Other specific measures (1) financial easing policy Since 1995, the Bank of Japan has been implementing the super financial easing policy, aiming at prospering and reducing the bad debt burden of financial institutions.
The financial easing policy is that the government has relaxed its control and made the market have sufficient capital supply. Therefore, the Bank of Japan lowered the short-term market interest rate, which is generally close to zero.
Therefore, it has played a role in improving stock market, housing investment and reducing the bankruptcy of small and medium-sized enterprises.
(2) Implementing "Early Corrective Measures" According to the Law on Ensuring the Business Integrity of Financial Institutions, in order to avoid serious financial incidents as much as possible and reduce the difficulty of handling bankrupt financial institutions, the Japanese government began to establish an early corrective system for banks and insurance from 1997.
The so-called "early corrective measures" means that the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan provide administrative guidance to financial institutions to improve their operations according to their own objective standards of capital ratio; For financial institutions with deteriorating operating conditions, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan can issue orders for business reform and closure, requiring them to take measures to rebuild and deal with bad debts as soon as possible.
(3) Debt-to-equity swap1999 In July, the Japanese government formally stipulated the implementation clauses of debt-to-equity swap in the industrial regeneration related bill, allowing financial institutions to implement debt-to-equity swap for enterprises with deteriorating operations and inability to repay loans.
This treatment can reduce the debt of enterprises and improve the financial situation of enterprises; At the same time, banks can also become shareholders of enterprises and supervise their business activities.
If the business situation of the enterprise improves and the price of subscribed shares rises, there is still a chance to recover the abandoned creditor's rights.
Three. Measures to deal with bad debts in the third stage (after 200 1) In April of 20001,Koizumi's government put forward that "without reform, there would be no economic recovery in Japan", emphasizing the need to "hold back the pain" and taking solving the problem of bad debts as the most important policy topic. In April 2002, it published a report on 1650. The Japanese government officially launched the "emergency economic countermeasures" and shifted the focus of reform to the economic restructuring centered on thoroughly handling bad debts, which marked that the handling of bad debts entered a new peak.
Therefore, since the second half of 2002, the Japanese government has successively announced the implementation of a series of financial countermeasures to speed up the handling of bad debts.
1.The new goals and plans formulated in September 2002, when Takenaka took office to replace Liu Ze as Finance Minister, clearly put forward the early treatment plan for bad debts.
The plan requires that by the end of March 2005, the non-performing loan ratio of large banks (the ratio of non-performing loan balance to total loans) should be reduced to half of that at the end of March 2002, and requires major banks to dispose of the old non-performing assets before September 2002 within two years and the new non-performing assets after September within three years to realize the normalization of non-performing loans.
At the same time, Koizumi's cabinet put forward a new plan to reduce bad debts, including: first, strictly grasp the calculation standard of deferred tax refund assets, and require the bank's asset adequacy ratio to reach10%; Second, order banks to strictly examine loan claims; Third, among the preferred shares formed by injecting capital into large banks, the part that cannot be repaid at maturity is immediately converted into common shares; Fourth, a new round of audit of the loan assets of major Japanese banks is conducted to find out whether there are more bad debts.
2. Establish a new and stable financial system. After Koizumi took office, he tried to fundamentally rebuild the financial institution system, mainly in the following aspects: (1) set off a wave of financial institution restructuring. For a small number of financial institutions with operational crisis, other normal financial institutions can be allowed to rescue or merge them.
General financial institutions are also willing to acquire financial institutions in a state of operational crisis. Under the system of strictly controlling the opening of branches of financial institutions, with the help of the Japanese government's relief action, they can not only get financial assistance from the Japanese government, but also get the benefits of rapidly increasing branches that are not available under normal circumstances.
For the Japanese government, the direct cost of dealing with this problem can also be greatly reduced.
Therefore, most financial institutions are involved in the wave of merger, and in the process of financial reconstruction to deal with non-performing loans, a three-legged pattern of Mitsubishi United Financial Holding Group, Mizuho Financial Holding Group and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Holding Group has been formed.
This reduces the number of financial institutions and avoids excessive competition among many banks. Financial institutions can also take back the decision-making power of loan interest rates and make interest rates market-oriented.
For banks with weak and unrecoverable financial foundations, the Japanese government generally implements temporary nationalization measures by means of compulsory capital injection.
For example, in May 2003, public funds were injected into Lisona Bank, and in June 2003, Ashikaga Bank was temporarily nationalized.
Due to the implementation of these measures, the overall instability of the financial system has been further eliminated, and the impact on other financial institutions and the real economy has been minimized as much as possible.
(2) Further Strengthening Financial Inspection and Financial Supervision First of all, revise the asset verification standards, strictly verify bank assets, combine bank self-inspection with financial service department inspection, regularly publish inspection results, and require banks to take measures to narrow the gap with financial service department inspection.
For banks that fail to narrow the gap between self-inspection and inspection by the financial services department in time without justifiable reasons, the financial services department may issue a business improvement order.
Secondly, strengthen the supervision system of bank operation, and the specific measures are as follows: give play to the role of external supervisors, strengthen the external supervision function, and strictly carry out external supervision; Set up special institutions in the financial sector to strengthen the supervision of major banks; Strictly implement the "early rectification measures" and "early warning system", give necessary administrative penalties to financial institutions that fail to achieve a sound plan, and issue business improvement orders for rectification within a time limit; To investigate the responsibility of the operator, the operator should swear the correctness of financial statistics, and all statistical tables should be signed by the chairman.
3. Strengthening the functions of the non-performing creditor's rights clearing and recycling institutions The non-performing creditor's rights clearing and recycling institutions have always focused on recycling the bank's non-performing creditor's rights. After the Japanese government introduced the policy of dealing directly with bad debts, it was given the function of enterprise reorganization, and at the same time, the following measures were taken: to further strengthen the financial ability of sorting out and collecting institutions and enterprise reorganization funds, and to maximize their ability to recover bad creditors; Establish a creditor's rights trading market, improve the efficiency of bad debt disposal, make the clearing and recycling institutions and government financial institutions cooperate with each other, and speed up the transfer of recovering bad debts; Expand the securitization function of sorting and recycling institutions and promote the transfer of debt-backed securities.
4. The way banks deal with bad debts has changed from indirect to direct. In the past, Japanese banks mainly dealt with bad debts indirectly, that is, banks accumulated corresponding bad debt reserves to prevent the risk of returning loan funds.
In this way, even if the loan target enterprise goes bankrupt, the bank can use the accumulated reserves to tide it over.
However, its sequela is that bad debts continue to hang on the books, which puts pressure on bank credit and leads to more and more bad debts being dealt with.
Therefore, on April 6, 20001year, the Japanese government issued "emergency economic countermeasures", which took accelerating the disposal of bad debts as the main content of structural reform and decided to solve the problem of bad debts directly according to market principles.
The so-called direct way, that is, the bank completely clarifies the relationship between creditor's rights and debts by bankrupting the loan object according to law, including three ways: first, giving up creditor's rights; Second, sell the creditor's rights separately or in packages; Third, carry out liquidation according to law.
The financial services department will give up the creditor's rights as the most important means, mainly for enterprises that may have current account surplus within three years.
The focus of direct treatment is enterprise restructuring, which aims to fundamentally eliminate the bad debts of financial institutions through enterprise debt restructuring.
Direct treatment can completely dissolve the financing relationship between financial institutions and loan enterprises and directly remove bad debts.
5. The main measures to improve the financing conditions of small and medium-sized enterprises and provide them with more relaxed and preferential loan conditions include: modifying the relevant contents of the tax system, investment and financing system and commercial law, continuing to relax the participation restrictions of the financial industry, speeding up the examination and approval of newly established financial institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises, improving the financing system and financial support system for small and medium-sized enterprises, and ensuring the smooth financing of small and medium-sized enterprises; Formulate a sound SME plan and issue business improvement orders to financial institutions with poor SME financing performance and incomplete SME credit plan; Strengthen the inspection and supervision of financing of small and medium-sized enterprises.
6. Promoting the Regeneration of Industries and Enterprises The Japanese government has successively revised the Industrial Regeneration Law, the Corporate Regeneration Law, the Civil Regeneration Law, the Civil Procedure Law and the Civil Execution Law, creating a relaxed and favorable legal environment for industrial restructuring and regeneration, enriching the judicial functions conducive to the regeneration of industries and enterprises, and enabling the handling of bad debts and the regeneration of industries and enterprises to proceed smoothly.
In April 2003, the Japanese government invested 50.5 billion yen to set up a large enterprise industrial regeneration agency.
Industrial regeneration institutions buy the bank's loan creditor's rights at the current price, thus promoting the rectification and reorganization of enterprises.
The main task of industrial regeneration institutions is to provide additional financing and capital contribution to enterprises with the hope of restructuring and transformation, and provide them with financial services such as trust and guarantee.
In order to promote enterprise regeneration, the Japanese government has formulated a series of policies, including: strengthening the function of Japan's policy investment bank, increasing capital contribution to enterprise regeneration fund, and expanding financing and guarantee for enterprise regeneration; Formulate guiding standards for judging oversupply; Encourage domestic and foreign investors' private funds to play an active role in enterprise revival.
Taking this as an opportunity, Japan's enterprise regeneration has really embarked on the track.
Banks can refinance renewable enterprises.
In the long run, compared with the practice of letting the financing object go bankrupt, this practice reflects economic benefits, that is, through various reorganizations, the operating resources that can generate cash flow can be used to the maximum extent.
In addition, Japan has also set up some private investment funds to implement enterprise regeneration plans simultaneously with enterprises.
Second, how to analyze non-performing loans from the financial statements of banks?
Through the analysis of financial indicators, most of them are processed.
Iii. How to verify the authenticity of the balance of non-performing loans
To objectively analyze and judge the current credit asset quality of China banking industry, we should say that the asset quality is true and the disclosed non-performing loan ratio is basically accurate.
First of all, the information on non-performing loans disclosed is true. Important business data information disclosed by banks, including asset quality information such as non-performing loans, are audited by external auditors. If it does not meet the specified requirements, the auditor will ask the bank to make adjustments and disclose it according to the adjusted loan quality. Among them, the external audit of large banks is undertaken by internationally renowned accounting institutions, which shows that all operating data of banks are transparent. If the loan quality classification is not true or false in essence, both banks and external audit institutions must bear relevant legal responsibilities.
Although a few branches of banks may use illegal means such as fraud to cover up their non-performing loans, superior banks and regulatory authorities will correct or adjust their classification through various means of monitoring, on-site inspection and external audit. Of course, it does not rule out that there will still be some factual non-performing loans in normal interest loans. Generally speaking, the non-performing loans disclosed by banks now should be true.
Secondly, asset preservation and risk mitigation measures are important ways for banks to resolve risks. Some people think that an important reason why the quality of bank assets is not true now is that many branches of banks are covering up the true quality of credit assets through adjustment, extension, reorganization and even borrowing new ones to return old ones.
Great changes have taken place in macro-economic operation, market environment and trading methods, which will inevitably make it difficult for some borrowers to continue to perform financing contracts signed with banks. Banks will also encounter many new uncertainties, and need to take various measures such as risk prevention, preservation, slow release, control and disposal to keep the quality of credit assets as stable as possible. In this case, the bank negotiates with the borrower to adjust, modify or expand the elements of the original loan contract, and reach a new contract acceptable and enforceable by both parties, so as to reduce risks, preserve assets and adapt to the new economic operation. This is not only the need for enterprises to maintain normal production and operation, but also the most important and commonly used way for banks to resolve credit risks, which is in full compliance with regulatory requirements and international banking practices. Risk management measures, such as banks, cannot be regarded as acts to cover up the quality of real credit assets.
In fact, this kind of adjustment and modification of loan contract elements is common even in economic times, but now it is increasing. Of course, the basic principle of this operation is that banks should ensure that the risks are not expanded or controllable, and will not bring great pressure to the quality of credit assets in the future. For example, with the changes in the real estate market, the sales progress has slowed down greatly. The loan period of real estate development agreed in the original loan contract was set according to the inertia thinking of rapid sales in the past, which did not match the sales progress after the change of the real estate market, resulting in a great increase in the probability of loan default. Banks and borrowers need to re-negotiate, and adjust some elements such as the loan term and repayment method in the original contract according to the actual market sales repayment situation, so as to make the loan repay the principal and interest normally. In view of such risk factors, banks take such asset preservation and risk mitigation measures to avoid technical default by customers.
Third, loans with potential risks are not actual non-performing loans. Recently, overseas institutions and their analysts have continuously analyzed the asset quality of China's banking industry, and think that the proportion of risky liabilities or risky loans is on the high side, which is quite different from the disclosed data. This is actually a loan with risk factors or potential risks, but it is often misunderstood as a non-performing loan. Some people arbitrarily enlarge the credit risk of China's banking industry, identify some loans with potential risks as non-performing loans or call them non-performing loans, and use this as a reason to falsely question the non-performing loan ratio disclosed by banks.
According to the Global Financial Stability Report released by the International Monetary Fund in April 20 16, the risk debt ratio of China's banking industry is 15.5%. The definition of "risk debt" refers to the situation that EBITDA's profit (before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) is not enough to pay the interest of the current year. However, the report also counted the risk debts of the sample enterprises for two consecutive years, which dropped to 9%, a decrease of 6.5 percentage points. Obviously, loans with risk factors are not actual non-performing loans. Based on this, it is speculated that if statistics continue for three years, the risk debt of sample enterprises may drop to a lower level, which is generally consistent with the data disclosed by the banking industry. This also shows that the quality of credit assets of China Bank is true. Even if a company has the above-mentioned debt risk for many years, it only increases the probability of default. As long as the enterprise has the will to perform the contract and other sources of debt repayment, it will not necessarily default.
From the actual situation, some potential risk factors will indeed lead to non-performing loans, but most of them will not worsen. According to ICBC's follow-up analysis of overdue loans, it is found that 70% of overdue loans have controllable risks, nearly half of which are technical, and the overdue time is less than 10 day. Only about 30% of overdue loans are expected to lose money. If the work is done in a down-to-earth and meticulous manner, a considerable number of overdue loans can be kept within the time limit, and there will be no such big scissors difference, which will also reduce some people's doubts.
It can be seen that the loan with potential risk factors is a very complicated problem, which needs to be analyzed in detail through the appearance. However, from the perspective of bank credit risk management, this issue really needs to be highly concerned. If we are not careful, we do not take timely measures or take ineffective measures against risk factors and potential risks, more potential risks will be transformed into real risks. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent and control risks in advance and avoid or reduce the impact on the quality of credit assets as much as possible. In fact, this is also the most important content of bank credit risk management.
Finally, correctly treat the batch transfer and disposal of non-performing loans. In recent years, the proportion of non-performing loans handled by commercial banks in China has gradually increased, from 65,438+00% in 2065,438+03 to 32% in 2065,438+05. As a result, some people think that banks are covering up non-performing loans by moving them out of their balance sheets through this batch transfer.
Cash collection and write-off of bad debts are the most important ways for banks to deal with non-performing loans, and batch transfer is actually a combination of cash collection and write-off of bad debts. Batch disposal of non-performing loans is also a common way to dispose of non-performing loans internationally, so there is no problem of covering up non-performing loans. From the analysis of China's current situation, the disposal of bank non-performing loans, such as write-off and debt repayment, is subject to certain policy constraints and market environment restrictions. Some loans will be difficult to write off in time due to many factors, such as changing circumstances, overlapping and involving many responsible persons, and some collateral will be difficult to handle, which is very different from similar banks in the world. Although asset securitization has started, it is only tentative. At present, the market is still small, constrained by long process, many links and high cost, which is far from meeting the needs of banks for the disposal of non-performing loans. Debt-to-equity swap is also being explored, but there may be more problems to be studied.
Commercial batch transfer is a good way to deal with non-performing loans and is welcomed by the banking industry. However, because there are few institutions that can participate in batch disposal, the market for batch transfer is limited and the demand is increasing, the price of non-performing assets is gradually decreasing and the transfer cost is increasing. The repayment rate of some batch transfer packages is less than 10% of the face value of the loan, and some of them are even basically not repaid.
It is precisely because the channels and methods of bulk transfer and disposal of non-performing loans are relatively narrow, lacking sufficient market space, suitable investors and corresponding tools, forcing banks to try to find new ways and methods of bulk transfer and disposal through innovation within the framework of existing laws, regulations and policies, so that non-performing loans can be disposed of more effectively.
4. What does the authenticity audit of loan indicators include?
The authenticity audit of loan indicators mainly includes: whether it truly reflects the loan issuance and whether it truly calculates the loans issued by the department; Whether the new loan is compliant and true, and whether the preservation data is true; Is the loan occupation model true or false?