The rapid development of electronic trading systems by p>Ho-Chyuan Chen and Juping Wu has attracted researchers to study
pure restricted order market, which restricts the sequential traders from providing liquid assets completely. However, 1, the concrete empirical analysis of market behavior and the pure restrictive order of command flow are still quite lackp>ing in literature. Due to a highly
leveraged margin account and more well-informed traders, the harmful choice of expecting
have in the future market is changing expenses, which may greatly lead to another
market behavior and the orderly flow of property rights investment. Therefore, this paper
examines the pure restricted order future market quotation, Taiwan Province future exchange (TAIFEX), and the contrast of those results in the pure restricted order property investment market and supplements the existing
literature. Our research interests are in two aspects. One is related behaviors in the market, such as market variability, market depth and capacity; Others are the composition of market's
order-flow and its connection with market behavior. Previously, it was frequently examined in the nonpure restricted order market. The latter is rarely learned
in the pure restricted order market, and in the pure restricted order, the future market conditions are not particularly tested.
In a pure restricted order market, a trader may submit a market purchase order or limit orders.2
For a restricted order proposal, and its expected cost appears from reduced opportunity cost. When the price moves, immediacy, unexecuted possibility and harmful selection cost
against the restricted order. Its advantage is that it can be implemented at a better price, and when the benefit is greater than the expected cost, it will restrict the orderly placement of liquidity supply.3. The restriction order did not place Otherwise.
Foucault (1999), Glosten (1994), Handa and Schwartz (1996) and others provide
theoretical modeling for the balanced analysis of the proposed restriction order. However, the
traders' command suggests that the future market may be different from that in other markets, because the future market will attract more risk-averse expectations.
traders (Antoniou et al. 25). For these traders, when the price fluctuation increases, the limit
order proposal is higher than the increment, which leads to the increase of harmful selection cost and the benefit of fill-rate (Wald and Horrigan 25). Higher harmful choices will cost markets in the future, because margin customers are highly leveraged and traders are more
informed.4 First of all, derivative contracts are leveraged positions, and the value is
usually more volatile than the property of their subordinates. Traders who have experience in these contracts profit or the loss is in the position they control, not in the small cash expenditure they do that (original deposit), which may quickly lead them to a significant percentage
losses.