With the acceleration of the global economic integration process, the interdependence between the economies of various countries is increasingly deepening. It is increasingly difficult for governments of various countries and regions to implement policies on some valuable economic activities, because such activities are often transnational and beyond the control of a certain country's government. International tax competition is one of the typical manifestations of such activities. Our country has joined the WTO. According to the provisions of its GATS and other agreements, the capital market is gradually opening up, and our country's tax system will continue to be more dependent on foreign countries. Therefore, it is our country's rational choice to face international tax competition and international tax cooperation with a proactive attitude. Since appropriate tax competition has a certain positive effect on economic development and is quite attractive to international mobile capital, my country, which insists on opening up to the outside world, must also participate in appropriate tax competition, but this tax competition is competition within cooperation. , that is, competition on the premise of respecting international practices. International tax coordination and cooperation are the inevitable and reasonable trends in the development of the international tax field. Coordination and cooperation are also a process of certain concessions between sovereignty and interests. Therefore, our country should seek to actively participate and have a say in cooperation to maximize to protect our country's legitimate interests and strive to benefit from economic globalization.
(1) my country’s preferential tax policies
Since the reform and opening up, our country has implemented a series of preferential tax policies to attract foreign investment, introduce advanced technology, and promote the rapid development of our economy. develop. The implementation of preferential tax policies is within the scope of a country's tax sovereignty. However, as the process of joining the world economic integration accelerates, it is undoubtedly necessary to re-examine our country's tax preferential system from this standpoint.
Compared with the harmful tax competition standards determined by the "OECD Report", it is believed that some of my country's current foreign-related tax preferential policies are suspected of harmful tax competition. The main manifestations are: first, foreign-funded enterprises have enjoyed super-national treatment for a long time, forming a "ring fence" to a certain extent. In terms of income tax, although the statutory tax rate for domestic and foreign-funded enterprises is 33% (including 3% local income tax for foreign-funded enterprises, this part of the tax is in name only due to the reduction and exemption policies implemented by most provinces and cities), but due to tax base calculation, asset disposal, reinvestment The gap in preferential policies such as tax rebates makes the actual burden rate of income tax on foreign-related enterprises much lower than that of domestic-funded enterprises; in terms of turnover tax, domestic-funded enterprises must pay import duties, value-added tax and consumption tax when importing equipment, while foreign-invested enterprises can import with reduced tax or duty-free. These preferential tax policies separate foreign-funded enterprises from domestic-funded enterprises to some extent, forming a "ring fence." Some preferential policies for border trade and investment in my country's Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan regions and multi-level regional tax preferential policies designed around special economic zones, coastal open cities, coastal economic open zones, economic and technological development zones, etc. may also be considered a "Ring Fence", it's just that the former benefits a certain range of taxpayers, while the latter benefits a certain area. Second, tax incentives are multi-layered and complex, and the tax system lacks transparency. my country's current tax laws make extensive use of delegated legislation. Tax regulations are mostly expressed by administrative agencies in the form of regulations, interim regulations, implementation rules, decisions, notices, supplementary regulations, etc., and are not easily known to governments of other countries. Many preferential tax policies only stipulate some basic principles and lack corresponding implementation details. They are highly flexible and not very operable, and even have different interpretations and implementation methods in different regions. What's more, in order to expand the intensity and scale of attracting foreign businessmen in the region, some local governments are scrambling to exceed their authority to reduce or reduce taxes, expand the scope of preferential treatment, and use tax incentives as an important means to attract investment and enhance the competitiveness of enterprises in the region.
But at the same time, we must also note that the OECD's standards and containment measures against vicious tax competition are mainly made from the perspective of developed countries. Therefore, we must also analyze our country's preferential tax policies from the perspective of developing countries and our country's specific national conditions. Our country is vast and we can use the different comparative advantages of various places to attract foreign investment; in addition, our country is a country with huge market potential. The country itself has a huge temptation for international capital. As long as it is properly guided, international capital will have the motivation to flow in. Furthermore, my country's labor force and land resources are relatively cheap, and the political environment is relatively stable. These are powerful factors that promote the inflow of international capital, which shows that there is no need for my country to engage in vicious tax competition. Our country is still a developing country and needs the support of other countries on some issues. If our country’s tax preferential policies are not coordinated with the tax concession policies of developed countries, it will obviously be difficult to be effective; if our country is deemed to be engaged in malignant activities by other countries, Countries with tax competition may suffer retaliation from these countries, making it difficult for my country's normal tax preferential policies to be implemented, which is not worth the loss. Therefore, my country's foreign-related tax preferential policies should be based on fully considering the interests of the other country, signing relevant tax concession agreements with them, and giving appropriate preferences to foreign investment. Our country's tax preferences must also meet transparency requirements and actively promote the reform of the tax preference system.
(2) International Tax Forum
As mentioned above, the International Tax Forum established by the OECD report is a substantive attempt by the OECD to curb vicious international tax competition.
At the same time, we have noticed that in 2002, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD jointly initiated the establishment of the International Tax Dialogue Forum (International Tax Dialogue). The international community has moved from theoretical discussions to practical efforts to establish a consultation and dialogue mechanism that can reflect the voices of all parties and coordinate the conflicting interests between developing and developed countries. However, today's world is full of contradictions, and the huge differences in interests between the North and the South make the construction of an effective international tax coordination mechanism bound to be very long and difficult.
Under real conditions, there is no force beyond the national sovereignty of each country that can directly make the tax systems of various countries consistent. However, we must rely on each country to coordinate the tax jurisdiction of various countries and avoid vicious tax competition. International coordination of tax authorities based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. For example, Lesmussen proposed: International tax cooperation should be all-round cooperation on tax systems between two countries, including tax information exchange, selection of tax jurisdiction and tax rates, and whether to impose restrictions on capital flows, etc. The premise of international tax cooperation is that the cooperative equilibrium output of each country participating in international tax cooperation must be better than the equilibrium output of non-cooperation. How to grasp the balance point between maintaining national tax sovereignty and participating in international tax coordination has to be explored in practice.
The International Tax Dialogue Forum provides us with a good place for cooperation, exchange and coordination. The establishment of a dialogue mechanism means that international tax competition has been upgraded from a unilateral, low-level "preference war" to a multilateral confrontation in which the "rules of the game" are formulated at a high level. In this confrontation and cooperation, our country should actively participate in multilateral dialogues on international tax coordination and strengthen international tax cooperation with various countries. Our country should adhere to the principles of equal consultation and benefit sharing, reflect the wishes of developing countries in discussions on various fiscal and taxation policies, and actively promote the formation of tax policy norms that are beneficial to developing countries. At the same time, our country should also promote the transparency reform of our country’s tax laws and actively cooperate with international tax information exchange. In order to achieve its due position in the tax dialogue forum.
In summary, as a large developing country, China, in the face of international tax competition, must not only build a new preferential tax system based on my country’s national conditions and reasonably avoid vicious tax competition, but also cooperate in international tax cooperation. China actively participates and expresses the reasonable positions and demands of developing countries, with a view to strengthening my country's tax coordination capabilities from both internal and external aspects, enhancing my country's international economic competitiveness, and seeking faster development in the process of economic integration.
Introduction
This book is the final result of the National Social Science Fund Project (03BJY095) undertaken by the author, "Research on Asymmetric International Tax Competition - Also on the Adjustment of my country's Tax Policy". It is also a sequel to the "Research on International Tax Competition" published by the author (co-author) in 2004, and is dedicated here to the readers. In general, this book, based on the author's original analysis of international tax competition, further deepens the study of the basic theory and practical practice of international tax competition, proposes a relatively more comprehensive and systematic theoretical analysis framework, and further deepens the study of international tax competition. This article combines theory and practice to analyze the issue of international tax competition, and puts forward some opinions on my country's tax system reform and tax policy application under the new historical conditions of international tax competition. I hope to work with colleagues in the domestic fiscal and taxation theoretical circles to further enrich our understanding of international tax competition. Research on tax competition issues continues to accelerate my country's tax system reform and improve the application of tax policies under new historical conditions.
Part of the content in this book is based on some papers published by the author in recent years on international tax competition issues. These papers include: "Properly Coping with Trade Frictions and the Application of Fiscal and Taxation Policies" ( Deng Liping, 2006a); "Asymmetry in International Tax Competition and Its Policy Implications" (Deng Liping, 2006b); "Research on International Tax Relations under the New Concept of a Harmonious World" (Deng Liping, 2006c); "China-ASEAN Trade Liberalization" Tax Competition and Coordination" (Deng Liping, 2007a); "The Application of Steady Fiscal Policies in Coping with Trade Frictions" (Deng Liping, 2007b); "Effectively Participating in International Tax Competition and Promoting the Development of an Open Economy" (Deng Liping, 2007c); "Constructing "Three Views on the Socialist Taxation System with Chinese Characteristics" (Deng Liping, 2008); "Analysis on the Construction of International Tax Competition Model" (Deng Liping, 2008); "Some Thoughts on Taxation Development under the New Situation of Open Economy" (Deng Liping, 2009 ).
About the author
Deng Liping, male, vice chairman of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, deputy to the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh National People's Congress, president of Xiamen National Accounting Institute, Wang Yanan of Xiamen University Chair professor of economics, Minjiang Scholar Distinguished Professor, doctoral supervisor, and recipient of special allowance from the State Council. He received a bachelor's and master's degree in economics from Xiamen University. He studied in Canada in 1986 and obtained a doctorate in economics from the Department of Economics of Dalhousie University. He taught at several universities in Canada. Before returning to China in 1996, he was a professor (tenured professor) in the Department of Economics at Mount Allison University in Canada. position). After returning to China, he successively served as the dean of the Department of International Trade, deputy dean of the School of Economics, dean of the School of Online Education, assistant to the president, and vice president of Xiamen University.
He has long been committed to the teaching and research of international finance and taxation and international economics and trade. After returning to China, he published more than 200 papers in domestic and foreign academic journals and 20 monographs (and co-authors). His research results have been awarded by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Administration of Taxation for many times. Excellent scientific research achievement awards issued by Fujian Province and Fujian Province. He has presided over more than 20 provincial and ministerial-level research funds and horizontal funds from the National Social Science Foundation, the National Natural Science Foundation, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Justice, the State Administration of Taxation, and Fujian Province. At the same time, he serves as the vice president of the China Taxation Society, the executive director of the China Asset Appraisal Association, the executive director of the China Society of International Trade, the director of the China Finance Society, the director and academic committee member of the China International Taxation Research Association, and the economic adviser to the Fujian Provincial People's Government. Currently, he is a relatively influential middle-aged fiscal and taxation scholar in China. He is a subject leader in the fiscal and taxation teaching and research direction of Xiamen National Accounting Institute, one of the subject leaders of the finance discipline (national key discipline) of Xiamen University, and an international economics and trade scholar at Xiamen University. The subject leader of the subject.
Book List
Part 1: An exhaustive analysis of international tax competition
Chapter 1: Research on International Tax Competition: Basic Analysis Framework
Section 1 International tax competition is a “competition” behavior
Section 2 International tax competition is a “government competition” behavior
Section 3 International tax competition is a “government competition” Competitive behavior using taxation”
Section 4 International tax competition is “the international competition in which governments use taxation”
Section 5 International tax relations and international economic relations Tax Competition
Chapter 2 International Tax Competition: Analysis Based on the Development of Tax Relations
Section 1 From Domestic Tax Competition to International Tax Competition
Section 2 International tax relations and international tax competition
Chapter 3 International tax competition: analysis based on the development of economic relations
Section 1 International tax competition under the development of international economic relations
Section 2 International Tax Competition under the New International Economic and Trade System
Chapter 4 Tax Incentives and International Tax Competition
Section 1 Tax Preferences and Tax Incentive Policies: Theoretical Analysis
Section 2 Tax Preferences and Tax Incentive Policies: Empirical Analysis
Section 3 Tax Preferences and Tax Incentive Policies: Effect Analysis
Section 4 Tax Preferences and tax incentive policies: benefit assessment
Chapter 5 Sovereign States and International Tax Competition: Further Analysis
Section 1 Tax Incentive Policies and Transitional Capital Flight
< p>Section 2: Determination of Harmful Tax Competition: Restrictions on Sovereign Countries’ Participation in CompetitionSection 3: Analysis of the Role of Tax Havens in International Tax Competition
Part 2: International Taxation The Asymmetry of Competition
Chapter 6 Research on Asymmetric International Tax Competition
Section 1: Problem Raising
Section 2 Narrowly Asymmetric International Tax Competition Research
Section 3 Research on Welfare Effects under Asymmetric International Tax Competition
Section 4 International Tax Coordination under Asymmetric Conditions
Section 5 No. Symmetric International Tax Competition and Coordination: A Case Study of China-ASEAN
Chapter 7 Research on International Tax Competition with Asymmetric Information
Section 1 Asymmetric Information and Taxation: A Study on International Tax Competition New perspective
Section 2: Overview of the relationship between asymmetric information and modern taxation
Section 3: International tax competition under asymmetric information