Analysis on Market Transformation of State-owned Enterprises (I)
As the saying goes, the stock market is a barometer of the economy, and perhaps the high probability is the relationship between the index and the economy. Personally, the stock market seems to be more like a barometer of the enterprise industry. Although there has been a certain adjustment in the market recently, it will not affect my personal enthusiasm for structural long. After 30 years of development, China's economy has reached a certain gross and structural scale. Some industries are surplus, some industries are budding, and some industries are thriving. At the same time, the forms of ownership of enterprises have also begun to diversify. Many industries, many state-owned enterprises, although listed, but the mechanism has not kept up. Their marketization is actually a route to return to the essence of public companies. From the above two aspects, I personally propose that the main theme of the current and continuous market interpretation is likely to be: industrial upgrading and transformation and marketization of state-owned enterprises (industries).
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Since the beginning of this year, the rise of the military industry has been regarded as hype by many people. In fact, they have not yet figured out the background of the era when the military industry, driven by the planned economy development model for a long time, began to try to develop in a market-oriented way (of course, fish in troubled waters will always appear). Marketization is the profound reason for the rise of military stocks. Having said that, I thought of the railways invested by the state in recent years. Another bastion of the planned economy, the iron boss, will inevitably start its marketization process-the only difference is the way and time. Like the military industry, they not only need huge investment, but also need more efficient operation. Marketization can not only partially solve the capital problem, but also improve efficiency.
Industrial upgrading and transformation and marketization of state-owned enterprises are actually the main chords of China's economy at present. I think the market will constantly reflect the background of this era, and everyone in the stock market has no reason to ignore them.
Analysis of Market Transformation of State-owned Enterprises (Ⅱ)
The development of China's product market and factor market is unbalanced.
The perfection of market system is an important part of a country's marketization process. In the process of China's market-oriented reform, the development of the market is still unbalanced, in which the growth of the factor market lags far behind that of the product market (see table 1), and the development of China's factor market also lags far behind that of the product market. Why is the degree of factor marketization in China relatively low? This is because the development of factor market is more difficult than that of product market, and the former needs a stricter institutional environment than the latter, but the main reason is that the property rights and related institutional arrangements of factor market in China are not conducive to the development of factor market.
Judging from the marketization degree of China's financial industry, it was 4.07 in 2000 and 4.29 in 2002 (Fan Gang and Wang Xiaolu, 2004). The main reasons for the low degree of marketization of financial markets are as follows: First, are the banks in China mainly the four major state-owned banks? Unify the world? The financial sector is still a monopolistic market structure and lacks competition. Harvard economist Shleifer and his collaborators used 92 countries in 1970? The data study of 65438-0995 shows that the deeper the nationalization of a country's banks, the slower the financial and economic development of the country; At the same time, this negative correlation is more obvious in developing countries. In another study, Levin, an economist at the World Bank, and his collaborators further found that countries with deep state-owned banks tend to have higher deposit-loan spreads, while private financial institutions and securities markets are relatively weak. They concluded that the existence of state-owned banks weakened the competitiveness of the financial system. An uncompetitive financial system will naturally limit the financing needs of the public and small and medium-sized enterprises (Song Min, 2002). According to the analysis, the degree of competition in China's financial industry in 2002 was only 5. 12 (Fan Gang and Wang Xiaolu, 2004). Second, China's banks have not liberalized private capital, and there are still many restrictions on private capital entering the capital market. Third, excessive supervision of financial and capital markets has led to a large number of rent-seeking behaviors. According to the research of Hong Kong scholars Qiao Liu and He, they estimated that the shell value of listed companies in China reached 800 billion yuan (Qiao Liu, 2002). In 2002, the degree of marketization of credit fund allocation in China was only 3. 18 (Fan Gang and Wang Xiaolu, 2004).
The low degree of marketization of China's land market is mainly manifested in the following aspects: First, China's land is mainly an element owned and controlled by the state, and the market adjustment ratio of land transaction and transfer is very low. For example, an analysis by the Ministry of Land and Resources shows that due to the imperfect mechanism of state-owned land assets, low market allocation ratio, a large number of land illegally allocated to the market, and land prices are arbitrarily reduced or exempted, China's state-owned land income loses nearly 654.38+000 billion yuan every year. At present, the total amount of state-owned land assets in China is about 25 trillion yuan, which is about three times that of other state-owned assets. Second, the market of a large number of rural land is far from being established, which greatly restricts the transformation of China's dual economic structure. China's household contract responsibility system has entered as a system innovation? Institutional platform? It solves the problem of food and clothing for farmers in China, but it can't solve the problem of getting rich for farmers in China. If we want to fundamentally solve China? The problem of agriculture, rural areas and farmers must be to reform the land property right system and land policy in rural areas of China. At present, China implements the household contract responsibility system. As a result, everyone is hungry, but it is difficult to get rich. Farmers want to go to town, but? Give up? There is no contracted land at home; Household contract responsibility system? Curing? The existing rural pattern is not conducive to the development of rural economies of scale, to the innovation of China's agricultural system (such as family farms), and to the promotion of urbanization in China. Thirdly, the development of urban real estate market is greatly affected by the imperfect land property right system and other reasons.
Analysis of Market Transformation of State-owned Enterprises (Ⅲ)
China's labor market has developed greatly in recent years, but the flow of labor is still subject to many restrictions. As can be seen from the situation of labor mobility, the degree of labor marketization in China is still relatively low (see Table 2). According to statistics, the population migrating from one state to another accounts for 15% of the total population in the United States every year, and labor migration is very common. Every family or resident in the United States can weigh the tax burden of this place and how public goods are provided. However, the cumbersome household registration system in China increases the cost of labor mobility. The labor mobility in China is mainly caused by farmers going to work in cities and the distribution of college students. According to the general law of market economy, there is no job restriction in the labor market, but in some industries in China (such as electric power, post and telecommunications, railways, etc. ), migrant workers are prohibited from entering, or there are obstacles to entering; From a regional perspective, in order to solve the re-employment problem of laid-off workers in cities, some areas have forcibly dismissed migrant workers in many industries (some industries that urban workers were unwilling to enter in the past). On the surface, this restriction on industries and regions protects the interests of urban workers, but from a deeper perspective, it is not conducive to the development of these industries and regions. Discrimination, artificial division and restriction of personnel flow in China's labor market are the important reasons for the low marketization of China's labor market.
Judging from the government's control of product market and factor market, with the determination of the goal of market-oriented reform in China and the transformation of seller's market to buyer's market, except for a few products, most products have been liberalized. However, there are still many government controls in the factor market. In the factor market, the government's control is various, some of which are manifested as state monopoly, and some are manifested as restrictions by rules and regulations; Some show the restriction of factor pricing; Have a plenty of local government agents? Land policy? Restrictions and so on.
The development of factor market in China lags far behind that of commodity market. The deep-seated reason is that the property rights and institutional arrangements of the factor market are not conducive to the development of the factor market. First, the ownership structure of China's factor market is still dominated by the state. Theory and practice have proved that at least three systems are fundamental to human progress and civilized society: safeguarding property rights, freely transferring property rights through voluntary contract agreements, and keeping promises (Ke Wugang, Shi, 2000). In fact, these three systems are also the basic systems for developing factor markets. Although great changes have taken place in the ownership structure of China since the reform and opening up, due to historical and institutional reasons, the ownership structure of China's factor market is not clear, and the state still plays an extremely important role in the operation of the factor market. Second, judging from the situation of various factor markets, China's financial sector is still a monopoly market structure, lacking competition, and it is difficult for private capital to enter. This ownership structure is not conducive to the formation of an efficient financial market and to reducing financial risks. The main problem in the land market is the poor transferability and stability of land property rights. Compared with commodity market, the complexity of factor market requires much higher property rights. According to Coase's analysis, clear property rights are the premise of market transactions. Property right is very important for the effective use of investment and resources. For example, the clothing production mode of vertical integration of farms is different from the modern clothing industry. In the former way, farmers raise sheep, spin wool and sew clothes for their families. In the latter way, many different manufacturers invest a lot of deposited capital to buy equipment for producing different textiles and dyes, as well as machines for measuring, cutting and sewing fabrics. Investors who invest in modern textile industry are more sensitive to the enforceability of contracts and the certainty of property rights of purchased assets.
Braudel, a representative of French historical yearbook school, divided the market into upper and lower classes. He believes that the market economy includes many levels of market organizations. The bottom of the market economy is pure, face-to-face real-time transactions, which can be seen everywhere and belong to the basic content of the market economy. However, Braudel found that the above levels still exist in the market transactions of commodity economy. The first feature of the upper level is that the two sides of the transaction do not meet, and the middle becomes a professional and independent department, and the merchants are divided. Olson has a similar classification. He divided the market types into two types. In developing countries, he believes that more spot transactions are completed through the self-realization of traders, such as the sale of goods on the streets of Calcutta, India. Olson called the transactions in this market. Self-realization? Or on-site transactions; In developed countries, typical markets are complex markets such as capital market, money market, insurance market, futures market and foreign exchange market. Olson believes that transactions in such markets belong to? Non-self-fulfilling mutually beneficial transactions? (or social planning market). This kind of transaction is not done on the spot, but through the execution of the contract. He called this market property-intensive or contract-intensive (Olson, 2005: 145).
The construction of lower-level organizations in China's market has reached a certain level, and many aspects have reached the level of developed countries. However, it is still in the primary stage in the upper organization. What is the change from the lower organization to the upper organization? Obstacles across the system? The structure of upper market organization is also one of the ways to develop market economy in China? Hey? . In a sense, the current market-oriented reform in China is changing from the lower level to the upper level. For example, China's futures trading, stock trading, option trading and contract trading can all be regarded as the development of China's upper institutions. The subordinate organization is a direct constraint, and the superior organization is an indirect constraint. The conditions needed for the establishment of upper organizations are much more complicated than those needed for the establishment of lower organizations, and not all countries can have the conditions needed for the cultivation of upper organizations.
The slow development of upper-level organizations in China market is as follows: First, the upper-level organizations in China market are small in scale and slow in growth. At present, China's national debt accounts for 20% of GDP and corporate debt accounts for 5% of GDP, which is far from the mature market economy. The development scale of the upper-level organizations in other markets in China, such as futures market, stock market and insurance market, is not compatible with the growth of GDP and economic aggregate in China. Second, the upper-level organizations in China market seem to be vigorous in form, but lack substantive content, which is out of touch with the development of the lower-level market and lacks impetus to the development of the lower-level organizations in the market. The data shows that the A-share index in Shanghai stock market is either irrelevant or negatively correlated with GDP growth. There is a significant positive correlation between the H-share index of China companies listed in Hongkong and the GDP growth of China. They are all China companies. Why is there such a difference? In the market economy, price is an important basis for manufacturers and consumers to choose, and the price of stocks reflects the value of enterprises; Only when the price signal can accurately reflect the value of goods and the demand of products can resources be effectively allocated. The inaccurate price signal in China's capital market leads to a large number of resources flowing into inefficient A-share companies (Xu Xiaonian, 2005). Third, because the development of the upper institutions in China market is basically led by the government, there is too much government intervention, rent-seeking and corruption are more serious, such as internal transactions, and the interests of small and medium-sized investors are harmed; The lower development credit of higher institutions can not only reduce the market risk, but also aggravate the market risk to a great extent. The formation of upper market organization is the most typical institutional arrangement of modern market economy, which is closely related to a country's basic institutional arrangement, ideological and cultural values, social trust and legal environment. At the same time, the upper-level trading activities are generally confined to the core layer of the upper-level institutions, which is extremely concealed. Therefore, supervision is extremely difficult, even in the western countries where the supervision technology is quite developed, it is difficult to prevent the risks brought by the transactions of the upper institutions. Fourthly, there is no interaction between the lower market organizations and the upper market organizations in China, and there are still many contradictions between the two markets. The uncoordinated development of upper market organizations and lower market organizations in China is one of the important reasons for the widening income distribution gap in China. The function of the upper market organization is that the upper market organization and the lower market organization are complementary, and the scale of the lower market organization determines the scale of the upper market organization. However, the upper market organization is relatively independent, which in turn can affect the scale of the lower market organization. The market economy is an uncertain economy, and the uncertainty in the market economy can be alleviated by the upper market organization, which has the function of stability and redistribution, that is, the function of transferring risks. The subordinate organization is the current transaction, and the superior organization is the forward transaction. The upper organizations in the market have also solved the problems of time and transnational transactions in human social and economic activities, and have forward-looking functions.
Why does the upper market organization develop slowly in the process of marketization in China? The fundamental reason is that the degree of rule of law is still relatively low, which is difficult to support the development of upper-level market organizations in China.
First of all, the upper market organization is based on a society ruled by law. The establishment of upper market organizations and the establishment of a society ruled by law can be said to be two aspects of the same problem. Why does the establishment of upper-level market organizations need the support of a society ruled by law? The rule of law can measure the degree of protection of private property. Only in a society ruled by law can the power of the state be restricted. The society ruled by law is also an institutional guarantee to limit the state's interference in the upper market organizations. Why is it difficult for developing countries to form upper-level organizations? Has the upper organization developed? North paradox? The problem is that there are no countries and some countries are in trouble. Can you break through? North paradox? It is the key to the development of upper-level organizations in developing countries' markets. Excessive state intervention is a common problem for developing countries to develop upper-level organizations in the market. In the process of the development of the upper-level organizations in the market, those participants in the upper-level organizations often use the country to make huge profits. Can the government not only promote the development of the upper-level institutions in the market, but also learn from them? Temptation? Developing upper-level organizations in the market is the key. However, the particularity of the upper market organization has become the reason for state intervention. Why is it difficult for the upper market organizations in developing countries to operate effectively? The main reason is the lack of support from a society ruled by law. The existence of upper-level market organizations often has extremely serious negative effects. For example, in South America, the Philippines and other countries, the upper market organizations collude with the government to trade power and money, which not only harms the interests of the lower market organizations, but also does not bring about the expansion of social production scale and the improvement of transaction efficiency. It will only change the distribution of national income and cause serious polarization. The operation of upper market organizations is actually based on the operation of power (including property rights). Olson believes that this kind of market is completed through the execution of contracts, and he calls this kind of market property-intensive or contract-intensive market. Without the support of a society ruled by law, such a market cannot exist.
Secondly, the risks and uncertainties of upper market organizations are much higher than those of lower market organizations. An effective legal system provides a stable expectation for the implementation of other systems. In this expectation, people will predict who will breach the contract and who will eventually be punished more severely. The ultimate realization mechanism of many systems is in the legal field (such as various contracts), but more realization processes are between the two parties to the transaction. Many contracts are not executed according to law, but privately. In this sense, the legal system and all formal systems complement each other. The effectiveness of the formal system depends on the effectiveness of the legal system. The vast number of developing countries are not without systems, but lack opportunities to enter a society ruled by law. Transactions in upper-level market organizations are based on social networks, trust, contracts and even virtual numbers. Without the institutional environment of a society ruled by law, upper-level market organizations cannot exist and develop. Relevant data show that due to the intervention of legal services, the dispute rate of market transactions has dropped by about 70%. The remaining 30% shall be settled through mediation by lawyers of both parties to the transaction, and the remaining 65,438+00% shall be settled through litigation.
A large number of empirical studies show that the rule of law is closely related to the development of financial markets. For example, Llsv( 1998) shows that the creditor's rights of common law countries are often more than those of French law countries. Moreover, Llsv( 1997) and Levin (1998) also found that creditor's rights are positively related to the development level of financial intermediaries. Llsv( 1998) found that the level of shareholders' rights in French statutory countries is relatively low. Llsv( 1997) and Levin (2003) further found that the low level of shareholders' rights is related to the underdevelopment of the securities market. In addition, Llsv(2003) also found that laws to strengthen information disclosure and laws to promote private law enforcement through strict liability usually promote the development of the market. In addition, Llsv(2003) also pointed out that French countries often have loose responsibilities and low requirements for information disclosure, which makes the legal and regulatory environment of French countries unable to effectively promote the implementation of private contracts as common law countries (Baker, 2006: 1 14).