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Angang 20 1 1 event.
Large shareholders buy ore at high prices and devour profits.

20 1 1 year, affected by the slowdown of macroeconomic growth and other factors, the steel industry suffered an intermittent cold current, and the whole industry faced greater pressure to survive. A number of listed steel enterprises have predicted the performance of 20 1 1 one after another, and most of them fell sharply year-on-year. Among them, the net profit of baoshan iron & steel (6000 19, closing price 5.09 yuan) 20 1 1 decreased by more than 40%.

As an industry giant, the life of Angang Steel (000898, closing price of 4.76 yuan) is even more sad. Angang issued a performance forecast, announcing that the annual loss of 20 1 1 reached 2 1.5 1 billion yuan. This achievement is not only far inferior to Baosteel, but even inferior to some regional medium-sized enterprises in the industry. Affected by this bad news, A shares of Angang Steel fell by 4.38% on June 3 1, and H shares fell by more than 10% on that day.

What caused Angang, the former steel overlord, to fall into Pingyang? According to a survey conducted by the reporter of National Business Daily (Weibo), the cost pricing model of purchasing iron ore prices from the group made it impossible for the company to quickly respond to the decline in raw material prices; In addition, the product sales price policy is too cautious; These two factors led to the company's huge losses. 20 1 1 perennial struggle.

In fact, Angang's performance mine did not suddenly explode overnight. 20 1 1, every time the company announces its performance, analysts almost sigh "not as good as expected".

20 1 1 in the first quarter, the steel industry has just entered the early winter; Baosteel's three-month earnings per share can reach 0. 18 yuan. But at the same time, Angang's earnings per share are only 0.0 1 yuan.

But this is really just the beginning. Before the fourth quarter of 20 1 1, Angang had been struggling on the edge of profit and loss. In the second quarter, Angang's operation improved, but the interim earnings per share was only 0.03 yuan, which means that the quarterly profit in the second quarter was 0.02 yuan. In the same period, the earnings per share of baoshan iron & steel 20 1 1 semi-annual report was 0.29 yuan, and the earnings in the second quarter were 0.09 yuan.

20 1 1 In the second half of the year, the cold winter of the steel industry officially came. In the third quarter, Baosteel's earnings per share in a single quarter fell to 0.07 yuan, while Angang could barely maintain profits. In the third quarter, the company's earnings per share was only 0.003 yuan.

In the latest performance forecast, Angang explained the reasons for the huge losses in the whole year as follows: "Due to factors such as the increase in raw fuel prices higher than steel prices and the overhaul of blast furnaces, especially the sharp drop in steel prices in the fourth quarter, the main raw fuel prices are still running at a high level, which makes the company fall into a loss situation in the fourth quarter, leading to annual losses." Analyst: The main reason is that the price of minerals is higher than that of peers.

The industry downturn is a common difficulty faced by all steel enterprises. Why is Anshan Iron and Steel the most affected?

"Angang has the worst performance among all (steel) listed companies because of its special cost pricing model." An industry analyst pointed out. "Angang must buy iron ore through the group, and the price does not follow the market. This is a contract signed every six months. In this way, when iron ore prices fall, Angang must also use high-priced raw materials. This is the main reason for Angang's huge losses. "

The analyst further introduced that nearly half of the iron concentrate needed by Angang to maintain normal production and operation is provided by the group; The other 50% comes from imports. Even if you import this part, you need to go through the group channel, because Angang itself has no foreign trade qualification. "In the period of rising iron ore, this raw material supply model once played a role in locking costs for Angang Steel, but it was counterproductive when iron ore prices fell. The products produced by Angang are listed with the market, and the price is reduced when the market is not good, but the iron ore for production remains high. In this way, when the industry bears, Angang's performance will be much lower than the industry average. "

According to the research report of Shen Yin Wanguo, as of February 30th 12, the comprehensive price of steel fell by about 9%, while that of iron ore fell by about 14%. PB fine ore fell to less than 1000 yuan per ton at the end of the year.

"Overall, the price of iron ore used by Angang is 20% higher than that of its peers; At the current steel price, the company's gross profit margin should have been negative. " The above analysts pointed out.

The problem of high-priced iron ore in Angang has also attracted the attention of some brokers. Commenting on Angang's performance forecast, BOC International pointed out: "We estimate that the average purchasing cost of iron ore of 20 1 1 may increase by 50% from the previous month to1/50 yuan/ton. The management believes that the guaranteed gross profit margin needs to reach 5%~ 10%, but we expect that the company can only reach 3% in 20 1 1 year. "

This can partly explain why Angang's performance turned red earlier at 20 1 1, although the industry has not yet reached the freezing period. H-share shareholders deny related party transaction pricing.

This cost pricing model of Angang has also caused dissatisfaction among shareholders. Angang released the forecast announcement of daily related party transactions for 20 12~20 13. It is estimated that the total amount of related party transactions in 20 12 and 20 13 will not exceed 93.2 billion yuan, of which 29 billion yuan is expected to be purchased from Angang Group every year. In 20 10, the amount of main raw materials purchased by Angang from the group was 65.438+04.468 billion yuan, accounting for 47.38% of similar transactions. In addition, Angang expects that the annual purchase of "supporting services" from the Group will reach 654.38+0.68 billion yuan, and the transaction amount in 2065.438+00 will be 5.665 billion yuan, accounting for 65.8 1% of similar transactions of listed companies.

According to the announcement, the pricing benchmark for Angang Group to sell iron concentrate to listed companies is "not higher than the average import price of China iron concentrate in the first half of the year before the adjustment, plus the railway freight from Bayuquan Port to Angang, plus the price after the adjustment." 165438+1October 30, Angang announced again that the group promised to give preferential treatment on the basis of the above-mentioned pricing, and the minimum preferential amount was 5% of the average price quoted by the customs for iron concentrate imported to China in the first half of the year.

However, at the February19,65438 shareholders' meeting, the above-mentioned agreement on the supply of raw materials and services between Angang Steel and Angang Group was not passed. According to the communication between the National Business Daily reporter and Angang, the main reason why this agreement was rejected was that H-share shareholders voted against it. The product sales price policy is too cautious.

In addition to the high cost, Angang's "caution" in product sales prices has also made the company's operation worse.

Changjiang securities analyst Liu, 20 1 1 No.1 in the new wealth steel industry, has been tracking the monthly ex-factory prices of the three major steel enterprises. In May this year, Angang drastically lowered its ex-factory price, which attracted Liu's attention.

In that month, Angang lowered the 480 yuan/ton and 200 yuan/ton of hot-rolled coils and cold-rolled coils respectively, and even lowered the base price of some brands of silicon steel by 700 yuan/ton.

Liu clearly pointed out that Angang lowered its ex-factory price in May, which was much larger than Baosteel and WISCO, reflecting the relative caution of the company's marketing strategy. "In May, the price difference between Angang's main products and the market price dropped sharply to a negative value."

In order to alleviate the cost pressure, Angang slightly raised its ex-factory price in June, but Liu still believes that it is difficult to significantly improve the company's performance. On June 5438+ 10, Angang followed WISCO of Baosteel to raise the ex-factory price again, but the increase of 30~50 yuan per ton was still "lower than expected".

The product price policy is too cautious, coupled with the high cost price of iron ore, Angang Steel is under pressure at both ends, and the huge loss is of course reasonable.

After Angang and Baosteel released the third quarterly report, orient securities counted the financial data of the two companies, from which we can intuitively see the embarrassing situation of Angang: in the second quarter of 20 1 1, Baosteel's gross profit per ton of steel was 748 yuan/ton, and its profit per ton of steel was 42/kloc-0 yuan/ton; In the same period, Angang's gross profit per ton of steel was only 429 yuan/ton, and its profit per ton of steel was 2 yuan/ton. By the third quarter, Baosteel's gross profit and profit per ton of steel had dropped to 44 1 yuan/ton and 194 yuan/ton, while Angang had already suffered production losses, with gross profit and profit per ton of steel being 259 yuan/ton and-13 yuan/ton respectively. Angang complained: "I don't love children."

What is the iron ore pricing model of Angang? Why do product prices adopt a more cautious strategy than the market? The reporter of National Business Daily called Angang Steel as an investor, and the staff in charge of investor reception gave detailed answers. The tone of his answer was mixed with dissatisfaction and helplessness to the group.

National Business Daily (NBD): What is the company's iron ore pricing model?

Angang: The company purchases iron ore, 50% from Angang Group, and the other 50% is imported. The pricing of raw materials purchased from the Group is based on the agreement signed with the parent company. To put it simply, the pricing principle is that the parent company will give us a 15% discount according to the ex-factory price of customs import announced by the China Customs Department in the first half of the year. As for the import part, we purchase through the parent company's import and export company, and the pricing is similar to that of Baosteel's Changxie Mine. Because the price of iron ore in the second half of the year is lower than that in the previous second half, the purchase price of iron ore in the second half of the year is higher than that in the same industry.

NBD: What's the difference between this pricing model and companies in the same industry?

Angang: The price we purchase from the group is only adjusted once every six months. In this case, the response to the fluctuation of iron ore market price is lagging behind. The industry basically adopts spot pricing or quarterly pricing (Xie Chang Mine) for iron ore procurement, while we only adopt the same 50% pricing model as the industry, so our cost changes will lag behind the industry for half a year.

NBD: Why should we adopt such a pricing model?

Angang: Since the company went public as a whole in 2006, we have discussed the issue of purchasing iron ore with the group, and the pricing at that time was so fixed. But at that time, the international iron ore price continued to rise, so it was beneficial to investors. Although the group has suffered some losses in this respect, they own most of our shares, and the profits we earn will also increase their investment income. However, the price of iron ore has fallen, and our purchase price cannot be adjusted immediately, so the cost is really high.

NBD: Will the company consider changing this pricing model?

Angang: We are negotiating with the group. Whether the 20 12~20 13 annual raw material supply agreement signed with Angang group at our extraordinary shareholders' meeting has been revoked, we have to make a new agreement, but I don't know the final result. Our purchase price has deviated from the market price. For shareholders, it is acceptable to deviate from some shareholders if our performance is good, but our performance is poor and shareholders are very dissatisfied.

NBD: Then why do you adopt a more cautious strategy than the market when selling products?

Angang: After the new chairman came up, the management style was different, so that some of our own rights were controlled by the group.

NBD: Why not reflect these problems to the group? Give advice?

Angang: For example, if dad wants to run amok, can your son control it? We make suggestions, protest and do work. However, people (referring to Angang Group) do not regard you as their own son, but only regard Pangang as their own son. What can you do?

NBD: Will there be a new pricing model?

Angang: Yes, the pricing model was rejected by H-share shareholders. We are negotiating with the group, and he must make changes, otherwise the original pricing model of the second shareholders' meeting will still be rejected. Therefore, the advantage of our company is that we can only rely on H-share shareholders at critical moments. If you only issue shares in A-shares, it has long been pinned down by major shareholders.