1, the regulatory responsibility is not clear. From the perspective of supervision practice, there are two problems that need to be solved urgently: First, the division of responsibilities with the relevant departments of the central government is unreasonable. According to the relevant norms of China's Securities Law, this Law is applicable to the issuance and trading of stocks, corporate bonds and other securities legally recognized by the State Council in China. The issuance and trading of government bonds shall be stipulated separately by laws and administrative regulations. It can be seen that corporate bonds and government bonds, which constitute half of the securities market, are neither applicable to the Securities Law nor included in the centralized and unified management system. From the actual division of supervision, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the issuance and management of treasury bonds, the State Planning Commission is responsible for the issuance and approval of corporate bonds, the People's Bank of China is responsible for the interest rate verification of corporate bonds, and the CSRC is responsible for the listing supervision of corporate bonds. This pattern of multi-head management not only disperses the supervision power and increases the difficulty of policy coordination, but also becomes an important reason for the mutual division of the current inter-bank bond market, exchange bond market and voucher bond market to some extent. Because there is no unified bond market, on the one hand, the medium and long-term interest rates reflected by the current bond market transactions are not representative enough, and the benchmark interest rate function of national debt cannot be fully exerted. On the other hand, it also affects the coordinated progress of the securities market and weakens the promotion of the securities market to the national economy. In addition, because there is no special supervision department for private equity funds and OTC securities markets, it is easy to create a regulatory vacuum or multi-head supervision in practice. Second, the management responsibilities of local governments are not clear. After the implementation of the securities supervision system of vertical operation and management, due to the unclear management responsibilities of local governments and insufficient coordination between the two sides, there has been a phenomenon that the regulatory authorities are unable to manage and the local governments are unwilling to manage. For example, the management of delisting enterprises in the original legal person stock market, the management of stock trading of unlisted enterprises, the management of underground private equity funds, and spot disguised futures. If this situation is not reversed as soon as possible, it will inevitably affect the healthy development of the securities and futures market.

2. The current three-level supervision system can't fully adapt to the objective reality of China's securities market. According to the document number. Central Office [1999] 1 1 China's securities regulatory agencies implement a three-level supervision system of the Securities Regulatory Office of the CSRC, but at present, they actually implement a two-level supervision system of the Securities Regulatory Office of the CSRC and the Securities Regulatory Office of the CSRC. China Securities Regulatory Office and Commissioner's Office are both directly affiliated institutions of China Securities Regulatory Commission, which directly perform the duties and tasks entrusted by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In Guangdong, Liaoning, Fujian, Shandong, Zhejiang and other cities with separate plans, there are also two parallel regional securities management offices or special Commissioner offices, which not only artificially divide the market, but also violate the principle of economies of scale. In addition, no matter how big the regulatory area of the regional securities regulatory office or the Commissioner's office is, there is no subordinate regulatory agency, which weakens the sensitivity of the regulatory authorities to the market and easily forms a regulatory gap.

3. Compared with many responsibilities, the existing supervisors are still insufficient. Judging from the supervision experience of developed countries, it is necessary to equip enough supervisors to effectively carry out supervision work. To measure the adequacy of regulatory power, we should not only consider the size of the market and the number of regulatory objects, but also fully consider the complexity of regulatory functions and the breadth of regulatory fields.

4. The distribution of regulatory authority is unreasonable. The rational allocation of regulatory authority is the key factor to ensure the smooth performance of regulatory responsibilities and the realization of regulatory functions. However, judging from the norms of relevant securities laws and regulations, the authority allocation structure of China's securities regulatory authorities is unreasonable. First, heavy punishment, light remedy, heavy post-treatment and light prevention. Punishing securities violations afterwards, although it can better reflect the punishment function of regulatory power and play a deterrent and deterrent role, can not remedy or compensate the damage and losses caused by illegal acts to the market or investors. At the same time, because these measures are all handled afterwards, the regulatory authorities lack the authority to take corresponding measures to stop or prevent those illegal acts that are about to happen or have occurred but have not yet caused consequences. Second, the power of administrative law enforcement is relatively insufficient. For example, the securities regulatory authorities do not have the power of compulsory summons, the right to inquire about the freezing of bank accounts, and the effective coordination mechanism with law enforcement departments such as public security, procuratorial, court, industry and commerce, taxation and customs. This situation shows that the securities regulatory authorities in China are still a power allocation structure that focuses on control. After the development of China's securities market to a certain stage, this kind of authority allocation is not conducive to the supervision department to improve the efficiency of law enforcement, and can not meet the needs of safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of investors and maintaining the normal order of the market.

5. The supervision mode needs to be improved. China's securities market developed in the process of economic system transition, and there are still some traces of planned economy. The first is to re-examine and approve light supervision. Second, the supervision is overlapping, and the continuous crisis monitoring is light. Third, the entity is legal and the procedure is fair.