However, historical experience has repeatedly shown that financial markets often only pay attention to distinguish between "positive" and "negative", "significant" and "slight" when explaining and reacting to events, but do not pay attention to distinguish between "short-term" and "long-term" and "direct and indirect". This paper focuses on the medium and long-term perspective, considers the indirect impact, and discusses the possible international impact of the Greek debt crisis from several important aspects.
(A) the impact on the euro as a regional unified currency
Since the birth of the euro, people have always doubted its sustainability as a regional unified currency. There are many skeptics with names like george soros. Whenever there are differences of opinion, international disputes or street demonstrations in Europe, the voice of doubt will be loud.
This time, after the Greek debt crisis escalated and the differences between the Greek government and the euro zone, as well as between the Federal Republic of Germany and France became public, the euro has begun to waver and the view that it will collapse in the foreseeable future has become more popular.
Some people even imagined the path of the disintegration of the euro: first, Greece announced its withdrawal from the euro zone, and then Spain and Portugal, unable to bear the constraints from the euro zone, followed Greece's footsteps and held a referendum; Then, Germany and France, the two "axis countries" of the euro, chose to take the initiative to "divorce" because of the deepening differences of opinion.
If we carefully consider the essence of the problem, the key lies in: in the face of the Greek debt crisis, can the European Union, the European Central Bank and Greece reach and implement an effective rescue and debt restructuring plan? Or will Greece finally agree to accept the rescue plan led by the European Central Bank with strict fiscal adjustment conditions by the Greek government? If the answer to this question is no, then it is inevitable that the euro zone will fall into an unprecedented crisis of survival.
Legally speaking, the Lisbon Treaty adopted two years ago (also known as the EU Constitutional Treaty or the EU Charter) stipulates that member States have the right to leave the EU or the euro zone, as long as they can notify the EU two years in advance and fulfill certain obligations (see Athanassiou 2009). In the past, when the euro zone was launched, European official documents said that it was an "irreversible" process for countries to join monetary integration, which meant that member countries were not allowed to withdraw. Now, Europe seems to have taken a step back on this issue. But in fact, giving member States more autonomy on the issue of withdrawal is to consolidate the political and democratic foundation of European integration.
In this context, whether Greece will choose to leave the euro zone needs to analyze how the Greek people view the benefits brought by the euro.
Indeed, since the end of 2009, on the one hand, the Greek government has stepped up consultations with the euro zone on the rescue plan and planned fiscal adjustment measures at home, on the other hand, large-scale street demonstrations have broken out in Greece many times to protest against the government's austerity policy. Judging from the demands of the demonstrators, their spearhead could easily turn to the euro zone. The Greek government can tell the domestic people that it is the euro zone that has put forward strict requirements for fiscal austerity.
However, from two aspects, the fierce protest of the Greek people against the Greek government's fiscal austerity plan does not necessarily mean that public support for the euro zone has obviously weakened in Greece. First of all, the participants in the protests are mainly from the civil service sector, and they are the first "victims" of the fiscal austerity plan. Although this department is large in Greece, it is also a small part of all Greeks. Secondly, from the previous opinion polls, the Greek people's support for the euro zone is relatively high among the euro zone countries, and it is also close to other countries with similar economic development levels, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This clearly reflects a tendency, that is, within the euro zone, the lower the level of economic development, the more inclined its people are to think that joining the euro zone can gain more benefits. As mentioned above, if it were not for the enthusiasm of the Greek government and people, Greece would not have become the twelfth member of the euro zone in 200 1.
Economically, 46% of Greece's export market is in the EU, which is higher than many other comparable European countries. If we leave the euro zone, the link between the Greek economy and Europe will be greatly affected, and the prospects of the Greek economy will be even bleaker.
Greek political parties have reached a lot of consensus on the euro and its integration. They seldom play the "anti-euro card". In this respect, Greece, like some other southern European countries, has important differences with Britain, Sweden and Denmark.
Therefore, Greece is likely to voluntarily choose to accept the fiscal adjustment plan proposed by the euro zone and continue to be a member of the euro zone; In this process, there may be some local turmoil and setbacks, but the final result is that Greece will not be used as a precedent for leaving the euro zone.
In the next few years, Greece is bound to undergo painful adjustment, and the economic growth rate will hardly improve in the coming year. However, as long as the euro zone's rescue and adjustment plan is accepted, the euro zone's support for Greece is likely to further increase on the existing basis.
Objectively speaking, the Greek debt crisis and its accompanying tense relationship with the euro zone will have other profound effects on the euro zone. The most noteworthy direction is that if the adjustment measures for the Greek debt crisis are successfully promoted and achieve ideal results, the coordination of fiscal policies within the euro zone will be further improved in the future. In a sense, the Greek debt crisis is the result of the existence of unified monetary policy and the lack of coordinated fiscal policy in a currency area. In view of this, the euro zone will develop towards closer fiscal policy coordination in the future. In other words, the Greek debt crisis may also promote the deepening of fiscal policy coordination and cooperation in the euro zone.
In addition, the Greek debt crisis may also slow down the pace of the expansion of the euro zone. At present, there are many countries on the "waiting list" of the euro zone, not only the western and northern European countries mentioned above, but also the eastern European countries and even the former Soviet republics. Obviously, after the current Greek debt crisis, the euro zone will learn a lesson, treat the applicant countries more cautiously, and moderately improve the access conditions for new members.
(B) the impact on the European economy and the trend of the euro exchange rate
Greece has a population of just over10 million and a GDP of about 300 billion euros. Whether in the euro zone 16 countries or in the 27 EU countries, the proportion of Greece is very small. The impact of the Greek debt crisis on Greece's own economy is definitely very negative. After accepting the euro zone rescue and adjustment plan, the Greek government will have to implement a series of austerity measures, including reducing the salary and welfare level of civil servants and cutting some public expenditures. In the short term, domestic demand in Greece will shrink. In the medium term, if the bailout funds from the euro zone can meet the debt repayment requirements and can be used for non-debt purposes, the Greek economy will also be stimulated to a certain extent, which will be much better than the situation without any foreign aid.
For the European economy, mainly the euro zone economy, the impact of the Greek debt crisis is more complicated. During the outbreak of the Greek crisis, the economies of Europe and the euro zone were in the process of weak recovery. From figure 3,
As mentioned above, the creditors of Greek debt are mainly European regional banking institutions. If the Greek government declares default, these banking institutions will face tens of billions of euros of bad debts. Obviously, until the Greek government debt crisis is completely alleviated, European banks have to adopt a conservative strategy. In the near future, the credit growth in the euro zone and the whole European region will obviously slow down.
Figure 4: GDP growth rate of industrialized economic zones (unit:%)
Data Source and Description: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 20 10.
The outbreak of the Greek debt crisis and the faltering rescue process have brought some new uncertainties to Europe and the euro zone, which will obviously adversely affect the confidence of local consumers and investors, thus affecting the internal demand in Europe.
However, if the market turmoil caused by the Greek debt crisis begins to stabilize and other economies in the euro zone (such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain) also "turn the corner" with the support of the newly launched stability fund in the euro zone, then the financial market and the real economy in the euro zone may start a new recovery process.
But this new recovery may also be slow and relatively unimportant. This is mainly because in the context of rising unemployment, policy debates at all levels will consume a lot of energy of European policymakers. In addition, Europe has a "conservative" reputation, and it is impossible to have drastic reforms or stimulus policies like the Obama administration. In this way, in the next year or two, the European economy will continue to grow at a low speed. This has little to do with the Greek debt crisis.
The international impact of the Greek debt crisis has spread beyond Europe. American officials expressed "serious concern" about the adverse effects of the Greek crisis. The Asian region will also feel the impact of the Greek debt crisis and its subsequent shock waves.
Figure 4 shows the IMF's growth forecast for the three major economies without considering the impact of the Greek debt crisis. The most likely prospect is that in 20 10, the economic growth rate in Europe will be at least 0.5 percentage points lower than the forecast, and that in the United States will be 0.2 percentage points lower.
Figure 5: Euro-dollar exchange rate, monthly average,19991-2010 April.
Perhaps the impact on the euro exchange rate is the most important international impact of the Greek debt crisis. Since the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis, the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar has changed greatly, and the depreciation trend of the euro is very obvious. There are many factors involved in the Greek debt crisis, and what many newspapers now call the "European sovereign debt crisis" generally refers to the soaring government debt faced by many economies in the euro zone and the urgent need for external assistance.
As mentioned above, the euro zone is now facing major challenges, but it is unlikely that the euro zone will fall apart. Financial markets have assessed the risks highlighted by the Greek debt crisis and reflected them in the trend of the euro exchange rate. In the future, the euro exchange rate may continue to fall.
From the past experience, the exchange rate changes between the euro and the US dollar show a certain periodicity (see Figure 5). The euro and the dollar are now two major international currencies in the world. The demand for these two currencies comes not only from international trade and international direct investment, but also from financial investment and savings demand. In other words, the factors that affect the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar are not only the relative economic growth prospects of the two major economies in Europe and America and their related real economic factors, but also the factors related to financial investment.
The characteristics and functions of financial investment demand are as follows: adjusting investment portfolio as expected; Once the adjustment is started, the adjustment itself will have an impact on the trend of exchange rate (or asset price). It is very likely that such an adjustment is being made now. Many international investment institutions are not optimistic about the euro and begin to reduce their holdings of euro assets; In this way, the euro exchange rate fell further; When the euro falls further, more international investment institutions are not optimistic about the euro, or the original institutions are further pessimistic about the euro, leading to a new round of euro asset adjustment (reduction), which in turn leads to a new round of euro depreciation.
Although this process cannot go on indefinitely, it is likely to happen on a large scale within a period of time, such as one to two years. Therefore, the euro is likely to continue to fall in the future.
The extent to which the exchange rate between the euro and the dollar will change is also a common concern. After the birth of the euro, the lowest exchange rate between the euro and the dollar was 1 0.88 USD, and the current level (1 0/0.28 USD) is still much higher than this. Different from the previous situation, after the international financial crisis, there are many uncertainties in the international community's view of the US dollar, especially the judgment of the long-term prospect of the US dollar as an international currency. Considering the new situation of the dollar itself, the decline of the exchange rate of the euro against the dollar is likely to reach a historical record.
Because of the importance of the euro in the international economy, the exchange rate change between the euro and the dollar will bring many influences. One of the possible important impacts is that it will have a certain adverse impact on the economic recovery of the United States. The slogan put forward by the Obama administration to revitalize the domestic economy through export growth contains a signal that the US dollar is relatively cheap in the international market and the price competitiveness of American products is relatively high in the international market. However, this desire is obviously in conflict with the trend of the euro falling and the dollar rising. Economic and trade frictions between the United States and Europe may increase.
At the end of 20 10 at the beginning of 2009, when some economies reported that the speed of economic recovery was much higher than market expectations, many people began to worry that the world economy would face a new risk, that is, the recovery process was too fast in the post-crisis period. If the Greek debt crisis has brought some negative and restraining effects to the European economy and even the international economy, it may have played an objective and positive role in eliminating or weakening the risk of excessive recovery that the world economy may have faced.
(C) the impact on China's economy
There are many channels through which Greek debt may have a significant impact on China's economy. First of all, it directly affects China's foreign trade through bilateral trade; Secondly, it has an impact on China's economy by affecting the European economy; Thirdly, it influences China's foreign economic and financial relations by influencing the exchange rate between the euro and the US dollar.
The influence of the first aspect is actually not that important. The Greek economy has slowed down due to the debt crisis and its adjustment plan, and its foreign trade will certainly be affected. However, the specific transmission of this effect to the bilateral trade with China may be very small.
Secondly, Greek debt will slow down the European economic recovery and have a negative impact on EU-China trade. The impact may be great, but it won't be that great. In the past few years, the European economy has been growing at a relatively low speed, but the bilateral trade in goods between Europe and China has maintained a rapid growth. According to China's official statistics, since 2004, the EU has become China's largest trading partner in goods, and since then, the trade volume between the two sides has been growing faster than other trading partners of China. During this period, the exchange rate of RMB against the euro rose and fell. Exchange rate changes have little effect on the growth of China-EU trade in goods.
Since the beginning of 20 10, the growth rate of China's goods export has returned to double-digit level, showing a rapid upward trend. According to market participants, this is not entirely due to the conventional economic growth abroad, but mainly due to the behavior of foreign manufacturers (importers and domestic sellers) to increase their inventory. From the end of 2008 to most of 2009, many foreign manufacturers greatly reduced their inventories. At the beginning of economic recovery, they began to increase their inventory, reflecting the fluctuation of intermediate demand. In other words, excluding the serious fluctuation of intermediate demand, the demand for China products in foreign markets is relatively stable. If we agree with the previous analysis, that is, the adverse impact of the Greek debt crisis on regional economic growth in Europe will not be particularly great, then the adverse impact of China on regional trade in Europe will not be too great.
Figure 6: Monthly average exchange rate of RMB against Euro and USD from 65438+ in 10 in 2002 to 2065438+ in April 2000.
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange website.
The third aspect, that is, the possible impact of changes in the exchange rate of the euro, is complicated in many cases. If the RMB exchange rate against the US dollar remains basically unchanged, then the depreciation of the euro against the US dollar also means the depreciation of the euro against the RMB. This will more or less affect China's commodity exports to the euro zone economies and their growth. As mentioned above, the experience of the past few years shows that the bilateral trade between China and Europe or the euro zone has certain exchange rate flexibility, that is, while the exchange rate changes, the goods between China and Europe or the euro zone continue to show a rapid growth momentum, while China continues to maintain a trade surplus pattern. Of course, the sharp appreciation of the euro against the US dollar and the subsequent sharp appreciation of the RMB against the euro will bring great financial pressure to some China's export trade enterprises to Europe.
On the other hand, however, we should also see that the appreciation of RMB has a certain effect on restraining "imported inflation" when domestic inflation tends to climb, thus helping domestic monetary authorities to control the inflation trend.
The impact of exchange rate changes of major international currencies on China's economy now involves an important aspect, namely the value of China's huge foreign exchange reserves. Many commentators have noticed that the total value of foreign exchange reserve assets is affected by the exchange rate between these currencies and its changes. Usually, in a certain period of time, if more foreign exchange assets are allocated to currencies with rising exchange rates, the total value of foreign exchange reserves will automatically increase. Or vice versa, Dallas goes to the auditorium. Therefore, if the foreign exchange reserve management authorities maintain the same monetary structure, the total value of foreign exchange reserves will inevitably be affected during the exchange rate changes.
However, just because the euro has a tendency to depreciate, we cannot simply think that the currency structure of China's foreign exchange reserves should be adjusted accordingly, that is, reducing the proportion of euro assets and increasing the proportion of non-euro assets. If this view is really used in the management of foreign exchange reserves, the result is not good. The reason is that the currency adjustment of China's foreign exchange reserves, due to its huge scale, will inevitably have an important impact on the international currency market. In other words, if we decide to sell the euro and buy non-euro assets, the exchange rate of the euro will fall further, and the value of unsold euro assets in our foreign exchange reserves will fall even faster.
Therefore, from a relatively long-term perspective, the monetary adjustment of foreign exchange reserves cannot easily "follow the market". On the contrary, it is necessary to consider a variety of factors other than short-term exchange rate changes from a strategic perspective.
Third, the lessons and challenges of the Greek debt crisis.
The Greek debt crisis is not over yet, and it is too early to talk about its lessons. However, judging from the emerging situation, people can still sum up some lessons that deserve great attention, and see some major challenges brought by the repeated financial crises in recent years.
(1) Financial crises can happen everywhere, and no economy in the world can have a financial crisis exemption certificate.
Broadly speaking, the financial crisis is a manifestation of the accumulation and outbreak of risks in the financial sector (including the government financial sector) in the operation of modern economies. With the development of market economy, various risks in the real economy tend to shift and accumulate in the financial field. When a country's financial sector itself can no longer bear too many risks and is released in the form of violence, the financial crisis breaks out. The Greek debt crisis is only the latest example of this problem.
Moreover, it is often the economies with high economic growth in the past that may face more financial risks and the possibility of a financial crisis. In the 1990s, the economies in East Asia that were hit hardest by the financial crisis were the fastest growing before, such as Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. South Korea's rapid economic growth since the 1980s was once known as the "miracle of the Hanjiang River" and praised by people all over the world.
The two main sources of the international financial crisis in 2008, the United States and the United Kingdom, have been the best performers among industrialized countries since the end of the 1990s. These two economies were once considered by many people as the most developed financial markets in the world, and as a result, a super-large-scale financial crisis broke out.
In addition to Greece, the economies involved in the European sovereign debt crisis also include Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In the past period of time, they have also been praised by many people as the "stars" of European economic growth to varying degrees, and have achieved remarkable economic growth performance. Together with Iceland, a small Nordic country that went bankrupt in 2008, it can be said that Europe's "star economies" have all suffered financial crisis.
In 2009, the Dubai financial crisis also occurred in the Middle East. Dubai is the "star economy" in that region, a pearl in the desert. Rapid economic growth has attracted a lot of foreign investment, but the growth rate of capital inflow has exceeded the level that the return on local capital can support. The risk of default has risen sharply and debt restructuring is inevitable.
The specific reasons for the financial crisis vary from country to country, but they all have a huge impact on the market and normal economic activities. Fundamentally speaking, the financial crisis is the inevitable result of problems accumulated in the process of rapid economic growth. Any country that has experienced long-term rapid economic growth should shift its policy focus to preventing financial risks, structural adjustment and solving accumulated problems.
Moreover, those problems that once seemed less important in the rapid economic process, such as tax efficiency and financial information disclosure in the Greek economy, will become extremely difficult problems once the overall risks break out.
(2) Mature economies are also facing serious sovereign debt risks, and the international community must raise awareness of this issue.
For a long time in the past, the international community tended to think that the source of the financial crisis was mainly distributed in emerging market economies, and the sovereign debt risk was mainly those developing economies that borrowed heavily from abroad. These views all have reasonable elements. Emerging market economies are indeed facing huge financial risks. In order to cope with the shortage of domestic savings, many developing countries borrow foreign debts from various channels, thus forming a high foreign debt burden and facing serious sovereign debt risks.
However, if these correct views are improperly extended and expanded, so that mature economies will not face low financial risks or sovereign debt crisis, consciously or unconsciously, it would be a big mistake. Greece, some other economies in the euro zone, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan are all facing major sovereign debt risks recently, which are more important than many developing economies or emerging market economies.
In the past, the International Monetary Fund only paid attention to publishing the external debt data of developing countries, which somewhat reflected the influence of the above popular views. The Global Financial Stability Report released by this institution in April 20 10 released the long time series of the ratio of government debt to GDP of seven industrialized countries for the first time. It can be seen that this ratio reached as high as 1 15% in 1950, reflecting the special situation in the period of economic recovery in the early post-war period and the Second World War. In the following years, this proportion gradually fell below 35% in the early 1970s. Then it turned to rise, and the rising speed accelerated after entering the 1990 s; After the international financial crisis broke out in 2008, it further increased to 105%, and it is expected to reach 1 12% in 20 10, which is close to the level of 1950. Obviously, in recent years, it is these leading economies in the world economy that are facing increasingly prominent sovereign debt risks. In a sense, the Greek debt crisis may be just a prelude to the sovereign debt crisis of a larger mature economy.
From the historical evolution trend, when the financial sector was relatively underdeveloped in the past, the enterprise sector would go bankrupt when it encountered the economic cycle, and the adjustment of social and economic structure mainly occurred in the enterprise sector. However, after the financial sector grew up, especially under the background of weakening the risk control function of financial institutions, the risks of enterprise sector began to transfer and gather to the financial sector through various channels and forms, and the financial sector became the distribution center of various social and economic risks. If the private enterprise sector and the financial sector accumulate risks and a crisis breaks out, and the government comes forward to rescue them, then, in a certain sense, risks from the private sector will shift and accumulate to the public sector. From this perspective, sovereign debt risk is the final concentration of various risks that already exist in a country's social economy. Of course, in some countries with relatively low level of development, sovereign debt risks will also occur under the background of relatively underdeveloped private sector or financial sector.
In recent years, the government debt of mature economies has increased sharply, mostly under the banner of "Keynesianism" to cope with shrinking demand and economic recession. However, there are many misunderstandings about Keynes's thought. Increasing public expenditure to cope with short-term demand contraction is based on the short-term nature of demand fluctuation. If the growth of public expenditure is not aimed at short-term demand fluctuation, then the government's fiscal deficit and debt accumulation will become structural rather than cyclical problems. In this way, the risk of sovereign debt will increase day by day and eventually evolve into a financial crisis.
The outbreak of the Greek debt crisis should prompt the international community to re-recognize and re-evaluate the sovereign debt risk of mature economies, so as to prepare for the next greater financial risk.
(3) The operation of regional currency areas lacking unified fiscal discipline has endogenous risks, and the aid system may be accompanied by significant moral hazard.
As mentioned above, before the introduction of Euro 1999, the euro zone set a number of access conditions: the fiscal deficit of member countries or potential member countries should not exceed 3% of GDP, the government debt should not exceed 60% of GDP, and the inflation rate and interest rate in the past three years are close to the average level of member countries. If these conditions are observed, the euro zone as a whole can achieve consistent monetary policy and close fiscal policy. Moreover, if the last requirement is met, that is, "the inflation rate and interest rate in the past three years are close to the average level of member countries", it also shows that the economic cycles faced by member countries are at least close, and there will be much less friction in macroeconomic policies among member countries.
But in fact, since Greece was admitted as a new member of the euro zone, the original access conditions have been relaxed to some extent. In this way, the euro zone is equivalent to inhaling new and more risks for itself.
As mentioned earlier, since 2005, under the pressure of some member countries, the euro zone has relaxed the control standards for fiscal deficits and government debts of existing member countries. Because of this, Greece and other euro zone members have been able to significantly break through the fiscal deficit and government debt ceiling in the past few years. This breakthrough reached the highest level in history after the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008.
One of the practices of the European Central Bank is that commercial banks can use their national debt as reserves and transfer part of it to the European Central Bank. In this way, Greek commercial banks and non-Greek commercial banks in the euro zone can hold Greek government bonds as reserves. Since the European Central Bank is not allowed to discriminate against the national debt of any member country, in fact, Greek national debt is regarded as having the same risk as the Federal German national debt. In other words, the issuance of Greek government bonds has improved. Of course, the Greek government will be tempted to issue more bonds and increase its fiscal expenditure as never before. Banks, other financial institutions and investment institutions in the euro zone also have the incentive to subscribe for the national debt of Greece and other countries.
This practice of the European Central Bank obviously brings potential risks to itself. However, under the existing institutional arrangements, it seems difficult for the ECB not to do so. It can be said that the fiscal and monetary separation system is not only a risk control mechanism within the euro zone, but also a source of risk.
20 10 in may, the European union decided to set up a "stabilization fund" of up to 750 billion euros, hoping to support those euro-zone member countries suffering from sovereign debt crisis, which can theoretically play a positive role in the smooth transition of the euro-zone financial market. However, if the sovereign debt crisis of the euro zone member countries is solved by the way that the member countries get almost free funds, then the euro zone is bound to face longer-term internal risks or moral hazards. "Free subsidy" is equivalent to encouraging member countries to carry out irresponsible or irresponsible financial expansion.
Therefore, the Greek debt crisis essentially poses a serious challenge to the effectiveness of risk prevention in the euro system. The direction of future reform in the euro zone is also clear because of the Greek debt crisis.
Recently, there is also an international view that the unified currency has deepened the Greek crisis. This view was expressed by Krugman and others (see Krugman 20 10 and Cowen 20 10). They believe that if Greece, like Thailand more than a decade ago, has an independent currency and devalues it, it can stimulate economic recovery and finally solve the problem of foreign debt repayment. Moreover, they also believe that the government debt /GDP ratio of the United States is also very high. One of the important reasons why we don't have to worry about the debt crisis like Greece and other euro zone members is that it may devalue our currency.
This view cannot be said to be completely unreasonable. However, people should also think about the collateral effect of currency devaluation during the East Asian financial crisis, that is, Thailand's sharp devaluation caused financial market turmoil and currency devaluation in other countries later, such as Indonesia and South Korea a few months later. Imagine that Greece is outside the euro zone, and the drachma (the original currency of Greece) depreciated sharply after the debt crisis. Then, this situation will almost immediately produce a wide and serious shock wave effect in Europe: needless to say, Portugal, Spain and other economies are unbearable, and it is likely that even Italy and others will not be able to support it. European economic and financial markets will undoubtedly fall into chaos. There were many similar experiences in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.
In other words, if there is no euro currency area in Europe, the same Greek debt crisis will cause greater impact and destruction. In this sense, the euro zone system has played a great buffer role.