The Court's opinion on Yi Bei accounts for only four pages of the US report. It is a simple and intuitive analysis. The original intention of the court did not go beyond the consideration of reaffirming the solution of "traditional laws and safeguarding fairness". "But because of unintentional, simple opinions. It is difficult for lower courts to define the restrictions on starch and Yi Bei food. Does the decision apply to preliminary and permanent bans? Has the general practice of substantially irreversible damage and wanton behavior been overturned to represent patent or copyright infringement? What about trademark cases? Or, for that matter,
Courts and critics have solved these problems for four years. The purpose of this paper is to pay attention to a certain problem, but suffer relatively little attention-prohibiting the Yi Bei effect in false advertisements, especially the presumption of irretrievable damage caused by certain types of false statements.
We believe that Yi Bei should not read the actual cases of disturbing false advertisements. Assuming that at least some false claims have caused irreparable harm, this is the table, which is only a change of the advertisement rebuttal of the burden of proof, and has little similarity with the prohibition of "classification rules" In addition, as a theoretical issue, there is no reason to conclude that the injunction relief rule should be automatically applied to false advertising cases in patent cases. Protecting patents and copyrights by law must involve cultivating a balance between creativity and inventiveness. On the one hand, new inventions and creative works can be obtained by means of public interest.
& lt There is no similar balance in prohibited false advertising behavior, including equal interests. False advertisements harm private interests. Competitors who harm the public interest are spreading real business needs. Another benefit of the account book is only the benefit of the advertiser, because it wants to talk. When the weight problem is a wrong request, there will be benefits. "This may be a business statement, which is forbidden to conform to the First Amendment." This unbalanced principle of interest balance, combined with the relevant proof of the problem, usually cannot make up for the damage. The lawyer's false advertisement is conducive to maintaining a rebuttable and essentially irreversible damage, and the presumption of burden of proof is transferred to the false advertiser.
Ebay and false advertising
For the case of false advertisements, the court has been in court for a long time, and at least several false advertisements have also risen to the presumption of irreparable harm. For example, when many courts believe that there is irreparable damage, it can be presumed to be "a false statement of the comparative advertisement between the plaintiff and the defendant." "False comparison claims competitors' products" will definitely reduce the value of products. In people's minds, "consumers and other such reputational damages are usually unable to obtain quantitative damages separately." Other courts have further translated it into that false advertisements are presumed to have caused irreparable damage and then do it again, because "it is almost impossible to establish accurate economic consequences" and "intangible damage, for example, goodwill that damages reputation", which is the reason for false advertisements.
Ebay's decision didn't cause any irreparable harm. It's a common case of actively reconsidering false advertisements. Most courts just continue to apply it without even stopping to consider the potential impact of assuming Yi Bei. Even the medical cases in North America, some of which are suspected to be thrown into the trademark context hypothesis, are satisfactory. It is assumed that irreparable damage continues to apply to false presumptive comparative advertisements, and it is pointed out that only in the footnote, the court does not need to solve the cases that may affect false advertisements in Yi Bei. It seems to be only a hypothesis here, that is, the local court decides to return it, and this irreversible damage is essentially a false advertisement against Yi Bei. This paper makes a simple analysis of the wording, and the court only "gives up [d]" the presumption of application, lacking the authority of post-Yi Bei constraint and simulation. "The second lineup of loom circuits has a big climate, however, it is assumed that in any case, it will continue to survive," which is in the context of false advertisements or any other fields.
From Salinger's point of view, it is not surprising that most courts continue to apply the assumption of irreparable damage in Yi Bei's false advertising cases. For beginners, there is little similarity between inferring the "classification rules" and rejecting the decision about Yi Bei. The issue of the Federal Circuit Court has been ruled that in the case of patent infringement, a permanent order must be made, but there are exceptions. Only in "rare circumstances" is it necessary to take "negative injunction relief" to "protect public interests". This rule completely abandons the traditional newspaper test, and its actual effect is decisive. It is presumed that three or four kinds of traditional hazards are imposed, and the factors-irreparable deficiency and the balance of legal relief-have nothing to do with "public interests" under the most "abnormal" circumstances.
It is useless for false advertisements to apply to irreparable injury cases. In the case of false advertising, there is no absolute or refuting bright line. They just use classic proof to prove the authenticity of the hypothesis of "shirking the burden of proof" in a display. This assumption is based on the common sense conclusion, which exceeds the empirical case-false advertising and false comparative advertising, which almost invariably reduces the comparison of products' reputation being cheated. Because the damage of "exact economic consequences" can almost never be proved with any reasonable certainty, it is presumed that shifting the burden of proof to appropriate false advertisements will be enough as a remedy. At the same time, the estimated transfer cost also collects and presents evidence that the parties present engage in false advertisements, which increases the burden on false advertisers and can put an end to false claims and beneficial effects.
Presumably, it also has the effect of temporary relief, so that a more feasible plaintiff can choose a false advertising case. The key to quick rescue is to prevent false advertising from damaging the value and goodwill of the plaintiff's brand. Time pressure may not give the plaintiff a chance to collect detailed evidence of irreparable harm and then go to court. If the plaintiff is forced to wait for specific evidence, reputation or goodwill to be damaged, Swift's preliminary injunction relief will become an effective case without false advertisements. For irreparable harm, it is so false that the necessary condition for advertising activities is to stop in its nascent stage.
Irretrievable damage is also evidence, and there are many other hypotheses that the court has been applying to false advertising cases. For example, the "presumption" caused by the advertiser's intention and established deception can refute the consumer's confusion relief.
These rules, no less than assuming irreparable damage, are decided through cases over time. Like most legal rules based on precedent, they have embarked on a slow rising road. At first, laws were made by a few judges, and then more and more, until they became sacred principles. No one would suggest-and no one would suggest-that Yi Bei question these universally applicable proofs of right and wrong assumed in false advertisements. There is no reason to make any difference between irreparable harm like the rebuttable presumption rule.
In fact, despite the opinion of Yi Bei Salinger of the Supreme Court, if there is any difference, the case of changing false advertisements in practice is solved as a whole. In Yi Bei and the District Court, this presumption applied to basically irreversible damage, but the court held that this presumption was rejected. It is worth noting that Yi Bei's appeal to the Supreme Court challenged this almost absolute entrustment, and refuted the presumption of irreversible damage of the district court's injunction relief. However, when the Supreme Court completely rejected the rules of the Federal Circuit Court and accepted great efforts to criticize the judgments of other regional courts, the Supreme Court did not criticize the regional courts in any way to refute the presumption of irreversible damage in essence. Refutable assumptions, including self-assertion of false advertisements. , is unfair, and has been read back to the auction of Yi Bei.
However, even though many courts still maintain that the rebuttable and basically irreversible presumption of damages should no longer be applied to patent and copyright cases, there are sufficient reasons to maintain the background of false advertising presumption. Patent and copyright law need a careful balance of interests, aiming at encouraging the development of inventions and creative works, vigorously implementing intellectual property rights, while retaining the public domain with strong robustness so that people can access valuable innovations. False advertising law-much like trademark law-does not include similar cases about stock market balance.
Deceiving consumers is never in the public interest. The essence of Y is that "false advertising" hurts consumers "and deprives them of the right to obtain accurate information related to purchase decisions". In particular, false contrast advertisements not only include the plaintiff's private interests, but also include his brand reputation. The public's "strong interest" is to eradicate the false advertising market. & lt recognizes the benefits of these key behaviors, and the text reflects the "congressional policy" that strongly encourages commercial companies to seek injunctive relief, which can not only make up for their personal injuries, but also "serve as a fictional substitute for the avenger of consumer rights". The injunctive relief after the rejection found that false advertising deception would only "continue to penetrate into public discourse, thus" destroying, not promoting. "
The interests of both parties have been seriously infringed by the plaintiff and the public, and advertisers only have their own interests to continue to spread misleading advertising's infringement. To be fair, the interest should be completely zero. Only the wrong behavior is prohibited.
To be sure, in the preliminary injunction motion, the court did not finally make the determination of false advertisements. The advantage of the possibility of success, not the certainty, is all that is needed. The possibility exists. If the injunction relief is obtained, the advertiser will make a preliminary injunction and finally find the real constitutional protection. This is really meaningful, but it has no reason to give up a case that assumes that false advertisements cause substantial irreversible damage. On the contrary, the court should focus on analyzing the possible success and initially prohibiting the use of public interest tuning forks as the first amendment. The court should also try its best to ensure that any record suspected of false or misleading suppression of statements is narrow and only covers tailor-made statements, which are most likely to deceive consumers and hurt plaintiffs. By taking these measures, the court can avoid the expression of collision protection in the preliminary injunction stage, without sacrificing an irreparable and valuable injury like the common sense of presumption rules.
The doctor suggested
Although it is clear that false advertisements should continue to apply the presumption of irreparable damage, the law has not been solved in this field. So what is the landscape that practitioners are a little uncertain about? First of all, the plaintiff of false advertising should continue to rely on the assumption that the damage can not be compensated when seeking injunction relief; Even in the Second Circuit Court, they should think that Salinger's famous words are not binding and should be
At the same time, the environment is still very uncertain, relying on speculation to be alone. The plaintiff should admit that some courts may need to take the opposite view, and the district court of the Second Circuit may feel constrained by Salinger. The plaintiff shall, according to the plaintiff's reputation and credibility, remedy any and all evidence of irreparable damage by increasing the response to its injunction proposal.
On the other hand, the defendant of false advertising should be prepared to object to the scope of application of the presumption of irreparable damage. Although we don't hold this view, we advocate that the case of applying for false advertisements for defensive temporary relief should follow Yi Bei's global rules for all applications for injunctions, including its obvious dependence on Salinger. It advocates the possibility of trying to sell the court's initiative to read the case of Yi Bei and Winter v. National Defense Committee of Natural Resources, and insists that the plaintiff will actually bear the burden of irreparable damage through the supervisor's evidence.
conclusion
What determines that Yi Bei, who has been in foreclosure, has taken on the case of irreparable damage caused by false advertisements? In almost all cases, the issues of patent ban and copyright ban are related to climate issues, and public and secret hazards lead to false advertisements calling for ban relief. It is difficult to refute that the presumption of irreversible damage has essentially shifted to the appropriate burden of proof-damage that is difficult to quantify and promoting the fair and accurate dissemination of commercial information to safeguard public interests. Ebay should not prevent the court from continuing false advertising cases and using basically irreversible damage presumption.