(A) the fixed amount of resource tax leads to slow income growth.
From 1994 to 2006, China's resource tax revenue increased from 4.55 billion yuan to 20.73 billion yuan, with an average annual income of 8.286 billion yuan, with an average annual growth rate of 13.47%, far lower than the growth rate of all industrial and commercial taxes 18. 18%. ① Specifically, except for the rapid growth of resource tax revenue in 1995, the growth in other years was slow, basically "standing still" from 1999 to 2000, and even decreased in 1997. The stagnant trend of resource tax growth is in great contrast with the rapid growth of other taxes and the whole tax revenue. As a result, the proportion of resource tax in all industrial and commercial taxes has decreased year by year. In recent years, after the state adjusted some resources tax, the resource tax revenue increased rapidly, with the growth rates of 43.9% and 45.37% in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Even so, in 2006, the resource tax revenue only accounted for 0.55% of the total industrial and commercial tax revenue, and the proportion of resource tax decreased by nearly half compared with 1994.
(B) the relationship between resource taxes and fees is chaotic and the collection is not standardized.
At present, the nature and function of resource tax and mineral resources compensation fee converge. And the relationship is disordered. In fact, this problem has appeared since the resource tax reform and the introduction of mineral resources compensation fee in 1994. At the beginning of its establishment, resource tax is a kind of adjustment tax, that is, it regulates the differential income formed by the units developing natural resources due to the differences in resource structure and development conditions, because it was levied progressively according to the profit rate of mining enterprises for some mineral products at that time. The tax reform of 1.994 will expand the scope of collection to all mines of all minerals, regardless of whether the enterprise is profitable or not. Resource tax is no longer a simple adjustment of differential income, but a compensation income according to the ownership of resources. That is, the nature of resource tax has changed, and resource tax has the original nature of regulating differential income. It also has the nature of "resource compensation fee". From this point of view, when the role of resource tax in regulating differential income is offset by its "local tax" positioning, China's current resource tax and resource compensation fee have basically converged in nature and function (in fact, China's resource compensation fee also implements different rates for different resources, but there is no difference for the same mineral resources). This kind of practice, which is similar in nature and function, takes different forms of collection, resulting in confusion in the relationship between resources and taxes.
At the same time, in the case of resource taxes and fees, taxes and fees are collected by different departments. In particular, the fees are inconsistent in management and lack of standardization. As a result, the tax burden of resource enterprises varies from place to place, and it is impossible to form a market environment of equal competition among resource enterprises.
(C) unreasonable distribution of resources and income
In recent years, with the sharp rise in the prices of resource products such as coal and oil, the income of resource products has doubled. However, because the resource tax is a fixed tax rate, almost all the increased income falls into the hands of enterprises and individuals. In 2005, China Petroleum realized a profit of 654.38+075.6 billion yuan, an increase of 36.3% over the previous year. China Petrochemical achieved a profit of 39.558 billion yuan. As the owner of mineral resources, the country only collected 2.836 billion yuan of oil and gas resources tax that year. According to the constitution of our country, mineral resources belong to the state, and the income from price increase should belong to the public and all citizens. However, the current tax and fee system distorts the resource income distribution mechanism and needs to be reformed urgently.
(D) The current financial system is not conducive to the adjustment of the resource tax system.
Although resource tax accounts for a small proportion of all taxes, it is the source of local fiscal revenue, and even an important source of income in some places. However, since the resource tax is a local tax (no resource tax is levied on offshore oil), local governments have no power to adjust it, but only the central government. Resource tax is approved by varieties and mining areas respectively, and the adjustment workload is heavy. In addition, it is difficult to adjust the policy in time to balance the financial relationship between local governments, so it has to be adjusted in batches. For example, from 2004 to 2006, the state adjusted the coal resource tax of 20 provinces and regions five times. In addition, if you want to reduce some resource taxes. Under the current financial system, because it will affect local income, the resistance is greater. However, if adjustments are made while maintaining local vested interests, central financial subsidies are needed. Therefore, some adjustment decisions are often difficult to make.
Second, the basic idea of resource tax reform in China
(A) the comprehensive establishment of paid use of mineral resources system.
At present, an important reason for various problems in the development of mineral resources lies in the almost free use of resources. In most parts of the country, mining enterprises still adopt the "examination and approval system" in the planned economy period to obtain the mining rights and management rights of various resources. In addition to paying a small amount of resource tax, mineral resources are basically used free of charge. Although the trial auction of mining rights began in 2002, up to now, according to incomplete statistics, of the 6.5438+0.5 million mining enterprises in China, only 20,000 have obtained mining rights through market mechanism. According to China's Constitution, mineral resources belong to the state and the wealth owned by the whole people. Coal and oil are scarce and non-renewable mineral resources, and a lot of waste caused by free use will accelerate the depletion of mineral resources in China. Therefore, it is the premise of resource tax reform to replace the free system with the paid system and promote the establishment of a reasonable price system for mineral resources products.
"the State Council's Reply on Agreeing to Deepen the Pilot Implementation Plan of the Reform of the System of Paid Use of Coal Resources" (Guo Han [2006] 102) has actually laid a basic framework for the future reform of the system of tax and fee for resources, that is, the system of paid use of resources is applicable not only to coal resources enterprises, but also to all kinds of mineral resources enterprises. This is of great significance to straighten out the price system of mineral resources products in China, establish a resource-saving economy and realize sustainable development.
The basic idea of the reform of paid use of resources is to establish a reasonable cost-bearing mechanism based on paid acquisition of mining rights and resource exploration and development, so that mining enterprises can gradually bear the resource cost reasonably and make mineral products truly reflect their value. Further promote the paid acquisition of mining rights; The central finance establishes geological prospecting fund and a benign rolling mechanism between geological prospecting investment and resource income; Establish a new mechanism for environmental ecological restoration in mining areas, and urge mining enterprises to bear the environmental costs of resource development; Reasonably adjust the resource tax policy, promote enterprises to improve resource recovery rate and bear the safety cost of resource exploitation; Constantly improve the primary market of mining rights. Strengthen macro-control of resource development and management.
Of course, the implementation of the system of paid use of resources is very difficult, and it is a large-scale and wide-ranging work. It can be implemented step by step on the basis of pilot projects. The price of exploration right and mining right can be paid by installments or in the form of share conversion.
Taxes and fees coexist and each plays a different regulatory role.
The nature of taxes and fees is different, the fields of action are different, and the functions they play are different. In the current economic and social environment of China, it is not necessarily a wise choice to pursue the integration of taxes and fees blindly.
The author thinks that considering the national conditions of China and drawing lessons from international practices, the coexistence of taxes and fees should be a long-term basic idea for the reform of the resource tax and fee system in China. The main points are as follows:
First, as a universal means of regulation, resource tax mainly plays the role of regulating the differential income of resources, promoting the rational development of resources, curbing the indiscriminate exploitation of resources, and making the cost and price of resource products reflect their scarcity. At the same time, through taxation, it also raises necessary funds for the government to govern the environment and maintain intergenerational equity.
Second, as a special means of regulation, royalties or special income mainly play a role in regulating profiteering and safeguarding national and social rights and interests. In 2006, the income from special oil revenue collected in China was much higher than the total resource tax collected in that year. The special oil revenue has played an obvious role in curbing profiteering. Of course, royalties or special proceeds are not only for oil, but also for some mineral resources products with soaring prices (such as copper, tungsten and other non-ferrous metals).
Third. As a special adjustment method, mineral resources compensation fee is mainly used to ensure and promote the exploration, protection and rational development of mineral resources, improve the effective utilization rate of mineral resources, and control the phenomenon of "mining the rich and abandoning the poor" in the process of resource exploitation. Therefore, the recovery rate is a basic basis for collecting mineral resources compensation fees.
Fourthly, as a administrative charge, the royalties from exploration and mining rights are mainly used to promote the management and supervision of mining authorities and strengthen scientific guidance for exploration and development of mining enterprises.
Under the idea of coexistence of resource taxes and fees, the income system of resource taxes and fees will be further standardized. In principle, resource tax is still regarded as the fixed income of local governments (except for offshore oil resource tax, because offshore oil exploitation is difficult to be divided into provinces), so as to promote the management and protection of resource exploitation by local governments. Royalty or special income is regarded as the fixed income of the central government to meet the needs of macro-control and safeguard the interests of all people. As the income shared by the central and local governments, mineral resources compensation fees are mainly used for mineral resources exploration. As the income of the local government of mining enterprises, the royalties of exploration and mining rights are mainly used for daily management needs.
(3) Further deepen the reform of the existing resource tax system.
1. Resource tax reform. Mainly aiming at the problems of inapplicability of taxation methods, unreasonable taxation basis and narrow taxation scope, the existing resource tax system is reformed or adjusted.
First, the collection methods of "quantity quota" and "ad valorem rate" coexist. At present, most people advocate that the resource tax should be changed from "quantitative quota" to "ad valorem rate", which the author does not fully agree with. Indeed, there are some drawbacks in the current quota collection method, mainly the decoupling between tax and price, which interrupts the linkage between price and tax. The state cannot share the proceeds of price increase and cannot reflect the concept of "resource price increase returns to the public". Because the price increase of resource products reflects the scarcity of resources, not the result of the efforts of resource production enterprises, the price increase of resources is borne by the whole society, and the income from price increase should be turned over to the public. Ad valorem collection can make up for the defects of quantitative quota collection and safeguard the interests of the country and all citizens. However, there are also some problems in ad valorem collection. Because the price of resource products fluctuates due to the influence of market supply and demand, when the price of resource products falls, the ad valorem rate collection method will lead to the decline of resource tax revenue, which can neither reflect the authenticity and rationality of the cost burden of resource enterprises, but also cause damage to national rights and interests. The reason why 1986 was changed to the mode of fixed collection was not unrelated to the coal backlog and price drop at that time. From the international point of view, resource tax is not levied by a single method, and both "specific levy" and "ad valorem levy" exist. Therefore, the author suggests that the collection method should not be "one size fits all", and the collection of specific quantitative quotas and ad valorem rates should coexist. For resource products with an obvious upward trend in market price, the ad valorem rate can be levied according to the sales revenue, and for resource products with little change in market price, the specific number of quota method can still be adopted.
The second is based on the amount of mining or sales revenue. At present, there is a view that the proven reserves of resources are the tax basis of resource tax, which controls the phenomenon of "mining the rich and abandoning the poor" in the process of resource exploitation from the source. I can understand its intention, but I can't agree with it. First of all, taking reserves as tax basis will inevitably lead to a heavier tax burden on large mines than small mines, which will inevitably encourage small mines to "revive" or stimulate a large mine to be divided into several small mines, which is not conducive to the rational development and protection of resources; Secondly, it is difficult to design a reasonable tax rate or tax amount according to the reserves. Especially for ad valorem, how to price reserves is a huge problem; Thirdly, taking the reserve as tax basis, it separates the relationship between taxation and the actual production and operation of enterprises, and how to play the regulatory role of taxation. Therefore, it is not feasible to use reserve as tax basis. Judging from the practice of resource tax collection, it still follows the usual practice. For those who implement ad valorem taxation, the sales income of resource products is the tax basis, and for those who implement specific taxation, the mining amount of resource products is the tax basis.
Regarding whether the recovery rate should be regarded as an element of the tax basis, the author believes that it is not appropriate to include the resource recovery rate in the tax basis at present. Because the calculation of recovery rate is professional, it is difficult for tax authorities to master and use it, and it is not easy to operate it. The recovery rate is an important basis for collecting mineral resources compensation fees, which can better promote mining enterprises to improve the recovery rate.
The third is to further increase the resource tax rate. Since 2004, the state has adjusted the resource taxes on coal, oil and natural gas in batches. Although the adjustment range of coal tax is as high as 1 ~ 5 times, the specific increase is only 1 ~ 3 yuan per ton, which can be said to be minimal compared with the coal price of several hundred yuan per ton, and it is difficult to have any impact on coal mining and use. Since August 2007 1, the state has adjusted the resource tax of lead-zinc mine, copper mine and tungsten mine, and at most it has increased by 1.5 times, which is the largest adjustment of resource tax. How do enterprises reflect? 7 Jiangxi Copper said that the enterprise will pay the resource tax of about 710.25 million yuan, but the financial report of the enterprise also revealed that the sales income of the enterprise in the first half of this year was 20/kloc-0.0 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 43%. It can be seen that the sharp rise in resource tax is still within the tolerance of enterprises. According to relevant statistics, since 2002, the price of zinc, lead and copper in London futures has increased by nearly five times, more than six times and more than five times respectively. Therefore, even if the resource tax is adjusted by the same amount, it is not enough to straighten out the relationship between price and tax. For some resource products with large price increase, the adjustment range of resource tax or tax rate should be higher than the price increase. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a computer network and database related to the resource tax system, monitor the resource changes of key mines and key projects at any time, provide scientific basis for timely and accurate formulation and adjustment of resource tax rate or tax amount, and realize the scientific formulation of resource tax rate and tax amount.
The fourth is to adjust the scope of resource tax collection. At present, the resource tax is only levied on seven categories of mineral products, and the concept of resources is far more than these mineral products. Therefore, gradually expanding the scope of resource tax collection is also the proper meaning of resource tax system reform. First, the royalties levied on offshore oil and gas should be renamed as resource tax, and the resource tax system should be improved; Secondly, it is necessary to study whether water, forests, grasslands and wetlands should be included in the scope of resource tax collection, especially the relationship between affordability and prices and taxes, and selectively expand the scope of collection when conditions are ripe; Thirdly, due to the different distribution and scarcity of resources in different parts of China, and the fact that resource tax belongs to local taxes, the author suggests that local governments can appropriately increase the collection items of resource tax according to the specific conditions of local resources before the country uniformly adjusts the scope of resource tax collection.
2. Reform various resource charges. First, formulate and standardize the measures for the collection and management of royalties and special income, so that the central government can adjust the scope and rate of collection of royalties and special income according to law; The second is to adjust the compensation rate of mineral resources and explore the establishment of a floating rate system for mineral resources compensation; Third, appropriately adjust the charging standards of exploration and mining rights, and establish and improve the dynamic adjustment mechanism of exploration and mining rights. In short, the ideal resource tax reform should be win-win, which not only promotes the rational development and effective utilization of resources, but also ensures the necessary rights and interests of the central government and local governments, and is conducive to the benign development of mining resources enterprises. We should reform the resource tax system on this premise.