(1) Asymmetry between the concept of supervision and management and the ability of supervision

Judging from a series of supervision measures formulated by various regulatory agencies, the regulatory authorities almost all want to organically unify the three pillars of capital supervision, supervisor inspection and market restraint, but they have not found effective ways and technologies. This is reflected in three aspects: First, regulatory fees are not organically combined with the above-mentioned capital supervision, supervision and inspection by regulators and market constraints. For example, the CBRC collects supervision fees from trust-invested enterprises and banks according to the standard of capital scale and asset scale. This is far from the concept of crisis economic capital, maximization of shareholder value, profit after crisis adjustment and performance evaluation based on the unity of the three, and it is impossible to organically combine external supervision and restraint with internal consciousness, which deviates from the original intention of balancing the crisis and efficiency of financial product trading. Second, although all kinds of regulatory agencies have established crisis supervision means and methods with capital supervision as the core, the measurement of crisis financial assets and liabilities is not limited to their own regulatory areas, and there is no accounting standard for financial instruments, and there is a lack of a complete and unified accounting treatment system for financial instruments. This makes the crisis of many cross-cutting financial instruments not controlled by the full disclosure of accounting information. Take the crisis case exposed by Delong Group as an example. A commercial bank controlled by Delong Group has a 2-year national debt investment. According to the Management Measures for Capital Adequacy Ratio of Commercial Banks of China Banking Regulatory Commission, its crisis weight is . This seemingly safe investment has been misappropriated and repurchased by the custody securities companies controlled by it as self-operated assets for trust fund redemption and stock investment in the secondary market. However, in the crisis supervision system with net capital as its core, the discount ratio is also when it is not overdue. Its crisis has been magnified many times, and the regulatory authorities didn't know it until the Delong system crisis broke out. Third, it is difficult to identify innovation and violation. Supervisors lack understanding of the trading links and rules of cross-cutting financial instruments, coupled with the lack of relevant laws and policies, it is difficult to assess the crisis factors, and it is indeed difficult to accurately identify and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of cross-cutting financial instruments. Under the accountability system, we have to limit them first, such as the restriction of 2 trust property rights and the approval system for trust products. (B) The contradiction between separate supervision and coordinated supervision < P > This is first manifested in the different basis of their respective supervision, which leads to regulatory arbitrage and enclave. For example, in the MBO acquisition, some trust-invested enterprises accept the entrustment of the clients and directly purchase the equity of listed companies, and these funds come from bank loans or treasury bonds repurchase funds. According to the general principles of loans, you can't invest in equity. However, according to the Trust Law and the Measures for the Administration of Trust-invested Enterprises, it is difficult for trust-invested enterprises to examine the legal source of funds, and they can only indicate that the source of funds is legal with the statement of the client. Furthermore, according to the Administrative Measures for the Acquisition and Operation of Listed Enterprises of CSRC, the actual controllers of listed enterprises should be disclosed, but trust enterprises should keep secrets for their clients and refuse to disclose them according to the Trust Law.

Secondly, for the same wealth management products, the regulatory standards are different, resulting in unfair competition. For example, the financial products invested by trust enterprises in the form of principal-agent are required to be standardized as trust products, while the financial products invested by insurance enterprises, financial products of commercial banks and financial products of securities firms are tacitly implemented in the form of principal-agent, or all of them are implemented in the form of trust, but the restrictive conditions are very different. Once again, there is a lack of regulations and oversight. There is no legal arrangement related to financial holding enterprises in China, and the banking, securities and insurance departments lack targeted regulatory system arrangement for financial holding enterprises that actually exist, so it is difficult to detect the unfair trading crisis caused by their use of cross-cutting financial instruments. The most typical example is the Jinxin Trust of Delong Department, which invested 2 billion yuan in listed companies under its control by various means. (III) No supervision method conforming to the laws and legal characteristics of trust products has been found < P > The current separate supervision system, corresponding to different supervision departments and different supervision institutions have different supervision requirements, crisis screening methods and crisis management means for the core business of different professions. For example, banks are based on capital adequacy ratio, insurance is based on solvency, securities is based on net capital, and fund enterprises are based on net value as the most basic means of crisis supervision and crisis screening, and classified supervision is implemented accordingly. Because trust investment enterprises can't operate debt business, trust products are different from creditor's rights and equity financial products, and their unique legal characteristics determine that any of the above supervision methods can't be used as the basic crisis supervision means.

CBRC made some useful explorations in the Interim Measures for Information Disclosure of Trust-invested Enterprises in 25, taking capital adequacy ratio, trust return rate, weighted average expected return rate and weighted average actual return rate as the basic supervision methods of trust-invested enterprises and trust products.

However, the connotation and extension of the above regulatory indicators are not clearly regulated, and these regulatory indicators are not enough to reveal the crisis of trust products issued by trust investment enterprises. For example, capital adequacy ratio, because trust products are not debt products or standardized products, trust-invested enterprises can't operate debt business. Moreover, it can't fully reveal which trust products should be compensated by the capital or income of trust-invested enterprises, so trust assets are not counted as total crisis-weighted assets according to the crisis weight, so it is impossible to judge the appropriate capital adequacy ratio of trust-invested enterprises. At most, the rate of return on trust returns indicates whether the income source of trust investment enterprises is trust business or self-operated business.

the comparison between the weighted average expected rate of return and the weighted actual rate of return cannot explain the crisis situation of trust business, because the expected rate of return is not guaranteed rate of return and has no legal effect, and many trust products are not based on a certain financial product, such as beneficiary trust, voting trust and other rights trust and safe deposit box business. (D) can not effectively weigh the regulatory objective function: financial stability and financial crisis < P > The regulatory objectives of the central bank and the China Banking Regulatory Commission are consistent, but also have division of labor and overlap. The goal of supervision is to prevent and resolve the crisis and maintain financial stability. However, it is urgent for the central bank to prevent and resolve the systemic crisis from a more macro perspective and maintain financial stability. It is urgent for the CBRC to prevent and resolve the crisis in the industries it supervises, protect the legitimate rights and interests of depositors and other customers and promote fair competition. However, the central bank, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and other regulatory agencies have many overlapping points in preventing and resolving the crisis. Due to different information, different judgment standards and inconsistent departmental interests, it is easy to lead to conflicts in effective supervision, blank areas and regulatory arbitrage. For example, to judge whether a cross-cutting financial instrument endangers the stability of institutions and whether it needs central bank assistance, it is necessary; To judge the root cause and transmission mechanism of the financial instrument crisis and the degree of prosperity, it is necessary to coordinate various regulatory departments. The basis of coordination is the balance and authority of consensus and conflict of interest.