Why do managers dream of chasing stocks?
The shares that managers want are mainly term shares, dividend shares, management shares and real industrial and commercial registration shares. So, why do managers want shares? The answer is not professional.
Although the number of managers in China has been increasing in recent years, there are few professional managers, about 10% of whom are professional managers. The fundamental reason is that the current market level in China is still very low.
Judging from the motivation of managers to obtain equity, they are mainly in the following aspects: they always want to be bosses, improve their identity and enhance their decision-making power, hoping to gain something through their own efforts. They always feel that if they have shares, they will have an industry. If they don't work in the future, they will get dividends. Sooner or later, they will miss something. This is the unprofessional performance of managers.
What is "professional" manager?
What is full professionalism? "After finishing my MBA, I would like to be a professional manager all my life, not a boss." In fact, being a professional manager is just a profession, and being a boss is also a profession. These are completely two occupations, and it has nothing to do with how much money you earn.
As a manager and a boss, it is difficult to play two roles at the same time. A complete professional manager, at least in his mind, should be willing to be a professional manager, loyal to his career and proud of it.
Being a shareholder is not happy?
As a minority shareholder-the dilemma of the role
A manager once told me the story before and after he got the shares:
I have worked in the enterprise for two years and achieved good results. In order to fulfill his promise, the boss gave him 8% of the shares, and it was a real share that was changed in the industrial and commercial registration. However, after the equity change, my heart has changed a lot.
Although I am still the general manager as before, I am not what I used to be: I used to be a professional manager, thinking, making decisions, giving instructions, implementing the system, handling employee relations and so on. I think and deal with everything as a manager. After becoming a shareholder, my dual identity and role will lead to my predicament and confusion.
For example, when we used to give orders to our subordinates, we would blurt out, "We are all working. We should consider the problem from the perspective of the boss. If you were the boss, what would you think? " Easy to close the distance with employees, easy for employees to accept.
But since I have a stake, I can't say that. Employees will say "you are the boss now" and other sour words half jokingly. I don't talk about some things I used to talk to myself now, so the real information I get is gradually decreasing, the communication effect with employees is gradually decreasing, the power of speaking is gradually weakening, and my work performance is inversely proportional to being a professional manager.
Sometimes the boss is unhappy and thinks that he doesn't work hard after becoming a shareholder. Sometimes he simply says, "You think and deal with problems, you should change your role, you are a shareholder now" and so on. But at the critical moment, shareholders have no power at all, and the boss has the final say. Because the shares were given by the boss, he didn't really pay for them, and he didn't insist.
Since he became a shareholder, he has never really exercised his rights as a shareholder. However, due to the two-way pressure from the boss and employees and his own psychological role, his power as a professional manager has been seriously affected, which makes him very upset and he thinks it is better not to have equity.
Like this manager's experience, it is because the equity has brought about the change of role, which has led to the softening of the professional manager's scepter. After managers get the equity, the first problem they encounter is the dilemma of "traitor" and "spy": either completely stand in the boss's position and employees will regard you as a "traitor"; Or completely stand in the employee's position, the boss will say that you are a "spy", eating inside and crawling outside.
If you take care of both aspects as you used to be a pure professional manager, you will still be branded as a traitor and a spy. Therefore, once a professional manager is trapped by the shares given by his boss, it will be very embarrassing.
Equity is like a softener, which weakens the staff of professional managers, and the performance of professional managers will naturally be discounted.
Become a major shareholder-dig your own trap.
Professional managers encounter the above embarrassment when they are minority shareholders, so is it easy to be major shareholders? Let's speak with facts.
A boss wanted to invest in a new service industry and happened to meet a manager of this industry. The two hit it off, so they registered a company with a registered capital of 5 million and cash in place.
Because manager A has made a detailed business plan before, 5 million can be started completely and realize positive cash flow. The boss said I don't understand this business. I only send financial personnel, and the rest are completely managed by you. The legal representative is you. You hold 55% of the shares and I hold 45%. The premise is not to pay wages, but to reimburse the expenses incurred in the business. So manager a took office happily, became the boss seriously, and started to work grandly.
In addition to purchasing daily office supplies as planned, after recruiting technicians, administrative office staff, preparing websites and printing promotional materials, Manager A began to recruit a large number of industry veterans as business representatives with high salaries. For a time, talents in the industry gathered and the momentum was fierce.
As an absolute shareholder and legal representative, Manager A naturally goes all out and puts a lot of resources at home into the company, which is really riveting. The real boss, as the investor behind him, has left a big office of the company, but he seldom comes to the company because he is busy with other affairs.
As manager A used to be a business manager, the company started its business quickly. However, with the rapid development of the company's business, there are also many management problems, especially the management of business representatives.
Besides, manager A used to be a manager. Once he became a boss, his ability to deal with problems seemed stretched, so he persuaded his wife to resign and take care of internal affairs. For the sake of the company, the couple can be described as Dai Yue, but whoever wants his wife to join us, the management problem is more complicated, and there are opinions from top to bottom in the company.
Before long, many employees knew who the real investor was, so some employees with opinions stopped taking Manager A seriously, thinking that you were a part-time worker and opened a mom-and-pop shop-so some people began to complain about the "real boss", so the probability of investors behind them appearing in the company was high, and the identity of Manager A was embarrassing-although they still pretended to be the boss in front of employees, they had to look at people as long as the real boss was present.
Of course, the company's business is naturally much slower than originally planned; After eight or nine months, the cash flow began to be tight; When I survived the severe winter, it was already a book loss and began to default on employees' wages; By May, the book loss was close to 2 million. At the same time, some employees who had not paid for two or three months began to find trouble with Manager A, and some employees were reluctant to leave.
Manager a is very unhappy. During this period, he consulted investors many times. When it is really impossible to force investors to continue investing, investors put forward two solutions: one is to make up for the losses according to the proportion of their shares, and the other is to close the company because of bankruptcy. Manager a and his wife can only agree to the bankruptcy of the company when they discuss it. In this way, Manager A left the company helplessly, sadly and dejectedly.
In fact, this manager A occupied the position of absolute majority shareholder in this case and served as the legal representative, which can be described as double insurance, but why did something happen? The fundamental reason is that manager A is a professional manager, and no matter what identity he appears, he can't change this feature.
As a professional manager, although he occupies the position of an absolute major shareholder, he has no energy to fulfill the responsibilities and obligations of the major shareholder, so his power as a major shareholder naturally cannot be fulfilled.
But he is nominally responsible for these responsibilities and obligations, so this will inevitably affect his power as a manager. What's more, he also serves as a legal representative, which leaves him no room for manoeuvre as a manager. So he lost miserably, and he didn't lose unjustly. It can be seen that equity is more binding and even toxic to the manager's scepter.
When can equity strengthen the scepter?
The above is the softening effect of real equity on the staff of professional managers.
Also softening is the management unit. Management shares are not real shares, but more dividend shares of management, which enjoy the right to vote and share dividends during the management's tenure. This kind of stock has a dual role for managers, and may win some initiative in the board of directors, but it still has a restrictive effect on the next scepter. The management unit is actually a sesame seed cake in the mirror, which has no practical significance.
The role of dividend-paying shares in the scepter should be treated differently. If dividend-paying shares are only targeted at key senior managers and other employees are not targeted, then such shares will also soften the scepter; If it is aimed at most employees, it will have a positive effect on the scepter of managers. Because at this time, the dividend-paying stock is an incentive means and a distribution method to turn the spot into futures, which not only inspires the manager, but also inspires all the employees. The manager can better use the role of the scepter to motivate all the employees to struggle.
Futures stock itself is futures, a way to postpone spot payment, a form of distribution, a way to motivate managers and employees to fight for the future, and a way for enterprises to reduce risks.
If futures stocks are aimed at a few managers, their influence on the scepter is not obvious; If futures stocks are aimed at most employees, then futures stocks will become an effective incentive way and play a positive role in the scepter of managers.
The defect of futures stocks is that once the goal is achieved, the incentive effect will be greatly reduced, which will have a negative effect on the manager's scepter. This negative influence may come from the managers themselves, or from those employees who become rich.