Looks like we’ll have to wait until next year. The Chinese stock market in the recent period can be summed up in two words: weird and mysterious. As the decision-making department's evaluation of the bull market operation turned negative, the China Securities Regulatory Commission began to intervene in the market. On the one hand, large-scale expansion, on the other hand, restrictions on funds entering the market, "window guidance" for fund companies and "beheading operations" on fund managers who do not obey are the most important means of this round of administrative intervention. Since the development of cemetery funds has reached a scale of 3 trillion yuan, and its proportion in the market value of circulation has reached as high as 37.5%, once the scale of cemetery funds entering the market is restricted, market funds will immediately show a cessation effect. Especially after "5.30", the retail fever has subsided and the fund fever has become mainstream. A large amount of social funds have entered the stock market mainly through fund companies. In the case of private equity funds being very underdeveloped and extremely limited in scale, the market has been stuck. Cemetery funds have undoubtedly curbed the throat of the bull market, making it difficult for the market to operate according to its own laws, and the full return of the "policy market" is inevitable.

The "policy market" is essentially a reaction against the principles of modern market economy. China's stock market has gone through many hardships over the past long period. One of the most fundamental reasons is the endless interference and control of administrative power in the operation and development of the market. The most important achievement of the share-trading reform is to correct the institutional flaws of China's stock market and open the institutional door for the market-oriented operation of the entire market. If the "policy market" resurfaces after the split-share reform, it will be a major reversal of the marketization process of China's stock market. In this case, not only will the macroeconomic results of the split-share reform be lost, but the market will also be disrupted. Losing its objective and normal market expectations, market operations will inevitably suffer major disruptions. China's stock market is likely to lose its once-in-a-lifetime major opportunity for development leaps and institutional changes, and China's entry into the capital era will inevitably will be greatly delayed.

It is normal for the market to rise and fall, even in a bull market. The core of the problem is not whether the market should adjust, but what factors and in what ways dominate the operation and adjustment of the market. If the management hides its "visible hand" to conduct large-scale secret regulation of the market, and presets the scope and point of regulation in advance, and will never give up until the goal is achieved, it will seriously violate the market's rules. Its own laws will also seriously distort the internal mechanism of the market. As a result, the principles of fairness, justice and openness of the market will be significantly and seriously mocked and challenged, and it will be difficult for the market operation to avoid distortion and deformation. The objective standard for measuring whether the stock market is normal or not can only come from the market itself and not from administrative power. No matter what the circumstances, administrative judgment cannot influence or even replace market judgment. For a Chinese stock market that has just experienced the huge institutional pain of the share-trading reform and whose market development is in the take-off stage, a price-to-earnings ratio of 36 times is neither high nor exaggerated from any perspective.

In view of the fact that the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s “window guidance” and “decapitation actions” for fund companies have become the most unstable and difficult-to-control major factors in market operation, in order to maintain the market’s “three public obligations” principles and use In order for the interests of small and medium investors not to be overly infringed, the China Securities Regulatory Commission must clarify a series of major and urgent issues as soon as possible:

1. Is the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as widely circulated in the market, dealing with Provide "window guidance" for fund operations? Are there clear regulations on the position ratio of fund companies and require fund companies to achieve this ratio within a time limit? What is the reason why the managers of several high-quality fund management companies have recently resigned one after another? Are they falling under the gun of the China Securities Regulatory Commission's "decapitation operation" as widely circulated in the market? What is the purpose of institutional investors in the development of China's stock market? Is it to serve the development of the market or to serve administrative power? If the development of institutional investors is to make them a bargaining chip or means to regulate the market, then is it necessary for such institutional investors to develop? Is it necessary for the majority of investors to provide support for the development of institutional investors?

2. The issuance of new funds has been suspended for several months. What is the reason for this? Is the issuance scale and pace of new funds determined based on stock index trends or market development strategies? When will the issuance of new funds resume, and when will its specific timetable be announced? Is using the issuance of new funds as a bargaining chip to regulate the market a market behavior or an administrative behavior? Is the highest authority for fund management the China Securities Regulatory Commission or the Fund Holders Conference? When will China's stock market fund issuance abolish the approval system and move towards a registration system? Is the China Securities Regulatory Commission's control of such a large administrative approval power in line with the marketization trend of China's stock market?

3. Chairman Shang Fulin has publicly stated many times that the time is ripe for the launch of stock index futures. Since it is mature, why is there no timetable for the launch of stock index futures? Is the China Securities Regulatory Commission's delay in announcing the timetable for launching stock index futures related to the current regulation of the stock market? If the launch of stock index futures itself becomes a bargaining chip for regulating the market, is it still necessary to launch stock index futures? The core condition for the launch of stock index futures is the marketization of stock market operations. With the administrative power of China's stock market so large and powerful, are the conditions ripe for the launch of stock index futures in China's stock market? If stock index futures are launched in the current market environment, how can the China Securities Regulatory Commission ensure that stock index futures can truly have the function of value discovery and truly operate in accordance with market-oriented principles rather than administrative principles?

4. What is the redemption situation of the fund in the recent period? Is it true that large-scale redemptions occurred as market rumors say? If so, what measures will the China Securities Regulatory Commission take to ensure the health and stability of market operations?

The stock market is essentially an expected market. The direction, flow and process of social resources, as well as the reasonable and effective allocation of resources, all depend to a large extent on whether the market can operate in a normal and stable manner. reasonable expectations. In a market that is expected to be chaotic and chaotic, there is neither a reasonable flow of resources nor an effective allocation of resources. In the Chinese stock market, there is a serious information asymmetry between institutional investors and small and medium-sized shareholders. If the China Securities Regulatory Commission adopts a black-box operation method that only greets a few institutional investors, the vast number of small and medium-sized investors will be affected. Being kept in the dark will not only further amplify this information asymmetry, but also cause serious injustice in the entire market. Information disclosure and transparency should not be limited to requirements for listed companies, but should also be reflected in market supervision, especially stock market policies. Since the prerequisite for the effectiveness of the stock market is to clarify market expectations, market supervision without a timetable should end as soon as possible! The above four aspects are not only the most important and critical issues that determine the current market trend, but also the most essential and core issues that determine the market-oriented path and market-oriented mechanism of China's stock market development.

At the most important moment that determines the fate of the market, the China Securities Regulatory Commission should assume its due responsibilities to the market and investors, instead of being solely responsible for administrative power and administrative mechanisms, let alone holding hundreds of millions of investors as hostages. Give administrative mechanisms and administrative power, otherwise, the reform and development of China's stock market may be seriously damaged, and investors in China's stock market may once again become victims of the "policy market". The market will bleed for no reason, and shareholders will shed tears for no reason. The typical feature of the old market, meaningless loss, may reappear in the new market that has undergone the split-share reform.