1.2 1 year dystocia: since 1993, the State Council first proposed to establish a deposit insurance fund, the system has been brewing for 2 1 year, but it has not been realized due to various objective conditions and related constraints.

2. Global development trend: The establishment of deposit insurance system has become an urgent problem in China's financial market. The system originally originated in the United States, and the US Congress passed the glass-steagall act in 1933. As of 20 13, deposit insurance systems have been established in11countries around the world.

3. Prevent moral hazard:

Moral hazard is the fundamental defect of deposit insurance system. On the one hand, the existence of deposit insurance system makes depositors' risk awareness decline; On the other hand, the risk restraint mechanism of commercial banks will be weakened, which may lead to excessive speculation. At present, there is no good strategy in the theoretical circle.

4. Clarify five questions:

First, provide implicit insurance or explicit insurance for banks? There are two kinds of insurance for depositors: explicit insurance provided by deposit insurance companies and implicit insurance provided by banks.

Second, should we provide insurance for bank assets or bank liabilities? In theory, financial stability can also be achieved by insuring bank assets, but insuring bank liabilities is more efficient.

Third, is it to provide partial insurance or full insurance? According to the research results of many scholars, the degree of deposit insurance (the ratio of the insured amount to the per capita deposit) will affect the stability of banks, and the minimum guarantee is better than the high guarantee and full insurance. Excessive protection often weakens market discipline and intensifies moral hazard. The higher the degree of insurance protection, the more serious the banking crisis will be and the effectiveness of banking supervision will be weakened.

Fourth, how does the deposit insurance system weigh the implicit subsidies of depositors and banks? The establishment of the deposit insurance system, on the one hand, reduces the cost of information processing and monitoring of banks, which is equivalent to obtaining subsidies from the deposit insurance system; On the other hand, it stimulates banks' risk-taking motives and depositors' negligence, and threatens the solvency of deposit insurance funds, which requires the government to bear the insurance costs (including various generalized rescue policies with the same nature as deposit insurance), and ultimately requires taxpayers to bear them, which is equivalent to providing subsidies to banks.

Fifth, should the deposit insurance system be flexible? Research shows that the looser the system and regulatory framework, the greater the negative impact of deposit insurance system on financial stability.

5. Insurance rate structure:

The deposit insurance system in China is difficult to produce, and the rate structure is a difficult problem. At the end of 20 13, it was reported that there was still a big dispute within the bank about whether to adopt a unified insurance rate, and there was no conclusion at present.