70% from the local government and 30% from the central government.

"Land Management Law of the People's Republic of China"

Article 55 A construction unit that obtains state-owned land use rights through transfer or other paid use methods shall, in accordance with the provisions of the State Council, The land can only be used after paying the land use right transfer fee and other paid land use fees and other fees.

From the date of implementation of this law, 30% of the paid land use fees for newly added construction land shall be turned over to the central government and 70% shall be reserved to the relevant local people's governments, all of which will be earmarked for Farmland development.

Extended information

"The problem of land transfer fees must be solved from the root"

On the occasion of the first large-scale audit of land transfer fees nationwide, the management of land transfer fees attracted attention again. Data from the Ministry of Land and Resources show that the national land transfer price increased from 129.6 billion yuan in 2001 to more than 4 trillion yuan for the first time last year, an increase of more than 30 times in 13 years, with a total total of more than 19.4 trillion yuan.

However, most of this huge amount of nearly 20 trillion yuan is in "closed operation," leading to constant violations and corruption. This can also be confirmed from the audit reports on land transfer fees in some areas in 2008 and 2010.

The problems in land transfer fee management are not the result of lack of system, but the result of failure to comply with the system. Management and use of land transfer fees, Land Management Law, "Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Regulating the Management of Revenue and Expenditures from the Transfer of State-owned Land Use Rights", "Measures for the Management of Revenue and Expenditures from the Transfer of State-owned Land Use Rights", "Collection of Paid Use Fees for New Construction Land" Regulations such as "Usage Management Measures" have regulated them. Among them, "two lines of revenue and expenditure" and strengthening the coordination and connection with the public financial budget are basic requirements.

However, no matter how "full" the system is, it cannot offset the "skeleton" in actual operation: there are those who make false accounts to reduce fixed expenditures, there are those who do not include local fund budget managers, and there are those who embezzle and misappropriate Yes, it is by no means an isolated phenomenon.

Non-compliance with the system is admittedly caused by system flaws and criminals taking the opportunity to seek rent, but the more fundamental reason lies in the land transfer fee book. While recording the main local extra-budgetary income, It also “records” the heavy demands of local interests and the inertia of local governance that has developed over the years. Developing both the economy and public services are the two top priorities of local governance.

The single economic growth model leads to a single source of local finance, limiting local governance space. In the face of increasingly complex local affairs and rigid public expenditures, relying on land price differences to supplement local fiscal revenue and making full use of local debt platforms has become a common choice for many places. Whether it is local governance obligations or debt repayment obligations, it objectively poses challenges to the management of land transfer fees.

On a subjective level, many local budget management levels are still low, and there is a lack of understanding of scientific management of land transfer fees that should be included in fund budgets. In addition, local money decisions have not yet been coordinated with the National People's Congress and other institutions. Due to the institutionalized coordination model, land transfer fees are often outside the scope of supervision.

It can be said that the chaos in land transfer fees has concentrated on the disadvantages of inconsistent local financial and administrative powers, lagging budget management, and unscientific decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, only by eradicating the shortcomings at their root can the land transfer fees be made clear.

First of all, the management of land transfer fees must be combined with the ongoing reform of the fiscal and taxation systems. The focus of the new round of fiscal and taxation system reform is to moderately adjust the relationship between the central and local governments and achieve the relative unification of local financial and administrative powers as much as possible. Once local governments can obtain long-term stable fiscal revenue that is commensurate with their management affairs, their dependence on land finance will be reduced, and an environment in which land transfer funds can be used exclusively and openly can be formed.

The issue of land transfer fees also reflects the practical need to speed up the revision of the budget law. Improving the scientific nature of budget preparation and implementation is the core of the budget law revision. How to coordinate the local fund budget with the fiscal budget, and whether the people's congress can supervise the fund budget throughout the process, the land transfer fee will be an important assessment criterion.

The problems with land transfer fees also call for the optimization of local governance. With the prospect of local governments gaining more financial power, how to regulate power and how to improve local decision-making on spending money is a major issue. Clarifying authority is also an important part of deepening reforms.