of it.

After successfully obtaining loans through fraud, Fu, Ma and Zhang invested part of the money into their own businesses and used the rest for consumption.

After the loan was granted, the bank repeatedly called for repayment from the three people, but the three people refused to repay. After the people's judgment of Kuiwen District, Weifang City, the three people still refused to repay, and they did not have any enforceable property in their homes. In January this year, after receiving a report from the bank, the Economic Investigation Team of the Kuiwen Public Security Bureau opened the case and launched an investigation. Fu and Ma were arrested and brought to justice, and the bank recovered an economic loss of 460,000 yuan.

Currently, Fu and Ma have been released on bail pending trial on suspicion of fraudulently obtaining loans, and Zhang is listed as a fugitive online.

Case 6 - A woman forged 30 false certificates to obtain a loan of RMB 7.2 million and was finally caught after hiding for two years

The main problem was providing false certificates

Liu 2012 In 2008, he ran an automobile trading company in Quanzhou that integrated trading, beauty services, and auto repair. He applied for three bank acceptance bills worth 7.2 million yuan from the bank. The repayment dates for each payment were about half a month apart. When the date came, she was unable to repay the loan.

So, she found a guarantee company, loaned money from the guarantee company and returned it to the bank. Then loan another amount of money from the bank and return it to the guarantee company based on the ability to repay the loan on schedule. By the second time of this operation, the bank would no longer lend. Without the money lent by the bank, it is no longer possible to borrow money from the guarantee company.

She found 30 motor vehicle certificates and pledged them to the guarantee company, and continued to loan them back to the bank. At the same time, she borrowed 400,000 yuan and 600,000 yuan respectively from two friends in the same form. After that, she disappeared.

Unable to find her person, the guarantee company staff took out 30 mortgaged motor vehicle certificates for comparison and found that they were fake. After calling the police, the police confirmed that the certificate was forged and listed her as a fugitive in 2013.

After hiding for two years, Liu was recently captured by the public security organs. He has been approved by the procuratorate for arrest and is preparing to be transferred.

Case 7 - Joint "insider" loan fraud case

The main issues are internal and external collusion and false information

In August 2003, the famous case of Foshan City, Guangdong Province Private entrepreneur Feng Mingchang was detained by the judicial authorities for being involved in a major financial case. But in February 2003, he had just been elected as one of the 40 "Best Private Entrepreneurs" in Guangdong Province.

Since then, Feng's Huaguang Plate, which has the reputation of "Asia's largest plywood production base", stopped production due to a break in the capital chain. Huaguang Plate once had over 10,000 employees and an annual output value of 2 billion yuan.

In November of the same year, the central government and relevant departments of Guangdong Province formed the "806" task force and stationed in Nanhai District, Foshan City. After the Spring Festival in 2004, Feng Mingchang was officially detained and investigated.

In June 2004, Li Jinhua, Auditor General of the National Audit Office, disclosed in his audit report to the 10th meeting of the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress that Feng, a private enterprise owner in Foshan, Guangdong Province, used 13 companies he controlled to Affiliated enterprises fabricated false financial statements, colluded with bank insiders, and obtained a total of 7.421 billion yuan in loans from ICBC Nanhai Branch.

It is reported that as of the audit, there was a balance of 1.929 billion yuan. A large number of these loans were transferred to personal savings accounts or directly withdrawn, and some were even remitted abroad through illegal channels. After preliminary verification, bank loan losses exceeded 1 billion yuan.

In the end, Feng Mingchang, former vice president of ICBC Guangdong Branch Ye Jiasheng, former president of Nanhai Branch Lin Yuxing, and former president of Foshan Branch Lin Junjiang were all sentenced to severe sentences.

Case 8 - Agricultural Bank of China Baotou loan fraud case involving a total amount of 110 million yuan

The main issues are internal and external collusion and false information

In March 2005, the China Banking Regulatory Commission reported A major suspected illegal operation case of the Agricultural Bank of China: In less than a year, bank staff colluded with credit unions and social criminals to defraud more than 110 million yuan of bank funds by misappropriating funds, falsely issuing large deposit certificates, etc. .

In 2004, under the unified deployment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the Inner Mongolia Banking Regulatory Bureau organized on-site inspections of guaranteed loans by banking financial institutions. During an on-site inspection of the Baotou City Branch of the Agricultural Bank of China, the Baotou Banking Regulatory Bureau found that when handling personal and discount business at the affiliated Huitong Branch and Donghe Branch, individual staff members colluded with credit unions and social criminals to defraud bank loans.

The inspection found that from July 2, 2003 to June 4, 2004, the Agricultural Bank of China Baotou City Huitong Branch Shifudong Road Branch and Donghe Branch, Baotou City Damao Banner Rural Credit Cooperative It has been found that personnel of some credit unions under the jurisdiction of the association colluded with other members of the public to commit crimes, misappropriating funds from the association bank, falsely issuing large time deposit certificates, applying for fake and illegal discounts, and obtaining bank credit funds to obtain high interest rates. A total of 98 funds were involved, with an amount of 114.985 million yuan.

Case 9: A state-owned bank branch was defrauded of 26 million yuan in loans by two shell companies

The main problems were employee negligence and shell companies

A state-owned bank Conghua branch Two shell companies in Guangzhou successively provided loans totaling 26 million yuan. In 2015, the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court sentenced the vice president of the branch, the manager of the financial business sub-center, and two loan officers to the crime of dereliction of duty as personnel of a state-owned company or enterprise unit, and were sentenced to criminal liability of one year and nine months to three years.

During June 2011, Li (female), who was the account manager (i.e. loan officer) of Conghua Branch of a state-owned bank at the time, was handling Guangzhou Daxiang Software Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Daxiang Company") ) In the loan business, on-site investigations were not carried out strictly in accordance with regulations to verify the actual operating conditions of the borrowing companies and an investigation report was issued. The pre-loan investigation was a mere formality, and post-loan supervision was not strictly followed. Kuang, who is the manager of the small business financial business sub-center, and Chen, the vice president in charge of credit business, also agreed and confirmed without in-depth investigation and verification, resulting in the bank being used by Zhang and others to obtain a loan of 20 million yuan from Daxiang Company. By the time of the incident, the bank had suffered a loss of nearly 16 million yuan, forming a non-performing loan.

Almost at the same time, another account manager, Wu, handled the loan business of Guangzhou Yipeng Trading Company (hereinafter referred to as "Yipeng Company") from November to December 2011. Wu also failed to conduct an on-site investigation to verify the actual operating conditions of the borrowing company and issue an investigation report in accordance with regulations, which resulted in the bank being used by Zhang and others to obtain a loan of 6 million yuan from Yipeng Company. By the time of the incident, the bank suffered a loss of more than 4.23 million yuan.

The reason is very simple. The loan officer did not conduct a detailed investigation because the business was introduced by the leader. The account manager Li confessed that Daxiang Company was introduced by Kuang, the manager of the small business financial business branch. , the two of them had conducted an on-site inspection together and found that the address did not match the business license. The other party explained that they had just moved to a new address. Li also confessed that because the other party provided company statements and bank statements, she assumed that she had verified the company's actual operating status. When Ding signed, Li did not compare carefully.

Loan officer Wu confessed that because Yipeng Company was introduced by Vice President Chen, he did not conduct an on-site inspection. After the loan was taken, when he was tracking the whereabouts of the loan and the lender's business premises, he did not go to the site to see it. He just asked the lender to send him the relevant information. Vice President Chen confessed that he did not know whether bank employees had inspected the two companies on-site before lending. Because he failed to understand the true situation of these loan companies, the bank's loans were defrauded, and he was responsible.

Case 10: Seven companies in Shandong Province used fraudulent loans to obtain nearly 400 million in drafts

The main problem is fictitious trade

In August 2014, Binzhou City, Shandong Province Intermediate The People's Second Instance Court ruled on a case of fraudulently obtaining bill acceptance. Guo, a native of Boxing County, Binzhou City, Shandong Province, and his wife established companies including Zibo Yongchi Automobile Sales Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Yongchi Automobile"), Shandong Hongchangda Automobile Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Hongchangda Automobile"), etc. Seven affiliated enterprises defrauded Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Qishang Bank, Shandong Boxing Rural Cooperative Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China of a total of 391 million yuan through false purchase and sales contracts between affiliated enterprises, and the exposed part was 180 million yuan.

After Guo and others were prosecuted, the people of Boxing County sentenced the above-mentioned seven companies and Guo in 2013 for the crime of defrauding bill acceptance. Guo was sentenced to four years and fined 100,000 yuan. After the first-instance judgment, Guo appealed against the decision. One of the reasons was that the financial institution should have known that both parties to the purchase and sale contract were related companies and whether the purchase and sale contract was authentic. He himself did not use deceptive means to obtain bill acceptance. On August 7, 2014, the Binzhou Intermediate People’s Court of Second Instance upheld the original verdict.

Guo used the above-mentioned seven companies to sign false purchase and sales contracts and defrauded bank acceptance bills 11 times, with a total amount of 391 million yuan, and the exposed amount was 182.3 million yuan.

Among them, ICBC Binzhou Binyin Branch accepted two acceptance bills, with an amount of 40 million yuan, and an exposure of 16 million yuan; Qishang Bank Boxing Branch, with an amount of 15 million yuan, and an exposure of 7.5 million yuan; Rural Cooperative Bank Pangjia Branch The total amount was 36 million yuan, with an exposure of 10.8 million yuan; the Bincheng Branch of the Agricultural Bank of China handled acceptance bill business 6 times, with a total amount of 300 million yuan, and an exposure of 146 million yuan.

If the latter acceptance exposure fails to be repaid when it expires, the guarantee company will repay it on its behalf. Of the previous 30 million yuan exposure, the guarantee company paid 10 million yuan, and after the Agricultural Bank of China advanced 20 million yuan, it filed a lawsuit against Hongchangda Automobile and others. As of July 14, 2014, Agricultural Bank of China has recovered 15.51 million yuan and received 12 semi-trailer tank trucks from Hongchangda Automobile, which should not cause actual losses.

The method used by Guo and others is not clever, which is to sign false sales contracts between related companies. Taking the Agricultural Bank of China with the largest amount as an example, on March 20, 2012, Guo forged a purchase and sale contract between the company and Yongchi Automobile Company in the name of Hongchangda Automobile Company without any real goods transaction, and used this as a basis for I applied to the Bincheng Branch of the Agricultural Bank of China for an acceptance bill worth 60 million yuan, paid a deposit of 30 million yuan, and had an exposure amount of 30 million yuan, with an expiry date of September 20, 2012. Just one day later, on March 21, 2012, Guo once again used the same method to handle an acceptance bill of 80 million yuan at Bincheng Branch, paying a deposit of 40 million yuan, and the exposure amount was 40 million yuan.

In addition, some clues can be seen from the names of the aforementioned seven companies actually controlled by Guo. Many companies with the same trade name such as "Hongchangda" may have been related before.

Case 11 - The first case of loan fraud in Zhejiang: "Yin and Yang account" loan fraud case

The main issues are shell companies and Yin and Yang accounts

December 2006 On March 23, a branch of the Bank of Communications reported to the Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau that He Zhijun, the legal representative of Zhejiang Zhijun Holding Group Co., Ltd. (referred to as Zhijun Company), was suspected of having borrowed hundreds of millions of yuan from the bank and had fled abroad, and requested the public security organs to file a case for investigation. . With the investigation of the public security organs, a shocking case gradually surfaced.

From 2003 to August 2006, Zhijun Company suddenly had more than 100 subsidiaries with registered capital exceeding 10 million yuan. The bosses of the subsidiaries were all employees of the company, and some were even canteen chefs. This abnormal phenomenon has already attracted the attention of the public security organs. After receiving the report, on January 5, 2007, the Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau decided to investigate the suspected contract case against Zhijun Company and He Zhijun. On April 23, 2007, the Hangzhou Municipal Procuratorate approved the arrest of fugitive He Zhijun.

The prosecutor's office alleged that from 1995 to the time of the case, He Zhijun instructed Wang Chengfu, Zang Chengcheng and others to establish more than 140 related companies across the country, the so-called "Zhijun Group". However, during industrial and commercial registration, these companies register subordinate employees, relatives and friends who have not actually contributed capital or actually participated in business decision-making as "nominal" shareholders or legal representatives.

According to the survey, most Zhijun companies have two sets of reporting systems. One real reporting system is provided to industry and commerce and taxation, called A-account; the other false reporting system is provided to Banks use it for loans, called B accounts. This set of B accounts inflates assets, sales revenue, net profit and sales costs, reducing long-term investment. These two sets of "yin and yang accounts" have been used for several years and have been used repeatedly in the process of illegal loan fraud.

From the first half of 2003 to August 2006, He Zhijun knew clearly that he had no ability to perform the contract, but still instructed his subordinates to provide copies of revised audit reports, fabricate false financial statements, and forge industrial product purchase and sale contracts. , provided false copies of special value-added tax invoices and other materials, and provided guarantees to each other in the names of "empty shell" Zhijunxi West Asia Company, Kailida Company, CIMC Company, Jiuyuan Company, Morningside Company, Antai Company, etc., successively He defrauded Bank of Communications, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and China Guangfa Bank to obtain loans totaling more than 1.3 billion yuan.

Case 12: Loan fraud case of the largest bank in Beijing: Rural Commercial Bank executives colluded internally and externally, and shell companies defrauded loans of 700 million

Main issues Shell companies, internal and external collusion

On October 10, 2012, the Beijing High Court pronounced judgment on the city’s largest bank loan fraud case, and the final verdict was against eight former executives of Beijing Rural Commercial Bank, including Tian Jun, the former head of the bank’s central business district branch. Five branch presidents and vice presidents made their judgments.

Among them, Tian Jun was sentenced to 20 years, Hu Yi, chairman of Beijing Huading Credit Guarantee Co., Ltd., and the other 16 people involved were sentenced to 3 to 17 years.

It is reported that these eight Beijing Rural Commercial Bank executives, together with Hu Yi and his employees, defrauded the bank of 708 million yuan in loans by fabricating procedures for second-hand housing loans and small business loans, etc.

It was found that from December 2007 to December 2008, Hu Yi and Li Jingjing, chairman of Huading Guarantee Company, fraudulently obtained loans from the Dajiaoting Branch and Shibalidian Branch of the Rural Commercial Bank. 255 transactions, amounting to more than 447 million yuan. In addition, Hu Yi and others used the names of 45 companies to fraudulently obtain 45 loans from the Shibalidian branch between September 2008 and February 2009, using fictitious excuses such as that the companies needed working capital and mutual guarantees. More than 261 million yuan. As of the incident, the attack had caused economic losses of more than 360 million yuan.

The case surfaced back to September 2008. At that time, when Zhao, an employee of the Personal Finance Department of the Bank of Communications, was preparing to take a loan to buy a car, he accidentally found out from the bank’s credit reporting system that he was in Beijing Rural Commercial Bank. A second-hand house loan of 2 million yuan appeared inexplicably at the Shibalidian branch. Coincidentally, at the same time, when a China Construction Bank employee, Wei, was preparing to take a loan to buy a house, he also found that he was also "borrowed" by Beijing Rural Commercial Bank, and immediately called the police. Faced with such a strange thing, after the two complained to the Beijing Rural Commercial Bank Head Office to no avail, they reported the matter directly to the Beijing Banking Regulatory Bureau.

Immediately afterwards, on February 27, 2009, Hu Yi’s ex-wife Li Jingjing went to the business department of the Rural Commercial Bank to apply for a credit card in order to withdraw a loan from one of the shell companies. At this moment, the attentive bank teller discovered , this loan company has been established for more than a year. The official seal is actually new and has no stamp on it at all. After a detailed investigation, the bank found that the loan withdrawal account actually involved multiple small business loans, so it called the police.

At the end of March 2009, the shocking case of Beijing Rural Commercial Bank being defrauded of 460 million yuan in loans was exposed. At that time, eight people in charge, including Tian Jun, president of the central business district branch of the bank, were suspected of colluding to defraud loans and were investigated by judicial authorities. An Dong, the legal representative of Beijing Huading Credit Guarantee Co., Ltd., and Hu Ding, the actual controller, who provided guarantees for the loans, were investigated by judicial authorities. Yi was also investigated by judicial authorities and took compulsory measures.

In June 2010, the Beijing Banking Regulatory Bureau confirmed that Jin Weihong, the former president of Beijing Rural Commercial Bank, and Jiang Chao, the vice president, were suspended, and Tian Jun, the former president of the central business district branch, was also dismissed. administrative and party positions.

In early August 2010, Hu Yi, chairman of Beijing Huading Credit Guarantee Company, and eight bank officials for fraudulent loans were tried together in the No. 2 Intermediate Court of the city. It is reported that there were 18 defendants involved in the case at that time, including the president and deputy president of Beijing Rural Commercial Bank’s CBD branch, Shibalidian branch, and Dajiaoting branch, who were accused of receiving nearly 10 million yuan in bribes. Yuan. The trial is expected to last five days. After the incident, only half of the 708 million yuan defrauded was recovered.

Enlightenment from the above cases

The above bloody loan fraud cases have sounded the alarm for our credit institutions. The author believes that the above cases have given us the following enlightenment:

Looking at the twelve cases above, the main forms of loan fraud are: (1) Providing false information, including false ID cards, real estate certificates, and false driving licenses , false land certificates, false certificates of conformity, false income certificates, false financial information, etc.; (2) False trade financing and fictitious trade. In such cases, there are often yin and yang companies and related companies, as reflected in Case 10 (3) Use of shell companies to defraud loans, such as cases 9, 11, and 12; (4) Employee moral hazard, employee negligence, internal and external collusion, when borrowers use false information, false trade, and shell companies to defraud During the loan process, some loan fraud cases involved internal and external collusion and employee negligence.

Enlightenment 2: Credit institutions need to optimize their governance structures

A good corporate governance institution is the cornerstone of the long-term and stable development of credit institutions. At present, my country's commercial banks have basically established a set of risk management systems. However, due to various reasons, commercial banks are still often restricted by administrative management structures when conducting risk management, and situations such as leadership intervention in loans often occur. It is recommended that commercial banks should establish a risk management department centered on business processes and be directly responsible to the risk management committee. Through this system design, an effective check and balance mechanism can be formed to prevent risks.

Enlightenment 3: Establish a risk management system with business processes as the core

Credit institutions should establish a A credit risk management system with business processes as the core. Risk management is a management process that includes the identification, measurement, evaluation and development of methods, processes and systems to deal with risks, with the purpose of minimizing avoidable risks and minimizing costs and losses. A complete credit risk management system includes four links, namely, credit risk identification, credit risk assessment, credit risk control and credit risk management evaluation.

ICBC e-Loan is a real scammer, don’t be fooled

Regular ICBC e-Loan is real and not a scammer. Have you been deceived by a fake one? You must use ICBC APP or ICBC online banking to apply.

The loan officer at ICBC asked me to pay 7,000 yuan to prevent the interest rate from rising. Was this a scam?

Hello, I think you have been scammed.

If you want the loan interest rate to be fixed, you can choose to sign a fixed-rate loan contract without paying cash. Any fees charged by the bank must be clearly stated and accompanied by an invoice. Generally speaking, mortgage loans only depend on the contract and there will be no additional charges.

If he does not give you any invoice, you can recover the losses from him if you have evidence.

In 2019, I borrowed 12,000 yuan from ICBC E-finance, and I was asked to pay 440 yuan in construction fees and 3,600 yuan in unfreezing fees. The money was not loaned and I was defrauded.

ICBC did not " "ICBC E-Financial Loan" product or "ICBC E-Financial Loan" mobile app, if you are defrauded, it is recommended to report the case to the local public security agency. At present, ICBC provides e-loan, or "personal credit loan" business. This business has no capital and unfreezing fees and can be applied for through ICBC mobile banking software or ICBC e-life software.

(Answer time: November 15, 2019. In case of business changes, please refer to the actual situation.)

Is ICBC e-Loan a scammer?

ICBC e-financing is real, but there is an ICBC e-financing that is a liar. Please note that ICBC e-financing has a similar name. They use ICBC e-financing to confuse people and specifically deceive people. First, you must They pay a fee of 900 yuan before transferring money, and then deliberately omit or miss a number on the bank card you filled in, and then tell you that the wrong transfer is frozen and cannot be transferred. If you are eager to ask them to make a payment, they will ask you to transfer several thousand to unfreeze the fee. Only then could they place the money, and in the end, they successfully defrauded them of an extra sum of money. Please, all friends who want to borrow money, please remember not to be deceived. Remember, it is ICBC E-Rong. It is a scam company. It has a fake license and it is not ICBC Rong-e. This is real. There is a world of difference. Advice from a person who has been deceived. I hope people who see it will forward it and don’t let more people be deceived