It provides policy and institutional guarantee.
In the pilot work of rural tax and fee reform in 2003, the author made some research on China's "three rural issues" and made a forward-looking analysis of the policies and measures to solve the "three rural issues". He believes that direct subsidies to farmers, that is, reforming the way of food subsidies, are the most direct and effective policy measures to increase farmers' income. However, as far as direct grain subsidies are concerned, the practices in different parts of the country are different. Some tend to subsidize prices, while others subsidize large grain growers. The author believes that these practices, including the subsidies currently implemented in our region, have great defects. Finally, this paper will evaluate the grain direct subsidy policy in our region. At present, the author speaks highly of the reform of grain subsidies in Anhui, Jilin and other provinces, and accordingly forms the following views: the reform of grain subsidies should be linked with the reform of rural taxes and fees, matched with the reform of grain circulation system, and adapted to the situation of China's entry into WTO. In short, through the reform of grain subsidies, the above three policy objectives should be achieved. Now described as follows:
First, it should be the continuation and deepening of rural tax and fee reform. The rural tax and fee reform is the third major reform in rural areas after the land reform and the household contract responsibility system. The land reform in the early days of liberation solved the problem of "land for cultivated land" and realized the long-cherished wish of farmers in China for thousands of years. In the early days of reform and opening up, the household contract responsibility system solved the problem of "the tiller has the right", and hundreds of millions of farmers regained their autonomy in production and operation, which greatly mobilized and tapped the enthusiasm and creative potential of farmers in production and operation. At present, the rural tax and fee reform should realize the policy goal of "land to the tiller" through "three cancellations, two adjustments and one reform", reduce the burden on farmers and standardize the rural tax and fee system. But this is not enough. If we think that the pilot work of rural tax and fee reform is "fully completed", it is all wet. Although "reducing the burden means increasing the income", this is only the current policy and measures to reform the law, and the greatest significance is only reflected in standardizing the rural tax and fee system. Due to the low price of agricultural products, the low level of agricultural labor productivity, the deterioration of natural environment and farming conditions, the agricultural tax set by the tax and fee reform has increased significantly compared with that before the reform, and it is difficult for farmers to achieve the goal of "benefiting", which is only a policy demand to ensure the normal operation of rural grass-roots governments in the transitional period. It is really necessary to increase farmers' income and reduce their burdens, and then give subsidies, support and other measures. This is the fundamental solution to the difficulties of increasing farmers' income. The reform of rural taxes and fees is all-round, which involves all farmers in rural areas. Therefore, the reform of grain subsidy mode should also be aimed at all farmers. This is a common measure to reduce the burden and increase the income of farmers. Specifically, the reform should focus on farmers' taxable land and taxable regular production, effectively link up with the tax reform in the early stage of the pilot work of rural tax and fee reform, and completely regard it as the continuation and deepening of rural tax and fee reform. Of course, in addition, the reform of rural taxes and fees also includes measures such as the reform of government institutions and the adjustment of education layout to ensure that the burden on farmers will not rebound; By making up for the lack of government services in rural areas in the past, increasing the government's support for rural social undertakings, "letting the financial sunshine shine on the vast rural areas", changing the backward appearance of various rural undertakings and so on. All these reflect the long-term, arduous and complex nature of rural tax and fee reform, but this is not the topic discussed in this paper.
The second is to deepen the reform of the grain circulation system as a supporting policy measure. The narrative of "deepening the reform of the grain circulation system" in the "Document 1" of the Central Committee is: "Since 2004, the state has fully opened the grain purchase and sale market and implemented multi-channel operation. Relevant departments should promptly clean up and revise policies and regulations that are not conducive to the free circulation of grain. Accelerate the reform of state-owned grain buying and selling enterprises, change the operating mechanism of enterprises, improve the spot and futures markets of grain, prohibit regional blockades, do a good job in cooperation between production and marketing areas, optimize the layout of reserves, and strengthen the management and macro-control of grain markets. At present, the main grain producing areas should pay attention to the role of state-owned and state-controlled grain buying and selling enterprises as the main channel, and establish a direct subsidy system for farmers to protect the interests of grain farmers. In 2004, the state allocated some funds from the grain risk fund for direct subsidies to grain farmers in the main producing areas. Other regions should also provide direct subsidies to grain farmers in major grain-producing counties (cities) in this province (autonomous regions and municipalities). Based on the principle of mobilizing farmers' enthusiasm for growing grain, we will formulate implementation measures that are easy to operate and supervise to ensure that subsidy funds are truly implemented in farmers' hands. "
The policy requirements of grain subsidy reform are as follows: First, the government subsidies are changed from grain supply enterprises to direct supply farmers, and from subsidized circulation to subsidized production. The second is to enliven the grain circulation system and reform grain enterprises through supporting reforms. In the past, the state's practice of "guaranteeing the price" by circulating grain to farmers in indirect subsidies did not benefit farmers, but added a heavy financial burden to the government. This is a ... Second, the policy of purchasing farmers' surplus grain at protective prices for many years has made it difficult for state-owned grain buying and selling enterprises to enter the market. "The price is set by the state, the funds are loaned by the bank, the reserves are supplemented by the finance, and the losses are accounted for". This "comfortable" business environment has caused state-owned enterprises to be only responsible for implementing policies, not for enterprise benefits, only for purchasing, not for sales, only for storing grain, not for profit and loss, and focusing on striving for acquisitions, stocks and subsidies. "Grain from a big pot" makes state-owned grain buying and selling enterprises gradually. "Three old people" means old people, old grain and old accounts; "Three more" means more losses, more non-performing assets and more institutional personnel; "Three Old" refers to old ideas, old management mechanisms and old management models. At the same time, grain circulation enterprises have some government functions and become bloated bureaucracies. So far, China's economic system reform has not touched the planned economic aircraft carrier, and its reform can't be delayed any longer!
In view of this, it is appropriate in time, opportunity and operation to implement the grain direct subsidy and the reform of the grain circulation enterprise system as one of the supporting reform measures. The previous direct subsidy reforms in Anhui, Jilin and other provinces were all centered on the reform of subsidy methods. On the premise of no experience to follow, the specific reform contents of "one cancellation, two liberalization, one locking and one adjustment" were put forward, that is, the policy of purchasing surplus grain at protective price was cancelled; Liberalize the grain purchase price and grain sales market; Lock the old stocks and accounts of state-owned grain purchase and sale enterprises; Adjust the grain circulation link subsidies to direct subsidies to farmers. In the concrete implementation, various implementation schemes related to the annual output of agricultural tax and the taxable land area set in the rural tax and fee reform have been adopted, forming such a benign interactive situation: the successful experience of tax and fee reform has laid a solid foundation for the smooth progress of direct subsidy reform, and direct grain subsidy has further ensured the results of tax and fee reform. It can be said that the two complement each other and complement each other. At the same time, the reform of direct grain subsidy outside many areas does not restrict subsidized varieties. It is stipulated that farmers can get subsidies as long as they plant land, whether it is grain or cash crops.
Third, it should also be the beginning of China's subsidies for agricultural products. It has been three years since China joined the WTO, and it is time to start taking domestic support measures for the production and circulation of domestic agricultural products. The WTO agricultural agreement divides domestic support policies into three categories: green box policy, yellow box policy and blue box policy. The green box policy is a supportive policy that has no distortion or little influence on production and trade, and does not limit or exempt the reduction obligation. Emphasis is placed on general services provided by the government, agricultural safety and environmental protection, including agricultural scientific research, pest control, training, technology promotion and consultation, inspection and testing, marketing and promotion, infrastructure and other service measures, structural adjustment subsidies for producer retirement plans and resource deactivation plans, and investment subsidies, environmental protection subsidies and regional assistance for structural adjustment. Yellow box policy is a supporting policy that distorts production and trade and needs to be restricted or reduced. The blue box policy is a special case of the yellow box policy, and it is a domestic support policy that exempts the reduction obligation.
The yellow box policy is mainly based on subsidies and price support, which plays a great supporting role in domestic agricultural production and means improving the competitiveness of agricultural products with foreign countries. Specifically, the yellow box policy subsidizes the prices of agricultural products and gives agricultural products marketing loans; Subsidize production or individuals according to the planting area of products; Subsidize production or individuals according to the number of livestock and poultry; Subsidize farmers to use seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and other inputs. These measures play a more direct role in promoting production and improving product competitiveness than the green box policy. Therefore, it is more important and urgent to study how to make good use of the yellow box support policy.
Obviously, the implementation of direct grain subsidies to farmers is the beginning of China's support for the yellow box policy, but it is far from enough to achieve this. We must also realize that:
(1) At present, the subsidy project is only grain, and the subsidy will be extended to all aspects of agricultural output in the future.
(2) At present, the total amount of subsidies is very small, and there is still a lot of room for subsidies in the future, that is, the so-called first-Mover stock (food risk fund) will be increased later.
(3) reflected in China's agricultural policy, on the one hand, agricultural tax is phased and temporary; On the other hand, the long-term nature of subsidies is the theme of the future.
(d) Subsidies will be limited and reduced, and awareness of the urgency of subsidies should be raised.
In the yellow box policy, WTO requires all members to reduce the level of yellow box support according to a certain proportion of comprehensive support to total agricultural output (or product output value). According to the Agreement on Agriculture, the total amount of comprehensive support for a specific agricultural product (or all agricultural products) cannot exceed 5% of the total output value of the product (or agricultural output value) (65,438+00% for developing countries). China's commitment to WTO is 8.5%, that is, its support for agriculture or a specific agricultural product can only be within 8.5% of the total agricultural output value (or the output value of a certain product) of that year. In addition, according to the agricultural agreement, the total amount of comprehensive support must be based on the average level of 1986- 1988. Starting from 1995, developed countries will gradually reduce it by 20% in six years, and developing countries will gradually reduce it by 13% in 10 years. As China has just joined the WTO, the base period of domestic support in China is 1996- 1998. In the base period of 1996- 1998, there was no direct subsidy in China, and the total amount of indirect subsidies was very small, about 30 billion yuan (grain risk fund), and it did not really make up for farmers and levied agricultural taxes on them. If this situation continues, China's agriculture will be really dangerous, and the worst thing is that the whole industry will go bankrupt. However, according to the average level of China's total agricultural output value 1996- 1998 (about 2040 billion yuan), China's annual subsidy level for agricultural products can reach173.4 billion yuan, that is, at least140 billion yuan per year, and it will gradually decrease with the passage of time. Now many people still think that China is unable to subsidize farmers, which is actually a misunderstanding. There is a total financial problem, more importantly, the distribution problem, not to mention the rapid growth of national fiscal revenue in recent years. People of insight who really realize the necessity of subsidies for agricultural products in China now believe that it is worthwhile for the state to implement subsidies by issuing government bonds every year. This shows that this is really a cognitive problem. In particular, our competent authorities need to know something about this subsidy.
However, there are obviously many defects in the policy of direct grain subsidy in our region. First of all, the General Office of the People's Government of the Autonomous Region forwarded the Notice of the Department of Finance of the Autonomous Region and other departments on the pilot implementation plan of direct subsidy for purchasing grain reserves in some major grain-producing counties (Zheng Gui Ban Fa [2004] No.50, hereinafter referred to as the Notice), which linked direct subsidy to purchasing grain reserves. Obviously, it is a "reform" under the premise of maintaining China's current three-tier reserve system. Secondly, the "Notice" said that "the industrial and commercial departments are responsible for strengthening the management of the grain market", indicating that the "two liberalization" has not been achieved. Third, the Notice stipulates that the variety of grain linked to direct subsidy is "early indica rice planted by farmers themselves in those years (excluding the rations used by farmers themselves)", which is not only limited in variety, but also limited in quantity, and does not have the meaning of "reform". Fourth, the "Notice" also said, "Grain farmers sell grain with the signed grain reserve order purchase contract and enjoy subsidies; Food sold without an order contract cannot enjoy subsidies. " On the one hand, it shows that it does not really want to subsidize farmers, increase farmers' income and benefit farmers; On the other hand, it shows that its policy purpose is to ensure that the national grain depot can collect grain, so the subsidy is only an incentive measure to collect grain, which is secondary. Therefore, I think it has at least the following problems and loopholes:
(A) did not take the reform of the grain circulation enterprise system as an important supporting reform measures, which is the biggest defect. This will miss the opportunity to deepen the reform of the grain circulation system.
(2) It is not a grain subsidy reform, nor is it a direct subsidy to farmers. Under the conditions that the original system, the policy of "protective price" and the subject and means of subsidies remain unchanged, this subsidy is at best a reward for farmers to sell surplus grain.
(3) The policy stipulates that the target of subsidies is the early indica rice produced by farmers in that year, rather than subsidizing all farmers. Even if this policy is successfully implemented, it is very likely to cause polarization between the rich and the poor in rural areas.
(4) Policies and regulations have given grain circulation enterprises great dominance, but have consolidated their bureaucratic status as officials and businessmen.
(5) This kind of direct subsidy misinterprets the spirit of the national policy of "ensuring national food security", thinking that the national grain depot is "safe" with food, but ignores the truth that "the world is full and the warehouse is solid".
(6) This direct subsidy is completely out of touch with the rural tax and fee reform, and has nothing to do with the tax reform.
(7) There are many loopholes in this direct subsidy operation, which is prone to problems and becomes a hotbed of corruption. Departmental interests and even personal interests are likely to reverse the policy orientation. According to the policy, it is easy to see that this is for the country to collect more grain. However, driven by illegitimate interests, it may be subjective to make farmers unable to sell grain under harsh conditions, then accept contracts, engage in business, "complete" acquisition tasks and steal subsidies.
To this end, the author puts forward some suggestions for subsidizing agriculture and farmers in the future:
First, clarify the focus of subsidies, put subsidies on agricultural production inputs and agricultural products trade, reduce agricultural production costs, enhance the competitiveness of agricultural products trade, and let farmers increase their income as soon as possible.
The second is to expand the scope of subsidies as soon as possible, increase the amount of subsidies, and use up the grain risk fund in the stock first in accordance with the requirement of "moving the stock first, then increasing it"; Then, by adjusting the investment structure of finance and national debt, rural areas can get more financial funds and accelerate the improvement of agricultural production and rural living environment.
Third, use the "green box" policy of WTO to protect agricultural resources and environment.
Fourth, we should learn to use technical barriers to protect agriculture.
That's all I see! ! Know this.