At the same time, the institutional intermediary system will be conducive to the improvement of the self-discipline system and the integrity system of the futures market, thus promoting the establishment of futures appraisal companies. Because of its independent intermediary status, futures appraisal companies can objectively evaluate the competitiveness of futures exchanges, futures companies and futures trading varieties, which can help investors understand the futures market, reveal futures risks, find investment opportunities and participate in futures trading. Through objective and fair evaluation, it plays the role of a "goodwill third party". On the one hand, it guides investors to conclude contracts with futures companies with good credit, standardized operation and rich management experience, on the other hand, it provides services for investors with poor credit and poor management experience. This is conducive to strengthening the supervision of futures exchanges and futures companies, improving the self-discipline system of futures industry and establishing the integrity culture of futures industry.
(3) Feasibility study on allowing only natural person intermediaries or institutional intermediaries to exist.
Futures companies mainly rely on natural person intermediaries to expand their business, and many futures operating institutions (including all companies and business departments in my jurisdiction) do not have institutional intermediaries. In China, institutional intermediaries are basically in the early stage of development, and their legitimacy is still unclear, so futures companies are more inclined or accustomed to cooperating with natural person intermediaries. Even if natural person intermediary is not allowed in laws and regulations, it is still difficult to put an end to this kind of intermediary in practice. For example, when dealing with accounts, futures companies can pay commissions in the form of various fees. Therefore, it is not feasible to cancel the natural person intermediary.
As a product of the development of China's futures market, institutional intermediaries have promoted the further division of labor in the futures market. If the ban is in its infancy, it will affect the operating efficiency and long-term development of the futures market. Moreover, the outstanding advantages of institutional intermediaries in customer resources, market development and customer service will inevitably make futures companies consider or attach more and more importance to cooperation with them. Even if the legal level does not allow institutional intermediaries to exist, it is still possible for futures companies to achieve business introduction and commission rebate with relevant institutions by circumventing policies. For example, consulting companies engage in intermediary business in the name of their staff and collect commissions. Therefore, it is not feasible to ban institutional intermediaries.
(four) the possible impact and problems of natural person intermediaries and institutional intermediaries on the futures market.
On the premise of effective regulation and management of natural person intermediaries and institutional intermediaries, the parallel operation of these two forms of intermediaries will have the following effects on the futures market:
1, the legitimacy of institutional intermediaries will be recognized, which will gain opportunities for rapid development and be conducive to the gradual optimization of the structure of futures intermediaries.
2. The futures company will get a partner with a certain scale and standardized operation, and both parties can also guarantee the stability of the intermediary relationship through the intermediary contract.
3. The above two changes will accelerate the process of specialization, scale and modernization of the futures industry and further improve the operating efficiency of the futures market.
At the same time, in the case of allowing institutional intermediaries to exist, there may be cases where customers designate the staff of institutional intermediaries as agents to place orders, and institutional intermediaries may form disguised private equity funds, which will greatly exceed the scale of funds that natural intermediaries can control as agents to place orders, and new problems and difficulties may arise in supervision. In addition, when there is a dispute between the customer and the agent (that is, the staff of the agency), the legal liability will become very complicated.