An analysis of the causes of the crisis faced by the unified account and pension model
The mode of combining unified accounts with old-age insurance is facing the crisis of making ends meet and running empty accounts. There are objective reasons such as slow macroeconomic growth, declining enterprise benefits and poor pension management, but the most important thing is that the inherent institutional problems of the mode itself have not been well solved.
(1) Avoid switching costs
The transition from the pay-as-you-go system to the "unified account combination" system means that a part of the pensions paid by the employed population should be set up in personal accounts, and this part of the pensions will not be transferred from generation to generation, which will naturally lead to a "gap", which is what the insiders call the transformation cost. From the experience of Latin America, governments all bear the cost of transformation and then take different measures to solve it. However, China is unwilling to publicly bear the restructuring costs, mainly because of its large scale. Estimates of the scale of China's restructuring cost vary greatly, from 65,438+0 trillion to 65,438+00 trillion, with a compromise view of 3-4 trillion yuan. Because of its huge scale, it is difficult to raise such a large sum of money at once to meet the needs of restructuring. Out of this concern, China avoided the thorny issue of restructuring cost, hoping to digest it slowly through ingenious system design, and unrealistically hoped that the working generation would shoulder the tasks of "old people" and "middle people" while accumulating pension funds, which also left hidden dangers for our pension insurance system.
(2) the target replacement rate is too high
The goal of China's social endowment insurance system is to establish a multi-level endowment insurance system involving the state, enterprises and individuals, that is, the combination of basic endowment insurance, enterprise supplementary endowment insurance (enterprise annuity) and employee personal savings endowment insurance. The target replacement rate of basic pension is 60%. In practice, the replacement rate of basic pension has reached about 80%, and in some places it has even reached 100%. Excessive replacement rate not only increases the pressure on the fund, but also induces early retirement. At the same time, the high replacement rate of basic pension in China has squeezed the development space of enterprise supplementary pension insurance and personal savings pension insurance, and it is difficult to form a real "three-pillar" pension model.
(3) Low retirement age and early retirement.
One of the preconditions for the pension fund accumulation system to be superior to the pay-as-you-go system is that the burden coefficient (retirement years/working years) is less than the internal support rate (number of retired employees/number of employees on the job), otherwise the accumulation system will be uneconomical. When China established the old-age insurance system in 1950s, the retirement age was set at 60 for men, 55 for women cadres and 50 for women workers. At present, the average life expectancy of China population has increased by more than 20 years, so it is obviously unreasonable to still adopt this retirement age. The retirement age in China is very low in the world. Among the 24 developed countries, 67% are required to be 65 years old, 67% are above 17%, 60% are 13%, and 3% are 55 years old. At the age of 60, the expected average remaining age of the population in China is 16. Assuming the service period is 40 years, the burden coefficient is 1:2.5, which is higher than the current system support rate 1:3. 1. For women, the burden coefficient is higher. If the retirement age is not raised and the burden coefficient is reduced, then the current partial accumulation system is uneconomical compared with the pay-as-you-go system.
(4) the collection rate is low
It is difficult to collect old-age insurance premiums, and there are a lot of unpaid premiums. Relevant data show that from 1992 to 1998, the national pension insurance premium collection rates are 95.7%, 92.4%, 90.5%, 90%, 87%, 90.7% and 82.7% respectively. After 1999, although the collection rate has improved, the collection work is still difficult. It is very common for enterprises to conceal the payment base, and the extra-wage income of employees does not enter the payment base, which leads to the low actual collection rate of pensions and seriously affects the total amount of funds. The low collection rate of old-age insurance premiums led to the failure of many provincial-level co-ordination areas to receive pensions, and during the period of 1999, there were 25 provincial-level co-ordination areas to receive pensions. Because the income of pension can't meet the expenditure, social security agencies have to increase the contribution rate, which leads to the contribution rate of enterprises exceeding 20% in most areas and close to 30% in many places. As a result, some enterprises with good benefits also feel that the burden is too heavy and they are unable to pay, which leads to arrears. In order to ensure the payment of pensions, social security agencies have to raise the contribution rate again, leading to a vicious circle, which makes the situation of unpaid pension insurance premiums appear on a large scale.
(5) narrow coverage
One of the goals of the reform of the old-age insurance system is to realize the socialization of employees' pension, promote the rational flow of labor force and the development and perfection of the labor market, and all employees should be required to participate in the system. In fact, on the one hand, the old-age insurance system is limited to enterprises, civil servants of administrative organs, employees of public institutions and social organizations have not yet entered the system, and the majority of farmers are outside the system. On the other hand, the insured lacks the necessary confidence in the personal account system, and it is difficult to expand the endowment insurance in order to reduce the cost of employing people. Moreover, the higher the institutional participation rate of state-owned enterprises with high over-age structure and heavy pension burden, the lower the institutional participation rate of other enterprises with light age structure and light pension burden, showing a relatively common phenomenon of adverse selection. The growth rate of retired employees in the system is higher than that of on-the-job employees, which leads to a high support rate in the system and the pension fund's income is not enough. According to statistics, from 1996 to 1998, the number of employees of state-owned enterprises participating in endowment insurance accounted for 80.4%, 79.6% and 78.6% of employees of all systems in China respectively. Urban collective enterprises are 16.6%, 16.6% and16.2% respectively; Other enterprises are only 3%, 3.8% and 5.2% respectively. By the end of 2002, the number of employees participating in the basic old-age insurance in China was11.28 million, accounting for only 44.9% of the total number of urban employees of 247.8 million and/kloc-0.5% of the total number of urban and rural employees of 737.4 million.
(6) The overall planning level is low, the management is chaotic, the cost is high, and the fund's appreciation ability is weak.
The old-age insurance management system and operation mechanism are not perfect, the old-age insurance fund is difficult to be widely used, the mutual aid and risk dispersion functions of social insurance are greatly weakened, and the provincial-level overall operation of old-age insurance is pale and powerless. According to the regulations, all provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) in China will implement provincial-level overall planning by the end of 1998, but at present, social insurance agencies below the city level are still managed by local authorities. Because the overall planning level is too low, the fund scale is too small to make effective investment. In addition, at present, the only ways to maintain and increase the value of social insurance funds are to deposit them in banks and buy government bonds. The interest rates of banks and debts are far lower than the average rate of return of social capital, so it is difficult to maintain and increase the value of funds. Although the country has loosened its investment direction at present, it is still under strict control. At the same time, due to the low level of overall planning, scattered funds, high fund management and difficult fund supervision, some confusion and corruption have occurred, which has caused damage to pension funds. In the management system, the implementation of social pooling and "mixed account" management of personal accounts has left room for the misappropriation of funds in personal accounts, providing a convenient door for pooling funds to overdraw personal accounts and accumulate funds without obstacles.
Thoughts and countermeasures on the reform of pension mode with unified account and combination
(1) Raise the retirement age
Retirement age is a basic factor to determine the level of old-age burden. If the average life expectancy and security level of the population are fixed, if the retirement age is raised, the average pension period will be shortened and the overall pension burden will be reduced. The research of the International Labour Organization shows that extending the retirement age can make the pension fund increase income and reduce expenditure, and the effect is very obvious. If the retirement age is reduced from 65 to 60, the pension expenditure will increase by 50%. According to China experts' calculation, if the retirement age is extended by one year, China's pension fund will increase its income by 4 billion yuan, reduce its expenditure by 654.38+06 billion yuan, and ease the fund gap by 20 billion yuan. It can be seen that raising the retirement age plays a very important role in alleviating the crisis of pension payment. It is necessary for China to gradually raise the retirement age and guarantee it according to law. At the same time, control all kinds of young retirement phenomena.
(2) Raise funds through multiple channels to absorb the cost of restructuring.
The conversion from digestion to cost is the key to personal account from "empty account" to real account, and also the key to the successful conversion from pay-as-you-go system to partial accumulation system. It is unrealistic to realize the transition from the old system to the new system only by collecting high social pooling funds from enterprises, which will further narrow the coverage and increase the system support ratio, aggravate the crisis of the pension system, affect the market competitiveness of enterprises and the development of the national economy, and then affect the foundation of the social security system.
Due to thousands of costs and huge scale, we need to explore various financing channels extensively. Possible ways are as follows:
(1) Reduce the state-owned shares, and the proceeds will be transferred to the pension fund to make up for the gap. In June, 20001year, the State Council issued the Interim Measures for the Management of Reducing State-owned Shares and Increasing Social Security Dividends, which needs to be improved in operability and enforcement.
(2) Collecting special taxes to make up for the gap of endowment insurance fund. Inheritance tax, gift tax, special consumption tax or special social insurance tax can be levied.
(3) Issue social security bonds to raise funds for hidden liabilities. Then, combined with special tax means, this part of bonds will be gradually cashed in a long period of time, and finally the problem of hidden liabilities will be solved.
(4) Increase the transfer payment from the central government, focusing on making up for the shortage of basic old-age insurance funds in backward areas.
(5) Reduce the target replacement rate.
Since 1990s, the wage replacement rate of public pension in developed industrial countries has been 57.04% in Sweden, 44% in the United States, 43.2% in Britain, 34.4% in Germany, 465,438+0.9% in Japan, and generally between 50% and 60% in other developing countries. China's target substitution rate can be set at 45%-50%, which is in line with China's economic development level and close to that of most countries in the world. The lower replacement rate can greatly reduce the pressure on pension funds, and at the same time give enterprises the necessary space to supplement pension insurance and personal savings pension insurance, thus forming a truly multi-level pension insurance system. Reducing the contribution rate of enterprises can also improve the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in the basic old-age insurance system and promote the further expansion of old-age coverage.
(6) Expand the coverage of old-age security and improve the fund collection rate.
Urban private and individual employment has become the main channel of new employment. According to statistics, in 2002, the number of employees in urban units nationwide was1098500, a decrease of1865438+00000 compared with the end of last year, while the number of private and individual employees in urban areas was 42.67 million, an increase of 6.09 million compared with the end of last year. As far as possible, urban private individual employees and employees of foreign-funded enterprises should be included in the old-age insurance system. Standardize the management of wage base, rectify the order of income distribution, standardize and monetize the extra-wage income, and crack down on the evasion of fees by concealing or omitting the payment wage base through legislation. For the old state-owned enterprises that are really unable to pay, the state should undertake it in time, pay it in the national budget, or share it in proportion in the central or local fiscal budgets.
(seven) social pooling funds and individual account funds should be managed separately.
Separate account management can stop the misappropriation of personal account funds from the system and is conducive to the realization of personal accounts. Social pooling fund and individual account fund are two different funds, which essentially require separate management. Social pooling belongs to the pay-as-you-go mode, which is a pure transfer payment. There is no need to accumulate funds, and there is no problem of maintaining and increasing value through investment. The core of management is the timely and full collection of funds, which can be managed by existing social insurance agencies. Personal account is a savings accumulation system. Due to the influence of inflation and wage growth rate, there is a problem of maintaining and increasing the value of pension funds accumulated in personal accounts. The core of management is to preserve and increase value. How to realize its specific security, profitability and liquidity is its main task. The fully accumulated personal account funds should be managed by independent institutions, and the focus of management is the investment and operation of funds.
(8) Adopt the small account system.
Smaller personal accounts can reduce the scale of hidden burden and reduce the pressure of government restructuring; Secondly, it is convenient to give play to the role of mutual assistance of pension funds and realize the redistribution function between workers and generations with different income levels; Third, it can reduce the risk of personal accounts. Due to the long accumulation time span of pension funds and many uncertain factors, the pressure of maintaining and increasing the value is enormous, while the relative risk of a small personal account is low. From June 5 to February 2000, the State Council promulgated the "Pilot Program for Perfecting the Urban Social Security System", which adjusted the related policies of unified account relationship and structure of basic old-age insurance, that is, unified account was managed separately, basic pension was determined at 30% of the average social wage, and the scale of individual account was reduced to 8%, which was completely composed of individual contributions. This pilot project can be promoted nationwide as soon as possible.
(9) Improve the overall planning level as soon as possible, and speed up the capitalization management and operation of personal account funds.
It is necessary for retirement funds to have a return on investment higher than the wage growth rate. If the rate of return on personal account funds is lower than the wage growth rate, the accumulation system is not an economic system. In order to ensure the rate of return of personal account funds, it is necessary to invest and operate personal accounts. First of all, it is necessary to implement provincial-level overall planning according to law to facilitate investment and operation. After the implementation of individual accounts, the accumulated amount of funds has increased year by year, and the amount is huge. Its investment must take the market-oriented road, its core is capitalization operation management, and the ultimate goal is to make pension funds get higher returns. Drawing lessons from international experience, we can set up a personal account fund management committee, which will select private fund management companies to manage the investment of personal account funds, and fund management companies can diversify their portfolios within the scope permitted by law to maintain and increase the value of personal account funds.