On February 7th, 20 14, the relevant assets of Xiao Jiashou, the actual controller of Xinri Hengli Company, were seized. The share price of Xinri Hengli plummeted by 8. 13%, which means that the steel trade credit crisis that started at the end of 20 1 1 is showing a big bottom. Shanghai Xinri Equity Investment, the largest shareholder of Xinri Hengli, received the notice of assistance in execution in Pudong New Area, and the civil ruling on the case of Minsheng Bank Shanghai Branch v. Xiao Jiashou and other financial loan contracts has taken legal effect. Due to the need of property preservation, Xiao Jiashou's 466 million yuan equity in Shanghai Xinri was seized (accounting for 365,438+0% of the total share capital of Shanghai Xinri). The 80 million shares of listed companies held by Shanghai Xinri (accounting for 29.2% of the total share capital of Xinri Hengli) were also frozen by the judiciary. Since 20 13, steel traders have been sued almost every week in Shanghai, and many famous steel market bosses' assets have been cleaned up. The bleak situation of steel traders today is rooted in the great credit leap forward after the financial crisis. Under the loose monetary policy at that time, some steel traders obtained a large amount of credit funds from banks and invested in real estate, futures and other markets in the form of joint guarantee or repeated pledge of goods. During the peak period, the balance of steel trade loans in East China alone was once close to 200 billion yuan. Subsequently, with the bank's collection of loans, a large number of steel traders fell into a liquidity crisis on 20 12, and vicious incidents such as running away and running away were repeatedly exposed. Then came banking, judgment and enforcement procedures, which have continued to this day. "Freezing shares is the joint responsibility of external guarantee." On 2014 February 12, Xiao Jiashou, chairman of Nippon Hengli, said that the bank loan was being repaid as soon as possible to solve the storm. Due to the ruling of Minsheng Bank Shanghai Branch, Xiao Jiashou's equity in Shanghai Xinri Equity Investment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Shanghai Xinri Investment") was sealed up for two years. Xiao Jiashou holds 365,438+0.07% equity of Shanghai Xinri Investment, amounting to 466 million yuan. At the same time, 80 million shares of Xinri Hengli held by Shanghai Xinri Investment are also waiting to be frozen for two years. The frozen shares account for 29.2% of the total shares of listed companies. The so-called waiting for freezing refers to other registered properties that have been sealed up, detained or frozen, which can be registered by waiting for execution, that is, multiple creditors claim debts in turn. On February 14 and 10, Ping An Bank Shanghai Branch and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Shanghai Pudong New Area Sub-branch held court hearings on several financial loan lawsuits involving Xiao Jiashou in Pudong New Area, Shanghai. However, due to Xiao's refusal to appear in court, the defendant shall be served with an announcement to the court. If he is absent again, he will be tried in absentia. The content of the lawsuit is that a steel trader applied to the bank for a working capital loan of10 million yuan, with a loan term of one year. At the same time, Xiao Jiashou's Songjiang steel market signed a maximum guarantee contract with the bank to provide full guarantee for steel traders. Other natural persons also signed the Counter-guarantee Guarantee, and the shareholders of steel traders signed the Guarantee Commitment. The content of such a case is the main reason why Xiao Jiashou's enterprise was sued. During the boom period, the steel trade industry used a lot of financial loans, guarantees and counter-guarantees, but they all lost their functions when the industry declined. In the end, due to the failure of steel traders to repay the bank funds on schedule, Xiao Jiashou's Songjiang steel market must fulfill the guarantee liability compensation. In Shanghai, there are as many as 22 financial loan lawsuits involving Xiao Jiashou, and the trial date is 2065438+March to mid-April 2004. Zhou Huarui, another big steel trader, has also obtained "financial loan contracts" from several banks. The court session lasted from March to late June of 20 14, and there were more than ten related lawsuits. The parties are Everbright Bank Shanghai Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone Sub-branch, Industrial Bank Shanghai Branch, Minsheng Bank Shanghai Branch and Postal Savings Bank Shanghai Branch. Zhou Huarui is the "leading brother" of Shanghai steel trade circle, the president of Shanghai Iron and Steel Association and the president of Shanghai Zhouning Chamber of Commerce. Like Xiao Jiashou Company, Zhou Huarui is also liable for compensation because the guaranteed object can't repay the funds in the process of joint guarantee and mutual insurance, asset pledge and other guarantee financing. In the first two years, only small steel trade enterprises faced bankruptcy. By the end of 20 13, the steel trade crisis had spread to "senior members" and even the president of the Chamber of Commerce. The joint guarantee mode of steel trade industry, which was originally a group warming, reached the worst situation overnight. "We Zhou Ning people are in the bank and have no bad debts." Zhou Peijian, former president of Zhou Ning Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, once proudly told the Economic Observer. In Zhouning, a county town with a population of only 200,000, about 80,000 people gathered in Shanghai to engage in steel trade business and engage in financing and investment business on the steel trade platform. Zhou Ning Shanghai Chamber of Commerce is quite powerful in the eyes of the outside world. The presidents of 20 branches, each of whom is worth hundreds of millions of dollars, have problems with their members, and the bad debts are shared and solved collectively, because no one can guarantee that there will be no problems in the future-for a long time in the past, they have thus smoothed out several financial loopholes in order to safeguard the reputation of Zhou Ning people. For example, on 20 10, a steel trader in Fujian frantically hoarded nearly 350,000 tons of steel in bulk electronic disks, and with a small amount of self-owned funds, through repeated warehouse receipts, the leverage ratio of funds was enlarged from private lending funds, and finally the floating loss was as high as 250 million yuan. However, at that time, it was considered an accident. Finally, with the help of Zhou Ning Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, the bad debts were solved. By making good use of the bank's money, Zhouning people have made outstanding achievements in their own industries, accounting for 90% in the retail field of Shanghai steel trade, 90% in the spot field and 70% in the wholesale field. The contribution of steel trade industry to Shanghai's GDP is close to 3%, and Dabaishu area is the most concentrated steel trade circle, with an annual transaction scale of over 500 billion yuan. "The reason why outsiders in this industry can't get in is the brand effect." The former president of Zhou Ning Chamber of Commerce once said. Zhou Ning, who is engaged in steel trade in Shanghai, said that even Fujian villagers, Zhou Ning, Fuan people, Zhenghe people have different credit in the bank-this is not just a simple personal credit problem, but Zhou Ning's common joint guarantee model. According to an industry insider, half of the guarantee companies in Shanghai are opened by Zhouning steel traders, not only with financing guarantees, but also with bank loans. "Usually, the guarantee company's deposit for the bank is borrowed from other steel trading enterprises, and the payment will be returned when it comes down." In the bank's view, anyway, there is a guarantee company to bear the risk of bad debts, and the guarantee company has deposits in the bank, so we will not delve into it. What's more, banks are willing to start with the steel trade industry in order to increase the scale of deposits. Banks once actively competed for traders. According to informed sources, for example, in the past, the mortgage rate of steel traders' real estate was 50%, and banks gradually rose from 5.5% and 6% to the peak 1.5 times in order to compete for performance. "That is to say, if the mortgage is 1 10,000 yuan, they can borrow from the bank to10.5 million yuan." When funds are abundant, steel traders can easily form a snowball model. Taking steel trade enterprises as the financing platform, we can obtain financing from banks, then obtain financial and real estate shares, and then mortgage them to banks, which can not only obtain relevant dividends and income, but also will not affect the cash flow in the steel trade field. However, with the regulation of real estate, steel prices have been depressed, and a large number of steel traders have fallen into a liquidity crisis, and news of running away and closing down has exploded one after another. 20 12 Li Guoqing, a native of Zhouning, disappeared after being taken away by the procuratorate to assist in the investigation. It is rumored that he defrauded the loan 10 billion yuan. He is the chairman of Wuxi Yizhou Group, and all its companies have filed for bankruptcy, involving dozens of cases. 20 13 The financing risk of "warehouse protection" of steel traders spread to large steel enterprises. Due to the bankruptcy of traders, large steel mills have become the object of bank prosecution, and the litigation funds are as high as hundreds of millions of yuan. In the first half of 20 13, there were more than 600 financial loans for steel traders in Shanghai alone. Faced with such a black hole of funds for centralized fermentation, the Zhouning Chamber of Commerce will be unable to cope until the president's own assets are seized. Many steel traders blame banks for the tragedy, but most of their wealth begins with "making good use of bank financing". The bank steel trade is addicted to bad debts, which can't be cured for a long time. Take Shanghai Branch of a joint-stock commercial bank as an example. In 20 13 years, its remaining non-performing assets include 120 steel-related loans and only two non-steel loans. The head of the corporate department of the bank said that in the whole year of 20 13, except for some smaller local banks, most banks were collecting bad assets in the steel trade industry, sorting out clues, speeding up the promotion and stepping up the collection. By the end of 20 13, due to the principle of risk prudence, the steel trade loans that have not yet expired are also classified as non-performing according to the classification principle, and full provision is made. In addition, in order to control the report data, many banks classify non-performing loans to the head office for write-off. Ping An, Minsheng (including Minsheng Village Bank), ICBC and Xingye are the four banks with the most loans from Xiao Jiashou. At present, the mortgage rate of industrial land is usually around 50%, and the enterprise qualification will not exceed 60% no matter how good it is. However, in the steel trade market and the upward stage of land price, some banks bet wildly on the future appreciation space, giving 100% or even 120% mortgage interest rate. The bubble burst, the assets were cleared and entered the auction stage, and the land value plummeted. Three factors are more important, one is the collateral and equity of listed companies, and the other is the disposal of industrial land controlled by them. The most important thing is a small willingness to repay. During the whole 20 13 year, the bank kept in close communication with Xiao Jiashou, and Xiao Jiashou kept paying interest, but in 20 14 and 1 year, the bank suddenly stopped paying interest to all banks, which was the direct motivation for the bank to pay interest to him. Earlier, Xiao Jiashou had spent tens of millions of dollars to hire a lawyer to set up an asset firewall for him. In the name of steel trade ice age, there are not a few steel traders who have money to pay back, and the integrity of private enterprises is also an important issue. Zhou Huarui said earlier that steel trade and finance are developing together. How to guard against financial risks and how to help enterprises tide over the difficulties are problems that need to be faced together. As major banks collect debts from steel traders, steel traders are the first to walk out of the industrial chain. Steel traders are blacklisted because they don't trust banks. In 20 13 years, the sales profit rate of the steel industry was only 0.65%, and the steel trade industry itself was unsustainable. "20 14 will be the year when the risk of steel trade finally breaks out in a large area." Lian Ping believes that steel trade is very different from other industries, with a high loss rate. If it is fully exposed in a short time, the non-performing assets of commercial banks will rise sharply. "Therefore, banks have taken various measures to reduce losses, which is reflected in a certain degree of reservation on the non-performing rate. It was not fully exposed in 20 13 years, and the loss situation may eventually be basically exposed in 20 14 years. " Lian Ping said. The black hole of funds in the steel trade industry also shows signs of spreading to other industries. The guarantee industry bears the brunt. There are not a few guarantee companies that act as cannon fodder in the downward stage of the steel trade market, and trust companies involved in the steel trade industry are also doomed.
2. What is the mortgage rate of industrial land stipulated by the People's Bank of China?
I guess it's only half, or less. If you want a loan, you can find us in Shenzhen.
3. What is the mortgage rate of industrial land?
The highest mortgage rate of real estate is 70%!
The right to use residential construction land, commercial construction land and real estate projects under construction are all qualified collateral of the bank. The mortgage rate ranges from 50% to 60%. The level of fixed mortgage rate mainly depends on the value of collateral (market value) and its changing factors, including the applicability, liquidity and changing trend of collateral value. The maximum amount of land use right as mortgage varies from bank to bank, and our system is within 56% of the assessed value.
The land mortgage rate refers to the ratio of the loan amount obtained by land mortgage loan to the land evaluation price.
Specifically, the mortgaged land is appraised by the appraisal agency designated by the bank, and the loan issued by the bank cannot be higher than the corresponding percentage of the appraisal price (if the mortgage rate is 60% and the appraisal price is 6,543,800 yuan, the loan amount cannot be higher than 600,000 yuan), so the mortgage rate directly determines the loan amount of the customer.
4. What is the mortgage rate of industrial land? Thank you!
Mortgage loans are generally low, not exceeding 50% of the appraisal price, but the appraisal price can be higher, and the loan interest rate rises 10% on the basis of the benchmark interest rate.