Investors' Conflicts of Interest and the Integration of Corporate Governance Mechanism in 2007, China Financial Publishing House, 2007.
Thesis:
20 10, Zheng Zhigang, information asymmetry of research preference, adverse selection and optimal education system design, World Economy,No. 12.
20 10, Zheng Zhigang, re-understanding of the connotation of corporate governance, financial research, No.8.
20 10, Zheng Zhigang and Deng Hefei, Differences in Legal Environment and Regional Financial Development —— Investigation on Determinants of Financial Development Based on Provincial Panel Data of China, Management World, No.6, 2009, Evaluation of Corporate Governance Development History and Present Situation of Listed Companies in Zheng Zhigang, Sun Juanjuan and China, Financial Research, No.1 10.
Zheng Zhigang, Lv Xiuhua, 2009, the interactive effect of the independence of the board of directors of listed companies in China and the evaluation of the policy effect of independent director system, Managing the World, No.7.
In 2009, Zheng Zhigang, agency cost, legal protection of investors' rights and interests and bonus design of managers' compensation contract, World Economy No.65438 +0.
In 2007, Zheng Zhigang, Corporate Governance Role of Extralegal System, Managing the World, No.9.
Zheng Zhigang, Sun Yanmei, Tan Songtao, and Jiang Dezeng, 2007, Determination of Consideration for the Reform of Non-tradable Shares and Test of the Effectiveness of the Governance Mechanism of Listed Companies in China, Economic Research, No.7.
In 2007, Zheng Zhigang, Shareholder Value Orientation of Stakeholders Sharing Corporate Control, Credible Commitment Cost and Corporate Governance, World Economy, No.8.
Zheng Zhigang, Jian-Jun Fan, 2007, Effectiveness Evaluation of Corporate Governance Mechanism of State-owned Commercial Banks, Financial Research, No.6.
In 2007, Zheng Zhigang, Determinants of Financial Development, Managing the World, No.3.
Zheng Zhigang, 2007, The Nature and Property Rights Arrangement of Pyramid Holding Structure, China Economic Issues, No.3.
In 2006, Zheng Zhigang, the design of equity incentive from the perspective of managers' plunder: commitment value and the influence of external legal environment, Financial Research,No. 12.
In 2006, Zheng Zhigang's Evolution of Economic Analysis Methods of Legal Issues and the Transformation of Connotation of Legal Economics —— Taking the Economic Analysis of Private Relief as an Example, Research on Institutional Economics,No. 1 1.
In 2005, Zheng Zhigang, equity incentive: Can it constitute a challenge to the principle of maximizing shareholder value? Economics (Quarterly), Volume 4, No.2, pp. 359-368.
In 2005, Zheng Zhigang's Political Perspective of Financial Development: The Erosion of Market Economy by vested Interest Groups, Managing the World, No.3, 163- 169.
Zheng Zhigang, 2005, "Incentive Mechanism for Diversified Investors in Emerging Markets to Invest in Pyramid-structured Companies", Economic Research No.4, pp.87-96.
Zheng Zhigang, 2005, The Debate between Structure Theory and Interest Group Theory of Financial Development and Its Reference Significance for the Development of China's Financial Industry, Comparison of Economic and Social Systems, No.3.
2005, Zheng Zhigang, takeover threat and external environment needed for effective board supervision, Economic Science, No.4.
Zheng Zhigang, 2004, Investor Conflict of Interests and Integration of Corporate Governance Mechanism, Economic Research, No.2, 1 15- 125.
In 2004, Zheng Zhigang, Literature Review of Corporate Governance Theory, Nankai Economic Research No.5 (full text of Enterprise Management Research, edited by NPC Information Center, No.1 1, 2005).
In 2004, Zheng Zhigang, external financing and the decision of optimal shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders, China Social Science Review, Vol. 65438 +0.
In 2003, Zheng Zhigang, The Economic Role of Enterprises, No.2 Economic Review.
In 2003, Zheng Zhigang, "New Perspective of Incentive Mechanism Design: From Property Right Theory to Admission Control Theory", China Social Science Review (Hongkong), Vol.2, No.2.
In 2003, Zheng Zhigang and Lv Wendong, Research on the Institutional Innovation of the Management of Conventional Scientific Research Equipment and the Allocation System of Scientific Research Funds, China Soft Science, No.3.
In 2002, Zheng Zhigang, "Producer Competition and the Change of Optimal Entrustment Arrangement", China Economic Problems, No.2.
Zheng Zhigang, 2002, Using Asymmetric Information to Prevent Collective Deviation from Nash Equilibrium, Economic Science, No.3..
Zheng Zhigang and Fan Guangzhe, 2002, The Impact of Different Fiscal Expenditure Effectiveness on Economy, Fiscal Research, No.5.
Zheng Zhigang, 2002, Review of Theory and Practice of Reputation System, Economic Trend, No.5.
Zheng Zhigang, 2002, Research Methods and Transaction Cost Paradigm of New Institutional Economics, Nankai Economic Research, No.6.
Zheng Zhigang, analysis of the overall supply and demand situation of China tourism market in 2002, China Soft Science, No.8.
200 1, Zheng Zhigang, defects of property rights as an incentive mechanism for providing specific investment and access control theory, Nankai Economic Research, No.6 (full text of theoretical economics, No.4, 2002, edited by the Information Center of the National People's Congress).
Scientific research projects:
Research on the Governance of Unlisted Companies in China. 07CJY002), National Social Science Foundation, 2007.7-2009.6438+02.
Executive compensation: strengthening internal control v.s. salary limit? (Project approval number: 7 1072 143), National Natural Fund of China, 201.1-2001.3.12.
Main invitations for economic and financial conferences and academic seminars:
20 10, 10 China forum for young economists (Xi' an, Shaanxi, September), articles of association, protection of investors' rights and interests and agency costs-evidence from listed companies in China;
20 10, seminar of accounting department, international business school, university of international business and economics, "why does executive compensation keep growing substantially even though there is little equity compensation and management power is relatively small?" -Evidence from listed companies in China "
In the sixth annual meeting of China Finance in 2009 (Chengdu, Sichuan, 1 1), did the share-trading reform achieve the purpose of improving the governance of listed companies? 》
In 2009, China Renmin University, Department of Finance and Finance, seminar, "Differences in Legal Environment and Regional Financial Development —— Determinants of Financial Development Based on Provincial Panel Data of China".
The 9th Annual Meeting of China Economics in 2009 (Hangzhou, Zhejiang, 65438+February), Differences in Legal Environment and Regional Financial Development —— An Investigation on Determinants of Financial Development Based on Provincial Panel Data of China.
In 2008, the accounting department of Fudan University School of Management held a seminar, "Legal investor protection and executive compensation-evidence from listed companies in China".
The 8th China Young Economists Forum in 2008 (Xiamen, Fujian, September), the legal protection of agency costs, investors' rights and interests and the bonus design of managers' salary contract.
In 2007, the seminar was held at California State University at Northbridge (Los Angeles, California, USA), "The Relationship between Incentive Compensation of Managers and Internal and External Governance: Evidence from China"
In 2006, the Sixth Annual Meeting of China Economics (Wuhan, Hubei, 65438+February), "The Determination of Consideration for the Reform of Non-tradable Shares and the Test of the Effectiveness of the Governance Mechanism of Listed Companies in China".
The 6th China Young Economists Forum in 2006 (Weihai, Shandong, September), Equity Incentive Design from the Perspective of Managers' Plunder: Commitment Value and the Influence of External Legal Environment.
In 2004, the third annual meeting of China Economics (Shanghai, 65438+February), the conflict of investors' interests and the integration of corporate governance mechanism.