CSI's point of view: strengthen intermediary responsibility and promote the reform of issuance. What can you learn from Facebook when you fail to reach the A-share issue? Hot Mine Trust Shanghai Stock Exchange 1, Guan Jinsheng threw out more than 7 million contracts before the closing of the last trading day to suppress the contract price. However, after the market closes, all open contracts have to be delivered in kind, and he can't deliver so many national debts at all. Why are you doing this?

Event speculation: Guan Jinsheng threw out a large number of empty orders before the market closed for two purposes: (1) to facilitate the liquidation of the agreement; (2) suppress the futures price of treasury bonds and lower the settlement price. The so-called settlement by agreement, generally speaking, is that when both parties violate the rules, the regulatory authorities force both parties to carry out liquidation through administrative means. The principle of settlement by agreement is generally "the loser pays less and the winner earns less". Before the 327 incident, there had been many liquidation agreements in the treasury bond futures market, and both sides violated the rules in the 327 treasury bond incident. Of course, Guan Jinsheng refused to give up so easily. As a result, he took a gamble and sold an empty bill, so as to have a greater impact, make the regulators and the society pay attention to the incident, and may find out the fact that both parties violated the rules, thus forcing the regulators to intervene again and promote the liquidation of the agreement. Because the price when the agreement is concluded is generally based on the settlement price on the closing date. Therefore, if the two purposes of throwing out a large number of orders are achieved, Guan Jinsheng may not only reduce his own losses, but also drag the bulls into the water to relieve his hatred.

Financial background At that time, the management of futures market was very chaotic, and treasury bonds futures were very popular. The game of subsidy rate is 1994. China is facing double-digit inflation pressure, and the bank savings rate is above 10%. Naturally, few people pay attention to fixed-rate government bonds. At that time, the subsidy rate for maintaining the value announced was 8%, which kept rising every month, and broke through double digits in 65438+February. Stimulated by this, the futures price of "327" government bonds began to rise linearly. From 1994 to10 yuan in June 1994, it rose to 140 yuan in early 1995, with an increase of more than 20%.

At that time, the standard of bond futures margin was set at 2.5%, that is to say, 2.5 million bonds could be traded with a market value of 654.38 billion yuan. An increase of more than 20% means that in just three months, property buyers have made huge profits equivalent to more than ten times the principal! Investment institutions are ecstatic about their daily progress. At that time, there was such an episode: a customer representative of an organization called the company headquarters in the morning and asked for another way to raise funds. When the market was in full swing, he made another100000. But an hour later, the customer called the head office again and told the other party that you don't have to mention your100000 yuan. I can just earn it here! The "327" national debt should be due on June 1995, and its coupon interest is 9.5% plus the value-added subsidy rate, and it will be paid at maturity for every 100 yuan of bonds 132 yuan. Compared with the bank deposit interest and inflation rate at that time, the return of "327" was too low.

Internal rumors began in early February 1995, and the market began to rumor that the Ministry of Finance would raise the value-added subsidy rate again, and the "327" national debt would be paid by 148 yuan. In the face of rumors, there have been sharp differences in the market. Guan Jinsheng, the godfather of the domestic securities industry and then president of IWC, believes that the first of the three major goals of macro-control in three years is to control high inflation, so it is impossible to increase the subsidy rate for value preservation, and there is no need for the Ministry of Finance to pay 654.38 billion yuan more interest for this, which will increase financial difficulties. Guan Jinsheng's point of view represented the point of view of a group of brokers at that time, so they put all their money on shorting.

At this time, China Economic Development Company began to enter the market and firmly do more. At that time, most small and medium-sized retail investors and some institutions in the market also did more. Their view is that inflation will definitely be uncontrollable in the short term, value-added subsidies will definitely rise, and the redemption price of 327 national debt will also rise. By mid-February of that year, "who is the enemy and who is the friend", the market boundary has been clearly drawn: retail investors and small and medium-sized institutions are everywhere, followed by "multi-command"; Many institutions such as Wan Guo and Liao Guofa are short. By February 23rd, every time the "327" contract is increased or decreased by 1 yuan, the profit and loss of the countries will fluctuate by 400 million yuan. An industry insider later commented that in fact, at this time, both long and short sides have no way out, and the difference in policy expectations has become a capital game in the market.

Legal means Legal means are imperfect and lack of laws and regulations. 1994165438+122 October, just after the news of "327" national debt interest rate hike came out, the price of national debt futures in Shanghai Stock Exchange showed 5 yuan amplitude, which did not attract attention, and many irregularities were not dealt with promptly and fairly. In the early trading of the "327" national debt, the expectations of the nations were wrong. When there is an irreparable huge book loss, it will only disrupt the market and make a mess of things. On the second day of the incident, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued the Emergency Notice on Strengthening the Supervision of Treasury Bond Futures Trading, and the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Treasury Bond Futures Trading. At last, China has the first national debt futures trading regulation that binds China. But it's too late.

The margin requirement is unreasonable and the speculative cost is extremely low. Before the "327" incident, the Shanghai Stock Exchange stipulated that the customer margin ratio was 2.5%, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange stipulated that it was 1.5%, and the Wuhan Trading Center stipulated that it was 1%. The setting of margin level is the core of futures risk control. 500 yuan's margin can buy and sell 20,000 yuan of government bonds, which undoubtedly magnifies the potential benefits and risks of the manipulator by 40 times. Such a low margin level is far from the international standard, even worse than that of domestic commodity futures at that time, which undoubtedly makes market speculation more intense and excessive speculation is inevitable.

Lack of standardized management and appropriate early warning and monitoring system. The price limit system is a common system in the international futures industry, but before the incident, the Shanghai Stock Exchange did not take this basic means to control the price fluctuation, and the spread reached the range of 4 yuan, and the exchange did not have an early warning system. At that time, the cash flow of China government bonds was very small, so the open position of a certain variety of government bond futures should keep a reasonable proportion with the cash market flow, and set it in the computer matching system. Judging from the fact that a large number of "327" contracts were sold at the end of February 23, it is obvious that the exchange lacks real-time monitoring of each order, which leads to tens of millions of empty orders being sold through the computer matching system in a few minutes, which disrupts the market order and exploits the loopholes in market management.

Management loopholes Management loopholes, overdraft transactions. China Securities and Futures Exchange takes computer automatic matching as the main trading mode, and controls risks by "marking the market day by day" instead of the clearing system of "marking the market one by one", so overdraft trading cannot be eliminated. The exchange can't control the dynamic price fluctuation of the day with the static margin and the settlement price of the previous day, which makes the crazy behavior of the empty main force illegally throwing out tens of millions of contracts become a reality.

Regulatory responsibility Regulatory responsibility is not clear. China government bond futures trading was initially launched with the approval of local governments. Before the promulgation of the "Measures", China has not yet legally defined the main institutions in charge of treasury bonds futures. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the issuance of national debt and participates in the formulation of premium rate. The People's Bank of China is responsible for the examination and approval and daily management of financial institutions, including securities companies, and formulates and publishes rates. The CSRC is responsible for the supervision of transactions, and the organizers of transactions are mainly directly supervised by local governments. Multi-head supervision leads to inefficient supervision and even a vacuum in supervision measures.