On June 165438+ 10/7, 2020, Huawei Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. decided to sell its glory business assets as a whole. The acquirer was Shenzhen Zhixin New Information Technology Co., Ltd. Huawei does not own any shares in the glory after delivery, nor does it participate in management and decision-making. * * * More than 30 glory agents and distributors jointly launched this acquisition, which is also a self-help act initiated by the glory-related industrial chain.
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Compared with the Internet mobile phone brands that appeared in the same period, Glory is a typical "rich second generation", supported by Huawei's technology and backed by Huawei's channels. After-sales service has natural advantages, and marketing resources are not so tight, especially in the supply chain where new brands are difficult to control. Glory can also share a supply chain system with Huawei. Backing Huawei is an accelerator for glory growth, but if the brand is similar to Huawei, it will lose its value of existence.
After 20 15, glory began to go its own way and formed a dual-brand strategy with Huawei. Huawei continues to deepen the traditional offline market, while glory focuses on Internet channels.
Of course, glory did not follow Xiaomi's example. For example, Xiaomi pursues a cost-effective strategy and gloriously bets on quality and service. When Xiaomi spared no effort to explore the offline market, glory chose the "light asset model" that moved Internet thinking offline, even in overseas markets. Xiaomi once again staged a price game to grab the demographic dividend. The glory strategy is to "focus on the brand highland and cover the populous country".