Regarding this round of cyclical market, the global release of water and the return of the economy to the right track were basically not expected.
However, Ache noticed one detail. In 202 1 year, crude steel in China will stop production! This change in supply may not be fully reflected in the price.
The official statement is clear.
On February 29th, 2020, at 65438, Xiao Yaqing, Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology pointed out at the National Conference on Industry and Informatization that "low-carbon industrial action and green manufacturing project should be implemented around the peak of carbon dioxide emission and the target node of carbon neutrality. As a high energy-consuming industry, the steel industry must resolutely reduce the output of crude steel and ensure that the output of crude steel declines year-on-year. "
21February 8th, the website of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, "Continue to struggle and forge ahead to start a new journey of high-quality development of the iron and steel industry", further pointed out that it is necessary to "study and formulate the work plan of reducing production, implement the policy of dual control of capacity and output, and ensure that the national crude steel output will decline year-on-year in 20021year."
Where does the intention to produce come from?
Carbon neutrality.
According to the peak of carbon dioxide emissions in China in 2030, we will strive to achieve the overall goal of carbon neutrality by 2060, vigorously develop new energy sources, and save energy and reduce emissions in old industries.
As the largest energy consumption and carbon emission department outside the power industry, the steel industry ranks first in the 3 1 manufacturing industry. The carbon dioxide emission of steel industry accounts for about 15% of the whole country.
Improving green manufacturing level and reducing crude steel production capacity are priorities under the carbon neutral commitment.
So why is the steel industry policy of 2 1 likely to exceed expectations?
Historically, the year of negative growth of crude steel output in China is extremely rare. In fact, there was only one year of negative growth from 1990, that is, 20 15. Since 20 16, it has mainly been "capacity reduction" rather than "production reduction".
Even in 2020, under the epidemic situation, the crude steel output in China still increased by 5.2% year-on-year.
Downstream, the crude steel demand of 202 1 will not be too bad.
The downstream of crude steel includes construction, automobile, machinery, household appliances and other industries, of which the consumption of construction industry accounts for more than 55%.
In 20021year, China's nominal GDP growth rate is still in the expansion period, and investment demand is expanding rather than shrinking. For example, the demand of manufacturing industry will increase obviously, monetary policy will not take a sharp turn, and fiscal policy is expected to remain strong.
In such a big environment, even if there are three red lines in real estate, it is hard to imagine that the demand for 202 1 crude steel will decline. It is conservatively estimated that the growth rate of crude steel consumption is around 2-4%.
That is, 202 1, crude steel will show a mismatch pattern of "supply contraction+demand increase".
Judging from the ten-degree crude steel output of China Steel Association, the average daily output of 202 1 1 10,000 tons is 286 1 10,000 tons, with a year-on-year growth rate of 7.6%, which means that in order to achieve the goal of "year-on-year decline", the subsequent output needs to be further compressed compared with last month, and at least it is a desirable assumption to strictly control the output growth.
If the output of crude steel is really realized under the will of ZF, it is hard to imagine that steel mills and even the whole black industrial chain will not make money.
If 202 1 is the first year for the steel industry to achieve low carbon, it will have the following impacts:
On the one hand, under the constraint of the peak carbon dioxide emission target, the supply-side reform will only reduce the production capacity, and the disorderly growth of output is expected to be suppressed and the profit fluctuation will be smoothed;
On the other hand, small and medium-sized enterprises with high energy consumption and low efficiency will be eliminated, and powerful large enterprises will further enhance their competitiveness and concentration through low-carbon innovation (improving production technology, updating production equipment and using low-carbon energy).
Investment opportunities, in the short term, the supply impact will increase the elasticity of product prices and profits; In the long run, it will bring about the improvement of the industry competition pattern.
Ferrosilicon is the first choice for price fluctuation.
Investment opportunities in energy-intensive industries have been staged in coke (de-capacity in Shanxi), Shaanxi Black Cat, Jinneng Technology and other sectors.
The current policy environment of ferrosilicon industry is similar, and the logic of de-capacity and energy consumption control is similar, both of which are small varieties with high flexibility.
From Wulanchabu to Baotou to electricity price adjustment, policies to restrict energy-intensive industries have been introduced one after another. Inner Mongolia, as one of the main producing areas of ferrosilicon, has begun to show its influence. 2 1, the pressure of energy consumption control in Inner Mongolia is also huge, and ferrosilicon will repeat the story of 20 17.
Figure: Ten-year price trend of ferrosilicon resumed.
Ferrosilicon related target: Ordos.
From different production processes, the carbon emission of long process is much higher than that of short process, and the carbon dioxide emission of long process mainly comes from sintering and blast furnace production process, especially the reduction process of blast furnace.
From the product point of view, bars, wires and profiles are all produced in short process and are less affected. However, most of the plates are produced in a long process, and the proportion of limited production is relatively high.
At present, the domestic policy means is to limit the output of crude steel.
For short-process enterprises, the main raw material is scrap steel, and the main energy is electricity. The carbon emission is much lower than that of long-process enterprises, and it is expected to be less affected. However, the limited production of long process will affect the supply of coil more.
Plate-related targets: Valin Iron and Steel, baoshan iron & steel.
Take the postgraduate entrance examination:
The characteristics of GF Securities-crude steel output 202 1 "demand expansion+supply contraction".
Huatai futures-peak value of carbon neutral steel
Guo Jin securities-the best elastic variety of steel industry chain under ferrosilicon ~ carbon neutrality
Changjiang securities-Under the general trend of inflation, where is the excess return of steel? 》
operator
The three major operators finally came out. Ache repeated the viewpoint of 65438+1October 12. The viewpoint remains unchanged and the valuation data will not be updated. Anyway, it's still lying at the bottom:
Every generation of communication network standards switch, operators go through a round of valuation remodeling cycle.
In the past five years, the policy of speeding up and reducing fees has created a golden period for the development of mobile internet, and the performance of operators has not been significantly boosted with the outbreak of data volume. Similar to the economic downturn, banks responded to the call to release water.
At this point, the traffic dividend period of the mobile Internet has passed, and the policy repression has been basically cleaned up. Operators have just spent a lot of money to build 5G, and the probability of letting them donate blood is very low in policy.
From 20 19H2, the ARPU growth rate of the three major operators showed an improvement trend, and the ARPU of China Unicom in 2020h 1 increased positively year-on-year.
The main reason is that the pressure of fee reduction has gradually slowed down since the second half of 20 19. For example, in September of 20 19, the three major operators announced the cancellation of unlimited packages, and the decline in traffic prices was controlled.
In the first three quarters of 2020, the ARPU of China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom were 48.9, 44.4, 465 and 438+0.6 yuan/household/month respectively, which were -0.2, -0.4, +65 and 438+0.2 yuan/household/month respectively compared with 2065 and 438+09.
At the same time, 202 1 is the year of 5G popularization, and CICC predicts that the 5G popularization rate will exceed 30% in 20021year.
At the beginning of the 5G cycle, under the background of stagnant growth of the overall user scale, the growth focus of operators shifted to the cultivation of user stickiness and the cultivation of single-user value. The price of 5G packages is expected to stabilize, and the accelerated penetration of high ARPU users will push the overall ARPU to stop falling and rebound, and boost the revenue side to return to growth.
Under the background of weak growth of traditional services, the three major operators have expanded emerging services such as industrial Internet (including IDC, ICT, big data, Internet of Things, cloud computing, etc.). ), and their revenue and revenue ratio are rising.
Operators rely on their own advantages in capital, land and bandwidth resources to vigorously develop IDC services, with a market share of over 60%.
Relying on the advantages of cloud digital infrastructure, operators will vigorously develop B-side industrial Internet services in the next five years, enjoy the digital dividend of government and enterprises, and give full play to the utilization value of high-quality network assets.
The peak period of investment in each generation of new network technology lasts for 2-3 years on average. The capital expenditure of operators will reach the peak of 5G cycle after moderate growth this year and next, and then enter a long-term asset recovery period.
At present, the valuation levels of the three operators are all below the historical center. The dividend yields of China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom 202 1 are 7.7%/6.9%/4.7% respectively, and the P/B ratio has dropped to the historical average of 1/3, which is contrary to the fundamentals of steady improvement.
Globally:
Four major operators in Europe and America (AT & amp； T, Verizon, Vodafone, Orange) The average PE in 2020-2022 is 13X, 12X, 10X, and the average PB is 1.3X, 1.4X,/kloc-.
The average PE of three operators in Korea (SK, KT and LG U+) in 2020-2022 is 10X, 9X and 8X, and the average PB is 0.7X, 0.6x and 0.6x.. ..
Regardless of PE or PB, the valuation of China operators has great room for improvement.
Related targets: China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom.
Take the postgraduate entrance examination:
CITIC Construction Investment-Communication Industry: Focus on the Three Major Telecom Operators in China.
CICC- Telecom Service Industry: Catalyzed by Multiple Turning Points, Is the Repair of Operator Valuation Far? 》
Baotuan stock
Today, Guizhou Moutai, Wuxi PharmaTech, Sunshine Power, Roborock and other pre-shareholding/core assets plummeted.
There are still many friends in Ache Watch Bar, Snowball and other places who refuse to admit defeat, hold firm beliefs and even want to bargain-hunting.
I can't help but think of a sentence from a big boss, "Many times we think we have lost a lot, and the loss may have just begun."
Atze still recognizes the fundamental quality of these targets, but it should be emphasized that for the vast majority of individual investors, the investment income still comes from the bid-ask spread.
It is also difficult to get positive returns by buying high-quality assets at high prices.
The theoretical basis of core asset valuation comes from the reduction of discount rate in the downward cycle of global interest rates. On the disk performance, the first thing is to continue to buy in the north, and then follow the firm public offering.
When the global epidemic is under control, when the upward trend of interest rates becomes a consensus expectation, and when finding a more cost-effective investment target becomes the same action, why grab the last copper coin?
Don't overestimate your risk tolerance, and don't try to gain benefits outside your ability circle.
Everything is illusory. If you see something different, you will see the Tathagata.
Tell me something interesting. During the Spring Festival, Snowball was asked under Shan Bin's post to the effect that:
But Mr. Bing, you once wrote an article saying that the most regrettable thing was that Maotai 80PE didn't sell in 2007, making the same mistake as Buffett 90PE didn't sell Coca-Cola. So now Maotai is close to 80PE. Are you going to sell it this time?
If you were Shan Bin, what would you say?