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The influence of specific causes of various world economic crisis time events
The first economic crisis cycle (1958- 1968)

1958- 1960, the crisis happened. 1958, the government's fiscal deficit was about 6 billion, and it reached 100 billion in 1960, accounting for 5.6% of the income of that year. The total deficit in three years reached 20 billion, and the fiscal revenue at that time was only about 60 billion. The high deficit has squeezed the funds for expanding reproduction and increasing employment. After 1960, the government had to mobilize about 20 million urban people to help themselves in rural areas to solve the unemployment problem in cities.

1960- 1962, economic depression. The national annual fiscal revenue further decreased from 57.23 billion to 310.36 billion. According to the government statistics published in the 1960s by 1982, the population growth curve of 1960- 1962 shows a downward trend, and the "non-increased population" is about 20 million people, most of whom can be considered as dying of hunger. People call it a "three-year natural disaster".

1962- 1963, economic recovery. Under the oppression of the all-round crisis, the government reformed the "one big and two big" people's communes, which ruled the rural economy by teams. The government relaxed its overall control over the rural grass-roots units and allowed farmers to engage in "three self-contracting" (this economic reform characterized by liberalization was repeated after 15, but it was renamed as "big contracting"). Therefore, agricultural production has been fully restored, the supply of agricultural products has increased year after year, and agriculture has been growing.

At this time, due to the differences between the central leaders on economic policy and political line struggle, this is becoming more and more obvious; However, the "socialist education movement" can't solve the problem of grass-roots class struggle, so the "Cultural Revolution" is in the brewing stage.

1963- 1966, high tide period. After the initial improvement of the economic situation, the state increased investment in industry and accelerated economic development, but then the fiscal deficit reappeared ... Then, 1968- 1972, millions of urban "educated youths" went to the countryside, and the real reason was the high unemployment rate that cities could not solve.

Then came the Cultural Revolution, a special historical stage. Although the role of non-economic factors at this stage is obviously greater than that of economic factors, it only prolongs the pain of the crisis.

1.04 the second economic crisis cycle (1978- 1986)

1978- 1979, the crisis happened. Since 1974, the national fiscal deficit broke through the10 billion mark, and it has suffered losses year after year. By 1978- 1979, the deficit has further increased to about 20 billion per year, accounting for about 20% of the income, which is 5% higher than when the last crisis broke out. The reasons are both the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the economy and the Great Leap Forward abroad-large-scale borrowing for basic industrial investment; And the direct extra-budgetary expenditure caused by the Sino-Vietnamese border war is about 5 billion.

1980- 198 1 year, the economic depression made the government adopt the policy of "liberalization" again, gradually lifted the control over rural areas, reduced agricultural taxes, raised the prices of agricultural products, and allowed farmers to contract land, operate independently and open up market trade. This is the first step of rural reform. It is also a replica of the "three-self-package" policy adopted last time to alleviate the crisis.

Similar to the last economic crisis, the city adopted the measures of "closing, stopping, merging and transferring" to reduce infrastructure investment, which made millions of infrastructure workers "stop work to refuel" and tens of millions of urban population "unemployed"; The difference is that the Mao Zedong era ended after the "April 5th" incident of 1976, and the post-totalitarian system lacked a paramilitary national mobilization mechanism, which could no longer force urban people to go to the countryside to solve the unemployment problem as in the early 1960s. As a result, the crime rate rose, and a nationwide "two strikes" campaign was launched, resulting in overcrowding in prisons.

1982- 1983, recovery stage. Due to the redistribution of rural land and the opening of the free market of agricultural products nationwide, the grain output has increased by 20% every year, and the total increase from 1982 to 1984 is about 7.5 billion tons. For the first time, farmers in China solved the problem of eating by themselves, and at the same time, the agricultural output value increased to 40% of the total industrial and agricultural output value.

1984- 1986, high stage. The growth rate of industrial output value accelerated, and the fiscal deficit in the same period increased to about 654.38+000 billion yuan per year. Among them, the more important reason is the role of "unit ownership" of state-owned assets formed after 1982 "changing profits into taxes" Due to the low interest rate policy of state monopoly finance and the freedom of government financial investment, compared with the higher price level, the investment of any unit itself means eroding the spread; Due to the "isomorphism of interests" within the unit, 40-50% of the total investment in fixed assets will generally be converted into consumption funds through various channels. Therefore, since 1983, the investment in unproductive construction has also increased substantially. Under the dual inflationary pressure of investment and consumption, the contradiction between supply and demand and the excess money transformed from deficit eventually triggered a full-scale inflation crisis.

1.05 the third economic crisis cycle (1988- 1994)

1988- 1989, the crisis broke out. The nationwide inflation crisis represented by the summer snap-up of 1988 and the social and political crisis of 1989 occurred one after another. If we can analyze the government's decision-making without considering the ideological influence, we can see that from 1986- 1988, when the traditional administrative means are used to forcibly reduce the dual expansion of investment and consumption, the government fails to play its role, and at the same time, the loan interest rate cannot be raised under the administrative compulsion .40086.10000000105 The bank's policy losses of more than 40 billion yuan for many years eventually rushed into finance, becoming a problem. Then, the high deficit oppressed the government to change its decision-making behavior and correspondingly raised the loan interest rate, and the crisis was passed on to enterprises in a vicious circle. This extreme measure of liquidity adjustment is operated without touching the existing capital, which will inevitably lead to extreme consequences because of the false property rights of enterprises, that is, the high interest rate of banks will greatly increase the capital cost of enterprises-the commercial enterprises that use the most liquidity loans are forced to reduce the capital occupation, change the purchase into consignment, and pass the cost burden on the production enterprises-the production enterprises do the same, delaying the payment of raw materials and passing the product cost on to the raw material enterprises to occupy the capital burden-chain liabilities spread rapidly.

Lack of experience and understanding of 1988 inflation and overreaction of economic regulation and administrative control are the subjective reasons for the heavy losses caused by the third economic crisis. Not only the excessive adjustment of monetary policy is the internal cause of chain liabilities, but also the excessive adjustment of market policy is the internal cause of "market weakness" at that time.

Before China entered the 1990s, there was only a "polarized market": there was no market for capital, technology, labor and materials, and there was no market for social consumption such as housing, insurance, medical care, tourism and education. /kloc-0.0 billion people can only enter a "seesaw"-shaped "bipolar" consumer goods market, which is a very high-end and bulky consumer goods and another basic consumer goods. In order to curb the short-term rush to buy high-end goods during inflation, the government has greatly adjusted the deposit interest rate, at the same time, it has also greatly increased the prices of bulk consumer goods represented by color TV sets, and imposed a high-end consumption tax, which greatly reduced the purchasing power of the same currency in the market and artificially closed one pole of the bipolar market almost instantly. One end of the seesaw is empty, while the other end, according to estimates, as early as 1986, most agricultural products have been "restricted by market demand", so the urban consumer goods market began to show a weak state at the beginning of 1989.

1990- 199 1 year, the stage of economic depression. The government adopted a policy of favoring large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, and invested 654.38+050 billion in loans, but at this time, the chain liabilities have reached 200 billion, and the inventory products of state-owned enterprises have accounted for more than 654.38+000 billion in the same period. According to statistics, the loss of state-owned enterprises has reached 74%, so they have to change "all-round tilt" into "point lending".

State-owned enterprises have suffered losses year after year, resulting in a deficit in government finance with state-owned enterprises as the main source. First, at the turn of autumn and winter of 1989, the attempt to collect financial foreign trade rights failed; Then, with the goal of financial relief, the government's reform policies of "dumping burdens" were introduced one after another. One of its effects, that is, after the cancellation of financial subsidies for the purchase and sale of agricultural products in the depression stage, the rural market is also weak in an all-round way: in the past, the state-owned circulation department monopolized more than half of the main agricultural products subsidized by finance. 1990 when the acquisition subsidy was cancelled, the direct response of the state-owned circulation department was to immediately reduce the acquisition and inventory, and at the same time misappropriate the special funds of the bank for high-profit operations. The direct impact of this behavior is that there is no "reservoir regulation" in the basic consumer goods market, which leads to all kinds of bullying, disorderly price fluctuations and social unrest at any time. With the increasing socialization of economic contradictions, the problem of stable relationship such as "vegetable basket" has gradually become the main contradiction that governments at all levels pay special attention to. The indirect effects are as follows: firstly, more than 200 million small farmers can't adapt to the new situation that the market share of the original state-owned big buyers has rapidly dropped below 20%, and the "difficulty in selling agricultural products" has appeared again. Farmers' income has declined for three consecutive years, accounting for more than 60% of the basic consumer goods market and the stable rural consumption, and then the overall market has been weak. Second, the old problem of low agricultural comparative income suddenly emerged under the influence of the "selling difficulty" of agricultural products and the successive decline of farmers' income, forcing farmers to leave their homes and causing a large influx of "migrant workers".

1992 or so, China's economy gradually recovered and then turned higher. There are two kinds of stimulants to stimulate economic recovery:

First, after the failure of the high interest rate policy of 1988- 1989, the government kept lowering interest rates, even lower than the original level, and a large amount of deposits absorbed during the high interest rate period had to be lent out, so the capital environment was relatively relaxed temporarily and the capital market was initially opened. The low interest rate policy makes currency holders turn to stocks, securities markets and other high-risk and high-return investment markets.

Second, since the mid-1980s, the central government has been in deficit for years, and more than half of the county-level finances have suffered long-term losses. In the case that the financial allocation is difficult to meet, the government's interests are still expanding rapidly at an increasing rate of 25-30% per year. Under the pressure of the third crisis, the working capital that the administrative authorities can occupy has been eaten up, and the interests of the government and its subordinate departments extend to the occupied and profitable real estate speculation. The wave of enclosure fever in national development zones, speculation in real estate, stocks and futures, and the division of stock capital suddenly rose like a hurricane. It is true that a group of profiteers who speculate on power and money transactions have struck a fierce palm behind the morbid economy while getting rich!

1993- 1994, the period of economic prosperity. The fixed assets investment of the whole society jumped from 760 billion in 1992 to10.3 trillion in 1993, an increase of 40% over the high proportion of 70% in the previous year. Any redistribution of stock capital will promote economic growth! In the early 1990s, China's economic development, characterized by enclosure movement and bubble economy, was dazzling, but its essence was just another redistribution of periodic laws and national capital.

It is said to be "another redistribution" because in the early 1980s, farmers redistributed the land and main means of production of people's communes, which immediately promoted the rapid economic growth. The difference is that distribution is the socialized possession of farmers by virtue of the natural rights of community members and the equal tradition of agricultural civilization; This distribution is a privileged possession made by the rentier by virtue of the legal right relationship redeemed by government rights or "rent-seeking behavior".

In any case, the two national capital redistributions ten years apart, although incompatible with the mainstream of thought at that time, were not satisfactory, but both formed the minimum foundation of economic development-active economic subjects with clear interests-thus promoting the rapid economic growth, so its progressive significance can be affirmed from a historical perspective.

1994- 1995, the fourth crisis occurred. Different from the previous three stagflation crises, this is an inflation crisis caused by excessive credit expansion. The phenomenon process is as follows: In the last stagflation crisis, the government only partially reduced losses, but did not fundamentally solve the problem of inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, the main source of tax revenue, and the losses of enterprises have been hovering around 50%. By 1992, the natural deficit was close to 50 billion, and the deficit excluding debt in 1993 further rose to about 80 billion. At this time, the financial overdraft for 8 consecutive years has eaten up all the self-owned capital of state-owned banks, making the financial system debt 100%. Although the government announced at the end of 1993 that it would no longer overdraw banks and issue120 billion treasury bonds to make up for its financial losses, the banking sector still had to buy 70% of the total. For banks, this means using debt (social deposits) to buy debt, that is, spending money to buy grain; For the government, this means filling government consumption with public deposits, which is obviously a government credit crisis!

Due to the failure of the interest rate policy in the last crisis, the chain debts of enterprises have not been fundamentally solved. The political tasks of "spending money to buy the situation" and "lending wages" further forced the bank to lend 40% of its funds to be difficult to recover after the deadline. In fact, 60% of the profits generated by loanable funds are used to pay 100% deposit interest! Senior researcher of China People's Bank pointed out: If it were not in the name of the country, the bank would have gone bankrupt!

Since the financial sector can't go bankrupt under such difficult circumstances, there are only two solutions: first, invest in high-profit areas, raise loan interest rates, and make up for past losses with high profits; The second is to turn to the international capital market to absorb its remaining low-interest funds, so as to alleviate the pressure of medium and long-term investment demand and prevent further losses.

Although the current national policy restrictions make it impossible to take the first road openly, it is still repeatedly banned, borrowing money illegally or using self-run companies to participate in financial speculation, keeping the interest rate in the domestic capital market at about half a month, and usury is rampant throughout the country. The second way-large-scale borrowing of foreign debts (external credit expansion) is obviously working. 1994 in the first half of the year, China's total foreign debt surged by nearly half from more than 80 billion yuan in the previous year to120 billion, which is an obvious example. At the same time, because 40% of overdue loans are getting heavier and heavier, banks have to look inward and expand credit. 1994 The sharp increase in deposits in the first half of the year is also an obvious example.

Further analysis shows that the financial system reform needs to change the mechanism and realize "asset-liability ratio management", which is difficult to be established because the whole industry has no self-owned capital and too much debt. Only by dividing the functions, leaving the burden of overdue loans and losses to policy banks and being borne by the state finance, can banks have normal operating profits. However, the financial burden is bound to worsen the financial loss and turn it into new domestic debt, which will still expand long-term credit.

Generally speaking, when credit expands to a critical point, credit collapse is inevitable. The nightmare of the last round of "triangle debt" still exists, and a new round of chain debt has happened again, which is one of the manifestations of credit collapse.

Other features of this economic crisis and the government's countermeasures are similar to those of last time. For example, the dual expansion of investment and consumption during the boom period, and the tightening of monetary policy and price control during the crisis period. Only this compression of infrastructure will relatively affect the employment of tens of millions of migrant workers, and the problem of social crime will inevitably become increasingly prominent, and because of its huge base, it is impossible to prevent it.

1.06 Just as the crisis in the late 1970s led to the first step of rural reform, the crises in the late 1980s and mid-1990s also promoted urban reform. In the rural reform, the disintegration of people's communes led to the development of various independent economic entities in rural areas, which became the basis of commodity economy, and rural society resumed its autonomous form. In this way, the system of unified purchase and marketing with the people's commune system as the organizational guarantee is difficult to operate, and the agricultural input and output markets are gradually opened, forming a truly revolutionary new commodity economic system in rural areas. Similarly, since the mid-1980s, urban reform has increasingly touched on property rights. The diversification and demutualization of urban enterprise property rights weaken the monopoly and planning control of government departments, and the market of industrial input and output is gradually liberalized. Therefore, if there is no new war to turn China's "civilian government" into a "hero government" again, China's market-oriented reform trend will be irreversible.