More and more challenges

*** Mutual funds are becoming the most important tools for ordinary investors to participate in the securities market, accumulate wealth and achieve long-term financial goals because of their comprehensive advantages such as professional management, diversified investment, sufficient liquidity, rich information provision, wide variety selection, high convenience and relatively low cost. Because of this, in the past few years, global mutual funds have achieved sustained development, and the total assets under management have increased from 11.9 trillion US dollars in 2 to 16.2 trillion US dollars in 24, with an average annual growth rate of 8%; The number of funds increased from 52, in 2 to 56, in 24, with an average annual net increase of 96.

On the whole, mutual funds are playing an increasingly important role in capital formation, economic development and social welfare improvement. However, with the reform of financial systems in various countries, the adjustment of regulatory rules and the intensification of market competition, the development of global mutual funds is facing more and more challenges.

Fund governance

Because * * * and the fund industry are based on the trust relationship between fund managers and fund holders, governance is very important. With the rapid growth of assets, two major governance problems of Datong Fund are increasingly prominent: First, fund holders lack understanding of the board of directors, which leads to the failure to effectively protect the interests of fund holders. The American model emphasizes the independent decision of fund holders and the role of the board of directors, but in fact, fund holders are relatively familiar with fund managers and fund families, but little is known about the board of directors, especially independent directors. Due to the lack of communication with the board of directors, fund holders can't supervise directors' behavior, so when the interests of fund holders and investment advisers are inconsistent, independent directors may turn to the investment adviser's side, which will harm the interests of fund holders. Second, shareholders' indifference to controlling costs and expenses. In recent years, due to the increasing enthusiasm of investors to invest in mutual funds, it is easier for fund managers in various countries to achieve the goal of expanding the scale of asset management. In this context, shareholders are not very concerned about the fund cost expenditure. On the one hand, because the expense ratio is relatively low, and on the other hand, because of the fund publicity, investors believe that the successful operation of the fund manager is worth the expense. This concept leads to the fact that the expense ratio of fund companies seems reasonable, but the actual absolute value is high.

the effective evolution of fund ecology

the fund ecology problem is actually a fund development model problem to some extent. At present, there are mainly three kinds of fund ecology in the world: one is the rule of law fund ecology represented by the United States; Second, the ecology of autonomous funds represented by Britain; The third is the political fund ecology represented by Japan. In the rule-of-law fund ecology, the market competition is full, and the fund product innovations emerge one after another. The fund realizes the survival of the fittest under the unified legal constraints and in a fair environment, and its disadvantage is that it is too volatile. In the ecology of autonomous funds, market players pay attention to giving full play to the self-discipline function of the fund industry in order to maintain the long-term coordinated and stable growth of the fund industry. The disadvantage is that it is not conducive to the formation of unified legal norms. Political fund ecology pays attention to the extraordinary growth of the fund industry with the help of the strong promotion of the government. Its disadvantages lie in insufficient market competition and insufficient fund product innovation, which is easy to breed corruption and shady. Generally speaking, the three kinds of fund ecology have their own advantages and disadvantages. The key problem is how to construct relaxed conditions, make full use of the self-evolution ability of fund ecology and improve the efficiency of fund operation. So far, the discussion on this aspect is inconclusive.

Equity in fund marketing

At present, fund managers are increasingly dependent on banks, brokers, financial advisers and other intermediary sales funds, and fund investors are increasingly dependent on their help and advice to buy funds. But for a long time, various unfair phenomena in fund marketing have affected the enthusiasm of investors to buy funds. First, there is a double standard problem in the charge of purchasing funds. When individual investors and institutional investors buy funds, they always buy the same products at different prices, and individual investors have to pay more than institutional investors. Under normal circumstances, in order to expand the scale of fund assets, fund companies will reduce or waive commission for institutional investors, and even give a certain amount of fund shares and reach an internal agreement on illegal transactions, whether in the fundraising period or in the opening period. Secondly, investors need to pay extra investment fees because of the unfair behavior of brokers getting gray rewards. The investigation shows that brokers receive two kinds of hidden rewards in addition to the fixed fund sales service fees from fund managers. One is the general sales reward, and the other is the "soft commission", or extra subsidies, such as the fund's efforts to trade on its seats at the request of brokers. No matter what kind of gray reward, the ultimate undertakers are ordinary fund investors, because they often follow the recommendation of brokers and choose unsatisfactory fund varieties without knowing it, which will eventually affect their investment income.

information disclosure

information disclosure is a long-term problem that accompanies the development of fund industry. In the United States, especially since the outbreak of "fund shady" in the United States in 23, people have paid more and more attention to the disclosure of fund information, and the regulatory authorities have therefore adopted stricter regulatory measures. According to the new regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, fund companies are obliged to disclose the approved consulting contracts, the policies of timing trading and delaying trading, sales discounts, the background and salary policies of fund managers, and the salary structure of brokers and distributors. In Europe, the European Union has promulgated regulations including information disclosure and other regulations to protect investors, and expanded the requirements for information disclosure, such as fund managers submitting regular reports to the competent authorities, providing other information about investment strategies, technologies and restrictions, and providing additional risk management information. With the improvement of information disclosure requirements, it will be a new challenge for funds to effectively control the cost of information disclosure, how regulators can monitor whether the information disclosed by funds meets the regulatory requirements, and how investors can quickly obtain and effectively interpret the geometrically increasing amount of information.

There are definitely more challenges in reality than those listed above, but these four challenges are fundamental and decisive. The global fund is at an important development juncture, and the key to the healthy and sustainable development of the fund in all countries lies in whether effective measures can be taken to solve the above-mentioned four problems and seize the important opportunities without losing time.