First of all, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia has greatly reduced the assets of Asians. 1On March 2, 1997, Soros attacked Thailand's foreign exchange market, which triggered a run on 56 banks in Thailand. The Thai baht depreciated by 60% and the stock market plummeted by 70%. The financial turmoil caused by Thailand has spread to northern Asia and even to Russia. Malaysian, Indonesian, Taiwan Province, Japanese, Hongkong and South Korea were hit hard. The assets of people in these countries and regions have shrunk dramatically, and the wealth created by Asian people over the years has depreciated. European and American countries took advantage of the devaluation of Asian currencies and the stock market crash to merge Asian enterprises and buy real estate, and easily acquired hundreds of properties at the cost of 1%.
Second, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia has thrown the social order of Asian countries into chaos. Due to bank failures, the financial industry collapsed and the economy was paralyzed. The economic recession has intensified domestic contradictions. During the Southeast Asian financial crisis, Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries were in social turmoil, distracted and disorderly.
Third, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia made the state power unstable. After the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, people's trust in the government declined due to social unrest and economic depression. Opposition parties and opposition parties have accused the ruling party. As a result, the Thai government was overthrown, Indonesia's Suharto government was overthrown, Japan's Ryutaro Hashimoto stepped down, and Russia changed six prime ministers within one year. Political instability has undermined the favorable environment for economic growth in Asia. Previously, the reason for the rapid economic growth in Asian countries was the stable political and economic environment. Later, the financial crisis destroyed this stability, triggered social fluctuations and almost endangered the national security of all countries.
From 65438 to 0997, Asian countries took many measures to remedy the defects that led to the financial crisis and the damage caused by the crisis. Banks have written off bad debts, reorganized their capital structure and strengthened prudential supervision. Enterprises rearranged their assets and liabilities, and the over-investment before the financial crisis was cleaned up one by one. More prudent fiscal and monetary policies dominate, and foreign exchange reserves are increasing day by day, replacing the situation of relying heavily on overseas short-term capital inflows in the past. However, we cannot regard financial opening as a "scourge" and lock up the country on this basis; On the contrary, no country has ever declined because of openness, but only because of closure, which is proved by human history.
So, why is the overall risk of an open system lower than that of a closed system? Because there is a complete set of market economy system in the open system, it is conducive to promoting the effective allocation of resources among economic entities and making macro and micro entities have stronger anti-risk ability. The successful experience of the four Asian Little Dragons shows that opening to the outside world is the main factor for the success of these countries and regions. The reason of the Asian financial crisis is not the economic opening of Southeast Asia, but the unreasonable domestic capital market and financial product structure of these countries and regions, which provides opportunities for commercial speculation in the international financial crisis. People see: on the one hand, the credit market in many East Asian countries is developing abnormally, and the proportion of domestic credit in GDP in Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia is as high as115%-200%; On the other hand, its capital market is immature or underdeveloped, which leads enterprises to rely too much on the indirect financing of commercial banks, while banks rely too much on the "leading" and guarantee of the government, which leads to excessive expansion of bank credit and excessive bad debts of banks. For example, the non-performing assets of banks in South Korea and Thailand account for 34%-40% of their GDP. At the same time, the immaturity of the banking system in East Asia is also manifested in poor financial supervision and imperfect laws and regulations. The central banks of many ASEAN countries have not increased their loan loss reserves with the increase of non-performing loans. In the Philippines, bank loans increased by 38% in the three years before the outbreak of the financial crisis, while the ratio of loan loss reserve to total loans decreased from 3.5% to 1.5%, with Malaysia having the highest ratio of only 2%. In such a fragile financial system, once there is any trouble, such as a sharp drop in the balance of payments, people's hearts will float, domestic funds will be sent out, foreign capital will be withdrawn quickly, and financial turmoil will follow.
Judging from the development history of market economy in developed countries, it has gone through about 200 years from commodity market, money market, bond market, securities market, futures market to derivative market. For example, the new york Stock Exchange was founded 200 years ago by 24 businessmen who signed an agreement under a buttonwood tree in southern Manhattan to regularly exchange bonds issued by the state government. It took 25 years for the board of directors of new york Stock Exchange to be established, and 1863 is the new york Stock Exchange. Later, the money market, bond market and futures market were developed, and the derivatives market was developed after the war. Futures and derivatives markets were launched when the securities system was not mature and even the relevant operating rules were not determined. All these have led to the inclusion of various markets, mechanisms and institutional tools to varying degrees. It is precisely because of these institutional weaknesses that the "catch-up" economy is inherently inadequate. At the same time, excessive use of short-term overseas funds the day after tomorrow, rather than trading first and then investing; Industry before finance; Tariff first, then non-tariff; First the current account, then the capital account. Excessive, excessive and abusive financial means will inevitably lead to risks. For example, Thailand opened its capital account prematurely when local banks accumulated huge bad debts and the current account was in deficit for years, which opened the door for international short-term hot money, so the vulnerability risk was the greatest.
From this perspective, the financial crisis is not in the opening itself, just as the fundamental measure to prevent the crisis is no longer inside the currency but outside it. Singapore is a small open economy, which is easily influenced by the external economic environment. Therefore, the huge impact of the Asian financial turmoil is likely to have a disastrous impact on its economy. However, when the whole East Asian economy fell into depression, Singapore was relatively unaffected. Although the stock market and real estate market have also been hit, the overall economic development is in good condition. 65438-0998, the economic growth rate is positive, but not high; 1999 rose to 5.4%. So, why can Singapore withstand the financial turmoil that swept across Asia? This is because Singapore has a solid economic foundation, especially a sound banking system and supervision system. The capital status of Singapore banks has reached the international level. Although a large amount of reserves have been withdrawn over the years, its capital adequacy ratio has increased from 65,438+06% in 65,438+096 to 65,438+08.3% in 65,438+098. 198, the bank of Singapore even made a profit of145 million Singapore dollars, although it was higher than 65438+. Because the local assets of banks account for less than 20% of their global assets, there is no possibility of a banking system crisis in Singapore. Most of the bank loans are domestic, and the assets and liabilities of domestic loan enterprises are in good condition, which can resist the negative impact of asset prices and domestic demand brought about by the financial turmoil. Singapore's experience shows that the financial crisis in Southeast Asia is not the result of reform and opening up, but the result of economic environment, economic policies and economic means. As long as the coordination of policies and systems is properly handled in the process of opening up, further economic opening will not lead to financial crisis.
Therefore, just because of the financial crisis in Southeast Asia, we cannot think that we have benefited from the slowdown of financial opening, so it is wrong to slow down further. In the globalized world, capital account is always open, which is very unfavorable to the whole economic development. The main reason why China has not been obviously impacted by the Asian financial crisis is not the slowdown and opening-up of China's financial system, but the relatively reasonable foreign debt structure of China since 1994. China has made progress in macroeconomic management, such as stabilizing the currency and regulating the financial market. Through a series of reforms in the fiscal and taxation system, financial system and foreign exchange system, the ability to resist risks has been enhanced. Therefore, ten years after the Asian financial crisis, we should promote domestic economic development by promoting economic opening, especially in the financial sector.
From the practice of opening up, China's financial opening has also promoted the development of the world economy. By the end of 2004, China's accumulated foreign direct investment was nearly $37 billion. From the early days of China's reform and opening up to the end of 2005, China * * * absorbed 630 billion US dollars of foreign direct investment, and the contribution rate of foreign direct investment to GDP exceeded 40%. The flow of capital has increased employment, expanded tax revenue and, more importantly, promoted the process of marketization and institutionalized reform in China. Therefore, we can't give up eating because of choking, and we can't be afraid of financial globalization. What's more, after the five-year transition period after China's entry into WTO, the financial industry will still have a protection period of about five years. As a developing country, China's financial industry is an infant industry, and it can have a protection period. We should make full use of these five years to speed up the reform of the financial industry, quickly cultivate the financial market, and enhance the ability of China's financial industry to participate in international market competition. Five years later, we can compete with global financial institutions on the same platform.
From this perspective, before fully integrating into economic globalization, it is urgent to learn from the lessons of the Southeast Asian financial crisis, establish and improve the micro-financial competition system, and improve the market-oriented macro-financial regulation and control mechanism. Judging from the current situation of domestic financial system reform, it is hard to say that we are ready, let alone ready for the opening of the capital market. Financial globalization requires commercial banks to change into "process banks". The vertical reporting route and matrix management will bring great impacts and challenges to the banking management system in China. Chinese banks still rely on the protection of national policies to a great extent, the concept of market competition has not changed much, and the advantages of competing with foreign banks have not formed. The present situation of China's banking industry is that the monopoly characteristics are still obvious, the four major state-owned banks have not been commercialized, have not got rid of the heavy historical burden of economic system transformation, and have not yet formed an effective internal and external incentive and restraint mechanism.
With the rapid development of financial globalization, we have less and less time for adjustment and reform. We should have a sense of urgency. Five years after China's entry into WTO, the reform of corporate governance mechanism of state-owned financial institutions has made breakthrough progress. At the same time, the financial sector has been opened to private capital, and before a large number of foreign capital entered, a competitive market pattern between private and state-owned enterprises has been formed, enabling domestic powerful financial institutions to meet the competition five years after China's entry into WTO. At the same time, we should speed up the financial market reform and allow the RMB to appreciate steadily. It should be affirmed that RMB has stable international and domestic conditions. However, the stability of the RMB exchange rate is not inevitable, and it is normal that the RMB exchange rate will still fluctuate within a certain range.
From the perspective of economics, price signals play a fundamental role in resource allocation. If the RMB is forcibly kept at a constant value, it will not reflect the changes in the foreign exchange market or the domestic factor market. It can be said that losing the function of reflecting market signals and capital allocation is equivalent to giving up a powerful macro-control means in an open international society. Therefore, as a price signal, the trend of RMB depends on the balance of payments and domestic economic development. Change is absolute, ups and downs are natural laws and normalcy.
Especially when China's economy moves towards a new institutional platform, it is very important to restore its leverage in macro-control. This is because, after joining the World Trade Organization for five years, the total volume, flow direction and structure of foreign trade and foreign capital will undergo fundamental changes, which will have a far-reaching impact on the foreign exchange supply and demand base of the market. If the flexibility is not enough, it will be unfavorable to regulate the foreign exchange market through RMB. From this point of view, five years after China's entry into WTO, the RMB has stable conditions, but the stability of the RMB exchange rate is not static. We should use RMB to reflect the foreign exchange market and international balance of payments, gradually return to its price signal function, and give play to the leverage of RMB in regulating macro-economy. It must be pointed out that high savings rate and high investment rate are the fundamental reasons for China's rapid economic growth, but economic growth cannot be achieved by infinitely sacrificing current consumption. China has a savings rate of 46% and an investment rate of 40%. The wealth owned by the government is more than the wealth of families, and the income obtained by the government holding assets becomes investment rather than consumption. From an economic point of view, the economic growth rate under this high investment rate is the limit. In order to maintain the growth of GDP, it is necessary to continuously increase the investment rate. However, no country or economy in the world can afford such a high investment rate.
The high savings rate and investment rate reflect the roughness of China's capital allocation system and the inefficiency of monetary policy. Once China's economy is in a downturn, it may generate huge bank bad debts again, which will put great pressure on China's fragile financial system which lacks a strong capital market.
So, how to learn from the lessons of the Southeast Asian financial crisis and solve the problems of excessive savings and excessive investment?
First, the government should change its functions and withdraw from the factor market. The government should improve economic efficiency by providing public goods and promote fairness by redistributing income to vulnerable groups.
Secondly, we should use fiscal and dividend policies to reduce the profits of enterprises and limit their reinvestment in overcapacity areas.
Third, adjust the income distribution pattern. China Academy of Social Sciences' Annual Report on Social Development in China in 2006 surveyed 7 140 households, and concluded that the Gini coefficient of China reached 0.496 in 2006. In contrast, the Gini coefficient of India is 0.33, the United States is 0.4 1, and Brazil is 0.54. If the income of high-income earners is legal income, wealth creation should be encouraged; But the problem is that part of the high income is obtained through unreasonable factors in the distribution system-illegal and unfair competition with the help of power and monopoly. This income gap does not reflect the principle of efficiency, and it also seriously damages social equity. Economically speaking, it will directly lead to the net loss of social welfare, increase transaction costs, reduce social marginal propensity to consume, which is not conducive to expanding domestic demand and affecting social stability. In the long run, social output will move from production possibility frontier to the border, and eventually the whole country will be in an inefficient state.
Finally, it is necessary to solve the problem of excessive uncertainty of expenditures related to health care, education and housing. The rising medical expenses have become a major concern of China people. Medical expenditure has accounted for 1 1.8% of the total household consumption, which is higher than the proportion of transportation or education expenditure. At the same time, China's social security system has just been established, and the sustainability of funds still faces challenges. Lack of confidence in the social security system is one of the reasons why families have high savings and are unwilling to spend. Without confidence, where does consumption come from?
The key to drawing lessons from the Southeast Asian financial crisis is to conform to international norms. International norms are the life of the financial industry, the only way, the general trend and irreversibility. After the shock in July and August, the financial market in Southeast Asia entered September, and the financial situation began to stabilize. In mid-September, the World Bank meeting was held in Hong Kong. Participants reached a relatively consistent view on the financial risks and preventive measures faced by developing countries in the process of globalization. The whole situation seems to be improving. Even Philippine President Ramos, who has always been cautious, expressed his belief that the monetary and financial turmoil in the Philippines will "disappear" soon, and this day will come earlier than people expected.
But in late September, things began to change again. First, international credit rating agencies downgraded the credit ratings of Malaysia and the Philippines. People began to question the economic situation in Southeast Asia, feeling that the situation was not good and the currency was still weak. On September 26th 1997, the exchange rate of the Indonesian rupiah against the US dollar reached an all-time low of 3 125 pairs 1 US dollar. 1September 27, 997 Indonesian rupiah hit a new low. The lowest in early trading fell to 1 USD = 3.20 15 RM, and then stabilized slightly. At the close of the Southeast Asian market, 1 USD can be exchanged for RM 3. 1950. Then, Southeast Asian markets sold their currencies in panic and bought dollars to cover their positions. On September 30th 1997, ringgit, Indonesian rupiah and Philippine peso all fell to new lows, with ringgit falling the most. Before the Asian trading ended, Ringgit fell to an all-time low of 3.25, which was the daily closing price of 3.245. 1 997101month1,the foreign exchange market in southeast Asia experienced a terrible day. The Indonesian rupiah, Philippine peso and Malaysian dollar fell to historic lows. The Singapore dollar, which usually fluctuates greatly, also fell to a 39-month low. At the close, the value of the Thai baht against the US dollar dropped by about 40% compared with July 2, and the ringgit fell sharply in early trading, falling by more than 4% in less than two hours. Later, the ringgit fell to 3.4080, and it was reported at 3.3550 in the afternoon, which was the lowest price against the US dollar since the ringgit floated at 1973. The decline of ringgit once again hit other currencies in the region, falling in succession, and the Indonesian rupiah fell to an all-time low of around 3.445. By June 3rd, 65438 10, that is, three months after the outbreak of the financial crisis in Thailand, the Indonesian rupiah had fallen by 53%, making it the second largest devalued currency in the world currency history, second only to the Turkish lira, which depreciated by 63% that year. On this day, the five currencies with the most serious devaluation in the world were Thai baht, ringgit and Fibonacci, with the declines of 32.69%, 25.438+0% and 5.27% respectively. Among Asian currencies,
The three-month decline is: HK$ 0. 12%, Indian Rupee 0.73%, Korean won 2.7 1%, Taiwan dollar 2.8%, Japanese yen 4.86% and Singapore dollar 6.7 1%.
Since then, a new round of financial hurricane has rolled up in Asia and even around the world.