There is a dilemma of high agricultural risk and low efficiency of agricultural risk management in China. Agricultural risks are characterized by the complexity of natural risks, market risks, institutional risks, technological risks and asset risks. However, agricultural risk management faces a series of difficulties. There are some problems in agricultural insurance, such as externality, moral hazard and adverse selection, agricultural systemic risk, and unclear boundaries between commercial insurance and policy insurance. Disaster relief is the most commonly used way to deal with agricultural risks in China at present, but it has limitations afterwards. Price protection and agricultural subsidies are gradually used as measures to stabilize agricultural development and reduce agricultural risks, but their basic starting point is not to deal with agricultural risks. The futures market is affected by the efficiency level and the difficulty of agricultural producers' participation, so it is difficult to give full play to its role in transferring risks. As a risk transfer measure, contract farming also shows direct or indirect defects. In order agriculture, farmers' failure to perform contracts or enterprises' rejection, price reduction and loan default cause credit risks, while the investment in special agricultural assets leads to the problem of "knocking on the bamboo pole" (when farmers change their planting methods according to the requirements of order agriculture and engage in some production with large investment and high technical difficulty, they will be forced to rely on order sponsors), which makes agriculture fall into greater risks. In addition, some other agricultural risk management methods have been tried or studied, such as emergency loans, information services, infrastructure construction, research and promotion of new varieties and diversified planting, but the overall efficiency is not high. The reason why China's agricultural risk management is facing difficulties is that under certain conditions, the agricultural risk management model and agricultural risk prevention may be inherently exclusive, and even amplify the impact of certain risks on agriculture, or the agricultural risk management model itself has risks, that is, "the risks of agricultural risk management model". When disaster relief is taken in isolation in the face of natural risks, it is likely that the decision-making behavior of farmers will be changed due to moral hazard and adverse selection, which will lead to the rise of asset risk; Price support measures taken to reduce market risks may change the preference of government policies and bring instability to institutional changes, such as the minimum purchase price may hinder the stable implementation of the reform of agricultural product circulation system; Increasing technical input and popularization in order to reduce technical risks may bring greater uncertainty of agricultural product prices and instability of agricultural product market system. The correlation between agricultural risk types and the isolation between risk management methods are the fundamental reasons leading to the dilemma of agricultural risk management in China, and recognizing this root cause is the premise to solve the dilemma.

According to the theory of modern industrial organization, enterprises, institutions and individuals engaged in agricultural production, processing, circulation, scientific research, popularization and related fields will be combined to form an interlocking industrial chain, which can greatly improve the degree of organization of agricultural industrialization, enhance market competitiveness and protect and enhance China's agricultural industry. In this industrial chain, production and processing (circulation) are the two most critical links, and the close cooperation between farmers and processing (circulation) enterprises determines the degree of organization of the whole agricultural industry. Specifically, under the unified coordination of the government, associations and various agricultural cooperative organizations, farmers and agricultural products processing (circulation) enterprises form an integrated organization through contracts or contracts. Agricultural products processing (circulation) enterprises provide farmers with improved varieties, fertilizers, pesticides and technical services, and farmers produce in strict accordance with the production processes and technical requirements stipulated by agricultural products processing (circulation) enterprises, and supply agricultural products with good quality and quantity. Agricultural products processing (circulation) enterprises trade with farmers in accordance with the agreed price and quantity. The closer this cooperation is, the higher the degree of organization is, and the stronger the market competitiveness is. However, the closeness and continuity of this cooperation depends on whether an effective system and mechanism of benefit sharing and risk sharing is established based on the principles of justice, fairness and reciprocity. However, the extremely fragile risk tolerance of small-scale farmers and the limited anti-risk ability of agricultural products processing (circulation) enterprises in China, coupled with the high-risk characteristics of agricultural industry and the lack of effective risk management tools in China's agricultural industry, make agricultural products producers and processing (circulation) enterprises often default for their own survival and interests when they encounter greater risk shocks. This integrated organization has become quite fragile, and farmers and processing (circulation) enterprises can "enjoy the benefits", but it is difficult. The main risks faced by agricultural industry are natural risks and market risks. In developed countries with market economy, the effective management tool of natural risks is crop insurance, which distributes the risks of natural disasters encountered by producers to many insured people; The effective management tools of market risk are order agriculture (marketing contract) and futures market. Order agriculture transfers the market risks faced by producers to traders and processing enterprises who buy products, and traders and processing enterprises can transfer or disperse these market risks to speculators in the market through the futures market. Many speculators in the futures market are willing to take huge risks and enjoy huge profits. The mature risk management tools and perfect risk management system in developed countries ensure the close and stable cooperative relationship between various production and operation entities in agricultural industry. In China, due to the lack of relevant risk management tools and non-standardization, farmers are often unable to rebuild after natural disasters, and it is difficult to obtain safety requirements without insurance. Faced with market risks, in recent years, some farmers have also tried to transfer the risks to traders or agricultural products processing enterprises through contract farming. However, due to the general lack of management awareness and experience of market risks (including domestic and international markets), they cannot use the futures market as a modern market risk management tool to transfer and disperse risks. There is no industry management organization to design and guide integrated risk management from the perspective of industrial chain. When the market changes to their disadvantage, agricultural products processing enterprises will either suffer huge losses or even go bankrupt after performing the contract, or they can only pass the risks back to the farmers by refusing to accept, suppressing prices and defaulting on payment, thus breaking the relationship between the two sides. Therefore, in the absence of risk management tools and integrated risk management system in agricultural industry, farmers and agricultural products processing (circulation) enterprises will only "take risks at their own risk and enjoy the benefits exclusively", farmers and processing (circulation) enterprises will not be truly integrated organizations, and agricultural risk management will naturally fall into the dilemma of "inaction, inaction".