Regarding the overall influence of the economic policies of feudal countries on ancient industry and commerce, Professor Leng Pengfei believes that China's feudal commodity economy has inherited the characteristics of the slave society's commodity economy: first, most industrial production is still monopolized by the state; The second is to reveal the strong intervention of the state in the commodity economy; Third, aristocratic bureaucrats do business, and civilian businessmen are constantly transforming into bureaucrats. Because commodity economy has been isolated from social politics for a long time, it is still regarded as a vassal of feudal politics at the time of social change. [[ 1]] Mr. Tian Changwu believes that in the industrial and commercial ownership structure of the feudal monarchy in China, the government-run state-owned industry and commerce has always been in the main and dominant position, while the latter is in the secondary and subordinate position; In terms of management, it is mainly managed directly by the feudal government, prohibiting monopoly and implementing multiple manipulation and control, which shows the outstanding characteristics of strong intervention by political forces in industry and commerce. The survival of folk industry and commerce depends on the policy and management of feudal government, which is always confined to a narrow scope and operates in a distorted form, and cannot develop normally. Most of the profits of government-run industry and commerce flow into government finance. [2] Taking the industrial and commercial forms of the Tang Dynasty as an example, Liu Yufeng pointed out that the Tang Dynasty not only inherited the state-run industrial and commercial system, but also adopted various measures to establish a layered system of administrative intervention and manipulation of industry and commerce. These systems include craftsman system, group leader system, urban system, tax system and various systems of commodity production and circulation. In addition to these open and legal institutional measures, they also extorted and even plundered private industrial and commercial enterprises, manipulated industry and commerce by monetary means, established a coinage official camp, maintained a monetary system that paid equal attention to money and silk, and used money cages to investigate commodity prices. In this way, the Tang government held private industry and commerce in its hands, which made it lack freedom and vitality, and its ownership and management rights could not be effectively protected by national laws and systems, and its fate was difficult to predict and grasp, which made it at an obvious disadvantage in the whole industrial and commercial economy. Its development depends entirely on the government's policies and management, so that its industrial and commercial profits are less transformed into industrial capital, and more into land purchase and usury capital, resulting in the trinity of businessmen, landlords and usurers, which can not give full play to the role of increasing industrial investment, expanding production scale and prospering commodity economy, and can never give full play to the social significance of disintegrating feudal rule. [[3]] The Song Dynasty was recognized by the academic circles as an era of great development of commodity economy, but Professor He pointed out that the development of commodity economy in the Northern Song Dynasty was severely bound by the feudal government, which was manifested in the following aspects: First, the monopoly of some commodities increased the burden on the people and narrowed the private industrial and commercial market; Secondly, the content of folk handicraft products was restricted and some products were banned, which narrowed the production scope and market of handicraft industry; Third, predatory expropriation and heavy business tax on industrial and commercial enterprises; Fourth, monopolize border trade and overseas trade. All these have narrowed the business scope and market of industrialists and businessmen, and seriously hindered the development of commodity economy. [4] Li Xiao made an in-depth study on the industrial and commercial policies and state intervention in the Song Dynasty. He pointed out that the industrial and commercial policies of the Song Dynasty not only had the purpose of "communicating with businessmen and benefiting workers", but also had a strong color of intervention, control and plunder. There are obviously two mechanisms in the economy of Song Dynasty: one is folk and marketization; First of all, the government is administrative. On the one hand, market regulation plays a more and more important role in the process of resource allocation, and the government's behavior is more and more inclined to use and play the role of the market; However, the government's control and intervention in social and economic life has been continuously strengthened, and most profitable industrial and commercial departments have been brought into the monopoly system, which is subject to the government's financial needs. The industrial and commercial policies of the Song government tend to be loose and open, but they are more manifested in manipulation and plunder. It not only supervises production, but also controls the market, so that a large number of industrial and commercial profits flow into government finance, and through financial distribution and other means, the industrial and commercial economy operates in accordance with the will of the government to a considerable extent. As one of the market subjects, the government's participation in market activities promotes the development of commodity economy to a certain extent, but also distorts market relations, resulting in some "edema" of commodity monetary economy. Comparing the two forces of market and government, government behavior will always dominate. The economy of Song Dynasty was a unified economy under the control of feudal government. [5] Mr. Wei Jinyu mainly takes the historical facts of the Ming and Qing Dynasties as an example to point out that although there are many restrictions on the effect and scope of the economic policies and measures of the feudal regime in China, they are from "industrial and commercial food officials", "square market system", "prohibition of Chishanze", "tea horse law", "salt law", "monopoly system", "official handicraft industry" and "weaving". [[6]] If it is specific to the industrial and commercial management of the feudal government, including market management, Mr. Liu Fuding took the urban market as an example and made a qualitative discussion with reference to the relevant situation in Western European countries. He pointed out that the commodity economy in ancient China was more developed than that in medieval Western Europe, and the market played a greater role in the national economy. The rulers saw the economic inevitability of the market in the society, but also advocated that the market exchange must be carried out orderly and normally under the control of the government. In the early and middle period of feudal society, major urban markets were established by the government. From the pre-Qin period, the state had very detailed regulations on the market system, and these management systems were more perfect in the Han and Tang dynasties. These regulations reduce the uncertainty of the market and transaction costs, which is conducive to the development of production and exchange, but various restrictive measures also have obvious constraints on economic development. This is idealistic and difficult to implement. From the middle Tang Dynasty to the Song Dynasty, commodity circulation became increasingly developed, and these systems were gradually relaxed or even abolished. With the abolition of the market system, China's market system began to change from the traditional market under the rule of state power to the modern market with free competition. In ancient China, as the basic principles of market economy, the legislation and rules of private property rights and exchange contract relations were missing; The government regulations before the Tang Dynasty mainly dealt with the relationship between the government and businessmen, businessmen and consumers, and did not involve market operation. After the weakening of state management functions, guilds came into being, but the guilds in China did not make new arrangements for the market, such as restricting competition, keeping technical secrets, restricting the use of foreign capital and new production technologies. After the Song Dynasty, although the market has modern characteristics such as free entry, equal competition and no monopoly of national guilds. However, until 1840, China was still a closed domestic market, lacking the stimulation of the international trade revolution, the market scale expanded very slowly and the market cost was expensive. [7] Li Shaoqiang cleaned up the changing process of China's feudal industrial and commercial management thought, pointing out that with the consolidation and development of the feudal unified dynasty in the Western Han Dynasty, the economic theory of state control of industry and commerce under a high degree of centralization also came into being, which became the basis of industrial and commercial management policies of later dynasties. During the Tang and Song Dynasties, Ada and Wang Anshi revised the light and heavy theory, making its main idea evolve into that the state controls the source of profits, dividing profits from businessmen to officials and businessmen, and implementing policies with businessmen as the auxiliary, which achieved good results. In Ming and Qing dynasties, with the further development of commodity economy and the rise of merchant class, monopoly was increasingly impacted by the market, and the efficiency of government industry was low and unsustainable. To this end, Qiu Jun and other manpower owners in the Ming Dynasty abolished the monopoly ban and implemented industrial and commercial privatization. Under the pressure of social reality, they began to implement reforms in the late Ming Dynasty, giving up direct control over industry and commerce, and began to supervise commerce by officials, and encouraged private management reform. By the early years of Kangxi, this transformation process was finally completed. [8] Mr. Wang Jiafeng pointed out from the perspective of comparison between China and the West that both China and the West are societies that produce small commodities, which will corrode the feudal hierarchy and make businessmen an important social and political force, resulting in usury and land annexation. Therefore, the starting point of commodity economy policy in feudal countries is: it is necessary to use commodity economy to meet the needs of production and life, maintain the operation of bureaucrats and military machines, and at the same time restrain its corrosive effect, so as not to endanger the feudal political order and obtain as much financial income as possible. China is a unified centralized country. Although this reality can promote extensive commodity exchange and is conducive to the development of commodity economy, the government can almost make economic policies at will. This policy is mainly for political stability, followed by financial considerations. On the whole, this policy can be summarized as emphasizing agriculture and restraining business, and the decision to achieve economic goals mainly through political control has not changed until the Ming and Qing Dynasties. The contents of the policy mainly include: First, the sea ban has destroyed the continuity of industrial and commercial activities, overseas trade has not received the minimum political and military support, and businessmen have to be eager for quick success and instant benefit, making handicraft production in an unstable state. Second, since the Yuan and Ming Dynasties, no matter whether it is suitable or not, it has advocated compulsory delivery of cotton, which has seriously suppressed specialized production. In addition, there is a policy of levying extremely heavy taxes on developed industrial and commercial areas, which also seriously affects the reproduction and capital accumulation ability of commodity producers. Generally speaking, what China lacked in the late feudal society was not production capacity, but a certain industrial and commercial operation system, that is, there was a lack of cooperation between officials and businessmen, and their interests were inconsistent, which could not promote the relatively free development of businessmen. Therefore, the feudal government's commodity economic policy did more harm than good. [9] Madison pointed out that China's economy was similar to that of the Roman Empire more than two thousand years ago, and it was higher than that of Europe in 500- 1400 years, that is, from the 6th century to15th century. After modern times, the west has surpassed it. It shows that the bureaucratic system in China is much more effective than the feudal system of European military aristocrats in utilizing nature, but the urban bourgeoisie in China, that is, businessmen, craftsmen and loan sharks, must be attached to the official class. Although they have guilds and other federations, they do not have the city license and legal protection that businessmen in European cities have enjoyed since the Middle Ages. Bureaucracy is the main force to maintain national unity, and it is not challenged by any land aristocracy or recognized sectarian judiciary. The arbitrariness, ethnocentrism and stubbornness of this system made it impossible for China to compete with western primitive capitalism in 1500- 1800 years, and thus failed to participate in the more dynamic economic growth process thereafter. In short, the predatory financial means under the bureaucratic system and arbitrary rulings in judicial trials have restricted the development of capitalism. Suppressed people's adventurous spirit. [[ 10]] Max Weber said: Businessmen in China enjoy a wide range of freedom of freight, peaceful migration, career choice and mode of production, and society does not dislike the business spirit. However, China did not lead to the rise of capitalism. What's all this for? Some commentators have analyzed the economic functions of ancient countries in China from the perspective of the formation of property rights system, and found some side reasons. As Professor Jason pointed out, the secret lies in the country's early involvement in the economy. Feudalism in the Western Zhou Dynasty in China [[ 1 1]] was defeated by the common people and the new bureaucratic forces, forming a dual structure of officials and people. Under this structure, the bureaucratic mechanism of the property system directly leads ordinary citizens and small farmers. The feudal middle class in the Middle Ages in the West did not exist in law or practice. In this kind of society, society becomes a scattered collection of individuals, not a collection of classes or collectives. Civilians have gained economic freedom, which encourages workers and is conducive to production. However, the new form of property rights and the protection system of property rights have not been established simultaneously, and civilians have obtained an isolated form of property rights through negotiation and consultation, rather than a brand-new property rights structure. The disintegration of the feudal system in the Western Zhou Dynasty made officials replace nobles as representatives of the country. They directly dominate the civilian population and use violence to violate and change the boundaries of civilian ownership. But there is nothing to be done about the periodic merger in each historical stage. Legally, there is almost no legal structure aimed at protecting property rights and adjusting economic life. The main task of law is not to protect individual groups from harm, but only to control society more strictly by the state. The dual structure between the government and the people is formed, and the social and economic forces are very scattered, and almost no class has enough bargaining power. There is also a lack of extensive and effective demand for property rights protection in society, and there is also a lack of legal devices for property rights protection in law. In this way, the desire for investment will be restrained, and businessmen and enterprises will not prosper without official support. "Enterprise capitalism" rarely comes into being and survives. In a word, the lack of the middle layer leads to a country with a huge bureaucratic system and the potential for violence, and a decentralized mass system on the other hand. The former's decision-making lacks the restriction and correction from the lower level through the middle layer. Therefore, only through periodic oscillation can China save the constraint cost and achieve economic coordination. [[ 12]] Similar to this article, Professor Qin Hui commented on the policies of "restraining merger" and "not restraining merger" in the history of China [[ 13]]. He pointed out: only under the premise of cultural autocracy can economic freedom be possible, and the conclusion of tough economic control can be drawn from Confucianism; You can also come to the conclusion that you are against this kind of regulation. The so-called suppression of merger is to strengthen the economic monopoly of the imperial court and prevent the "street bitch" from developing a powerful private economy. Results: restraining the merger will make the rich countries richer and poorer; If the merger is not suppressed, the country will be rich and the government will be rich. The results of both are not satisfactory. The crux of the matter is that the merger in China's history is essentially an act of power rather than an economic act, that is, the powerful have no right to merge, and the powerful have merged with the poor, which is what Marx said: power rules property. [[ 14]] The result is: the state control to restrain merger seriously restricts the economic development of "bitch in the alley"; However, the laissez-faire that does not restrict the merger enables the government and goods families to merge, and the truly free competition private economy has no future under the two. The reason why China can't develop a modern economy is because of the collapse of dynasties, not because there are too many problems such as repression and non-repression, laissez-faire and state intervention, doing and not doing. The fundamental problem is that "process justice" has not been established, which is necessary for a modern economy-a standardized market economy. The feudal economy in which power plays tricks on property is unfair in the process. The laissez-faire of the state will release countless local emperors, but not a middle class: economic control will only compete with the people for profits, but it cannot make rational adjustments.