In the fifth year of Yongzheng in Qing Dynasty (1727), the Qing government and the Russian government decided to use Chaktu near Kulun (Ulaanbaatar) as a trading point for their own businessmen. Since then, the trade of Chaktu has become increasingly prosperous. Since Jiaqing and Daoguang (1796— 1850), China's commodities exported from Chaktu to Russia are mainly tea, and its business is monopolized by Shanxi merchants. According to statistics, from 17 to 19 years of Daoguang (1837-1839), China exported 807 1880 Russian pounds of tea from Chaktu to Russia every year, with a value of 8 million rubles. After the Second Opium War, Russia coerced the Qing government to sign the unequal Sino-Russian Tianjin Treaty and the Sino-Russian Beijing Treaty by "meritorious mediation". The Russian government opened the passage of invading China and Mongolia without a single soldier, and obtained the trading rights of seven coastal ports (Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Taiwan Province Province and Qiongzhou). In the first year of Tongzhi (1862), the Russian government also obtained the Tianjin trade privilege with a tax rate one third lower than that of other countries according to the Sino-Russian Land Trade Charter. Since then, Russian businessmen have been lucky enough to go deep into China to grab products and promote their own products. In the fifth year of Tongzhi (1866), the Russian government forced the Qing government to cancel the re-import tax of Tianjin Customs, that is, to exempt the half tax on tea, which greatly reduced the trafficking cost of Russian businessmen.

According to the records of Tianjin Customs, before the eleventh year of Xianfeng (186 1), Shanxi merchants monopolized the tea trafficking in Hubei and Hunan. They transported the tea from the two lakes to Chaktu by land and sold it to Russia. However, from the first year of Tongzhi (1862), Russian businessmen set up tea warehouses in the above areas to buy and traffic tea. Because Russian businessmen enjoy the privilege of being exempt from half tax on tea, and it is combined transportation by land and water, the trafficking route of Russian businessmen is from Hankou to Shanghai along the river, then to Tianjin along the coast, and then to Europe by land via Chaktu, which greatly saves costs. Therefore, the tea business of Russian businessmen soared from 1 647888 Jin (1 865) in Tongzhi for four years. However, due to the restrictions of the Qing government, Shanxi businessmen could not enjoy the convenience of water transportation, and they had to pay several times the lijin tax of Russian businessmen. For example, selling tea from Hankou, Hubei Province to Zhangjiakou requires 63 lijinzi cards, and the tax paid is 10 times more than that paid by Russian businessmen, so the trade between Shanxi merchants in Chaktu and Russia is declining.

In the seventh year of Tongzhi (1868), the number of gold gangs in Chaktu decreased from 120 to 4. Shanxi merchants decided to "deal with a man as he deals with you" and put forward the general plan of "doing business in Russia through Chaktu", that is, "Russia came to China to grab my commercial interests, and China businessmen went to Russia to find another way out." (See "Shaanxi Foreign Trade Record" by Qu Shaomiao and Pang)

At the right time, Russia sent a message to the Qing government, claiming that the trade of Chaktu was declining and demanding that Zhangjiakou be turned into a commercial port and a consulate be established there. Zhangjiakou is adjacent to Kyoto, and the Qing government worried that it would endanger the security of Kyoto and Mongolia's rule after being turned into a commercial port and consul by Russia, so it agreed to let Shanxi businessmen go north to Russia to do business, so as to prevent the Russians from turning Zhangjiakou into a commercial port and setting up consuls to go south. The Qing government also reduced the amount of money for Shanxi businessmen going north and cancelled the floating tax to show sympathy. With this convenience, Shanxi merchants made great efforts to develop into the Russian mainland. They have successively set up business offices in Moscow, Dohms, Chita, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk and other Russian cities, and launched fierce competition with Russian businessmen. In the first year (1869) when Shanxi merchants marched into the Russian mainland, they exported 1 10000 tons of tea to Russia, and Russian businessmen directly sold 1 10000 tons of tea. In the first round, Shanxi merchants tied with Russian merchants. In the third year (Tongzhi decade, 187 1), Shanxi merchants exported 200,000 tons of tea to Russia every year, twice as much as Russian merchants directly sold tea. Shanxi businessmen trade with Russia by land, using camels, oxen and wagons with higher freight rates as transportation tools, while Russian businessmen transport tea with lower freight rates by land and water with the privilege. The competition conditions between Shanxi merchants and Russian merchants are very obvious, but Shanxi merchants can still get the upper hand in trade with Russia. If it were not for the corruption of the Qing government, Shanxi merchants would not necessarily fail in their trade with Russia.

In the eleventh year of Tongzhi (1873), Shanxi merchants planned to transport Hubei tea to Tianjin by water and then sell it to Russia by land, but the Qing government interfered with this plan and still levied lijin tax on Shanxi merchants who sold tea by water. Worldwide, how can domestic businessmen who traffic their own goods in their own countries not enjoy the same treatment as foreign businessmen, but have to pay extra taxes? However, under the rule of the Qing government, China did so. The rulers of the Qing Dynasty acted perversely and suppressed Chinese businessmen, which made Shanxi merchants in a very unfavorable position in the tea merchant war with Russian businessmen from the beginning. In addition, Russian businessmen have successively set up brick tea factories in Hankou, Jiujiang and Fuzhou, using steam engines instead of hand pressing. The brick tea produced has low cost, high quality and large output, but Shanxi merchants still rely on manual workshops to make brick tea, and their products obviously cannot be compared with machine products. Shanxi merchants were squeezed out by Russian businessmen in brick production. Then, the negotiations between China, Japan and South Korea began, and the Qing government pursued the policy of "inducing Russia to control Japan", which made Russian businessmen more and more rampant in China and successively controlled some tea-producing areas in China. In this case, the amount of China tea directly trafficked by Russian businessmen has soared, reaching 600,000 to 700,000 tons per year, while Shanxi merchants have dropped to only tens of thousands of tons per year.

In the thirty-first year of Guangxu (1905), the entire Russian Siberian railway was opened to traffic, and Russian businessmen switched to railway transportation via Vladivostok, which was not only low in cost, but also extremely convenient. It is difficult for Shanxi merchants to conduct large-scale tea trade with Russia. In order to open the market, Shanxi merchants also sold tea to Russian small and medium-sized businessmen on credit, and then returned the tea money after they sold it out. Unexpectedly, it caused trouble: some Russian businessmen deliberately defaulted on their debts, and some small and medium-sized Russian businessmen were squeezed out by domestic big tea merchants or their own management was poor, and there was no hope of repayment. Shanxi merchants were exhausted and lost 622 thousand silver. In order to recover the losses, Shanxi merchants wrote to the Qing government to negotiate with the Russian authorities, demanding to recover the silver owed by Russian businessmen, but the Qing government was afraid of westernization and flattered westernization, and simply refused to accept the letter from Shanxi merchants. In Xuantongyuan (1909), the Russian government suddenly violated the tea agreement between the two countries and imposed heavy taxes on Chinese businessmen in China, crowding out Russian businessmen doing business in Russia. Shanxi merchants suffered various blows and finally failed in the war against Russian tea merchants.

Second, the government is corrupt, and Shanxi businessmen have suffered heavy losses in investing in mining.

At the end of 19, foreign capitalism began to plunder Shanxi coal resources. In the 23rd year of Guangxu (1897), British Fu Company established Jinfeng Company through comprador Liu E and Fang Xiaojie in China to mine coal in Yuxian, Pingding, Zezhou, Lu 'an and other places in Shanxi. Later, due to the opposition of Jin officials in Beijing, the Qing government withdrew Liu E and others and turned to negotiate with British businessmen. Soon, Shanxi Bureau of Commerce signed a contract with Fu Company, and Fu Company obtained the mining rights of subway deposits such as Pingding in Shanxi. In the thirty-first year of Guangxu (1905), the railway was connected to Yangquan, and Fu Company sent people to mine in Zhanshan, Pingding, banned folk kilns and seized the mine site, which aroused the great indignation of Shanxi people and overseas students and broke out the movement for mining rights. In this struggle, Shanxi merchants took an active part and went on strike.

In the thirty-second year of Guangxu (1906), Li Peiren, a student studying in Japan in Yanggao County, Shanxi Province, jumped into the sea in Tokyo, Japan. Li's daring to go into the sea and tens of thousands of impassioned "desperate letters" further inspired the Shanxi people's struggle for mineral rights. Fu Ying Company felt that forced mining of Shanxi coal mine was no longer feasible, so it changed to money extortion. At first, the condition for handing over the mining right was to ask for 1 1 twenty-two thousand silver to redeem the mine, which was sternly rejected by the Shanxi representative. Finally, on the condition of extorting 2.75 million taels of silver from the mine, he agreed to hand over the mining right and quit Shanxi. The two sides agreed to pay the redemption money in four installments, with half of the redemption money paid first. Because the amount of money redeemed is small and there is no money left in the national treasury, in order not to lose faith with outsiders and protect the reputation of Shanxi Province, the Shanxi authorities used the donated mu as collateral, and the banks in Qixian County, Shanxi Province raised the money for all banks in Shanxi. Fu Ying Company heard that Shanxi Bank wanted to pay for the redemption of mine silver, so it secretly entrusted the banks with contacts to collect money outside to trap Shanxi Bank. However, Shanxi's banks were calm, and they raised 654.38+0.52 million silver in ten days, which surprised foreign businessmen. The activity of Shanxi merchants in the financial sector can also be seen. As Yan, a neighbor, said, "Without the help of the ticket merchants of that day, today's mining area would still be in the hands of Fu Company, and the British business forces have long been rampant in Shanxi."

In order to ensure the rights, Qu, a Shanxi merchant, established a mining company with Liu Maoshang, Feng Jichuan and other gentry and scholars in Guangxu 33 years (1907), with Qu as the general manager to mine coal and iron ore in the province. Jinbao Company agreed to receive 8 million taels of silver shares, and actually received 1.93 million taels. As mentioned earlier, the original silver redemption money raised by Qu's bank from Shanxi banks was mortgaged by Shanxi mu donation, but Shanxi authorities withheld Shanxi mu donation with 19 1 1 In order to return the redemption money borrowed from various banks, Qu had to transfer the equity silver absorbed by the company to various banks. In this way, the company was unable to maintain normal production due to a serious shortage of funds from the date of its establishment, and Qu was forced to resign as general manager. However, it was not until 19 16 that the money owed by Shanxi authorities to Jinbao Company was repaid in cash of 600,000 yuan. For the remaining arrears, the Shanxi provincial government gave Jinbao a "courageous" certificate and wrote it off. Shanxi merchants actively participated in the people's mineral rights struggle in Shanxi, tried their best to redeem the mineral rights and invested in the earliest and largest mining company in Shanxi in modern times. However, due to the oppression of Shanxi authorities at that time, it was impossible to make a difference in funds.

Third, Shanxi businessmen lost four opportunities by sticking to the rules, but they were unable to get up in spirit after all.

In the late Qing Dynasty, Shanxi Bank operated by Shanxi merchants declined gradually. However, there are also many people of insight in Shanxi who recognize the new situation and advocate reform for survival. Unfortunately, due to the stubbornness and ruthlessness of some financiers and general managers, they lost the opportunity of development four times. For example, in the 29th year of Guangxu (1903), Yuan Shikai, Minister of Beiyang, invited Shanxi Bank to join Tianjin Official Bank, but Shanxi Bank refused to be appointed. In the 30th year of Guangxu (1904), Lu was appointed as the Minister of Household Affairs and was ordered to form the Household Bank of Qing Dynasty. Lu also invited Shanxi Bank to become a shareholder and invited people to organize the bank. Most managers of Shanxi Bank Beijing Branch are in favor of Lu's proposal, and they are all eager to try. However, Shanxi Bank is dictatorial, and major events must be decided by the general manager.

The general manager of the bank is too hidebound, only enjoying ready-made happiness and having no foresight. He even wrote back to the manager of the Beijing branch of the bank, refusing to let him enter the stock market or send someone to participate in the formation, which led to a missed opportunity. Later, the bank was organized by Jiangsu and Zhejiang silk merchants, and the Jiangsu and Zhejiang consortia came from behind. Soon, Hubu Bank was reorganized into Daqing Bank, and Shanxi Bank was invited to co-sponsor, but Shanxi Bank did not call. As a result, Shanxi draft bank has never been able to participate in the National Bank and lost the opportunity to reorganize the bank for the first time.

In the thirty-fourth year of Guangxu (1908), Li Hongling, manager of Beijing Branch of Shanxi Weifuhou Bank, realized that Shanxi Bank would disappear in the business and financial circles if it did not conform to the trend and reformed as soon as possible, so it was the general trend to reorganize the bank. To this end, he and Qu planned a bank reorganization plan, and at the same time, in Kyoto, they jointly sent a letter to the general number with three banking groups in Qixian, Taigu and Pingyao, Shanxi Province, asking Qu to state the bank reorganization plan face to face. At that time, the banks of Wei Fuhou, Wei Taihou, Tianchengheng, Xintaihou and Wei Shengchang were five joint numbers, and Cai Dong was also the surname of Jiexiuhou. Among these five joint names, Mao Hongwei, the general manager of Wei Empress Dowager, is the most authoritative. Shi Mao stuck to a rut and voted against bank restructuring. On the contrary, he falsely accused Li and others of having other intentions, which prevented them from taking any action. In Xuantong Yuannian (1909), Shanxi banks in Kyoto once again put forward the proposal of restructuring banks through Shanxi banks in various ports, and Shanxi banks in Hankou, Lanzhou and Jinan wrote to the general bank, requesting that the banks be reorganized into banks. Helpless, the general manager remained unmoved, the demands from all over the country were shelved, and the bank's bank restructuring plan failed again. Shanxi merchants lost the opportunity to restructure banks for the second time.

When the Revolution of 1911 took place, various departments in Shanxi were caught off guard, and the released funds could not be recovered. However, deposits followed, and Shanxi Bank suffered serious losses, so the proposal of restructuring the bank revived. At this time, Mao, the general manager of Weihou Bank, who has always opposed the bank restructuring, has awakened and supported the bank reform. 19 14, three banks in Shanxi, Qi, Tai and Ping, jointly applied to Beijing authorities to bid for the bank. At that time, Premier Xiong Xiling knew that Shanxi Bank had a great relationship with general businesses, supported the request of Shanxi merchants, and agreed to the government's guarantee. Shanxi Bank borrowed 2 million pounds from Australia-based Huali Bank with a term of 50 years and interest of 6% in accordance with the method of "commercial loan repayment". Unfortunately, Xiong's cabinet collapsed in a few days, the European war broke out again, the loan went up in smoke, and Shanxi Bank lost the opportunity to reorganize its banks for the third time.

The foreign loan failed, and the plan of restructuring the bank jointly by Qi, Thailand and Pingbang could not be implemented, so Pingyao Gang decided to go it alone. Mao Hongwei, general manager of Weitaihou, Yan, Xin Taihou, Huo Yiting, general manager of Weishengchang and Fan Zisheng, general manager of Tianchengheng, plan to set aside some funds from their respective banks as funds to form a big bank. However, this plan has never been realized, and the reorganization plan of Shanxi draft bank finally failed for the fourth time.

In the thirty years of Guangxu (1904), Shanxi Bank struggled for more than ten years, missed the opportunity of restructuring four times, and finally failed to recover its decline.