Production and release of the input situation information will lead to a certain cost, that is, release cost or direct cost. Many funds that don't disclose information voluntarily usually say that the publishing cost hinders the regular information publishing. However, today, with the rapid development of Internet technology, this statement is hard to hold. Many American funds disclose information on their websites every month. Open-end funds disclose the transaction status and complete investment portfolio in real time on their websites. The frequency of information release has paid less attention to the cost of information release itself, but more attention to the arrangement of the overall investment strategy of the fund.
In addition to the direct cost, the information discloser has to bear the potential cost. Investment funds employ many experts to analyze oil wells to build a portfolio of securities. Frequent information disclosure will make these research results available to other investors, that is, the problem of hitchhiking. So that investment funds bear a series of potential costs. Wemers(200 1) points out that when a fund is required to disclose its shareholding structure, investors have two potential costs. First, when the fund discloses its assets, other investors can more conveniently use the information of capital flow to run ahead of the fund, thus raising the price of the securities that the fund manager wants to buy. This kind of cost is considered to increase with the increase of disclosure frequency, which will reduce the explanation of fund investment. Second, information disclosure will shorten the time period for fund investors to get personal returns from fund investment. In open mutual funds, managers of direct investment management will analyze a large number of securities and look for securities with undervalued assets. These securities have low risks and above-average returns. Because information disclosure exposes the fund manager's views on the securities he has bought, it reduces the potential benefits of the fund manager's securities research. When the fund discloses its composition, potential competitors and fund holders will understand the investment strategy of the fund manager. Therefore, the fund manager's income from undervaluing securities will be limited to the period from the completion of the research to the date of the next information disclosure.
It should be pointed out that the potential cost of information disclosure varies with the size and type of funds. Because the investment scope of index funds is limited and the research cost is lower than other types of funds, the potential information disclosure is also low. Investors generally believe that large-scale funds have stronger R&D capabilities than small-scale funds, so they pay more attention to the information released by large-scale funds, thus increasing the potential cost of information disclosure of such funds. In the United States, the frequency and degree of information disclosure of large-scale funds are generally higher than that of large-scale funds, which is a good example.
In order to reduce the above potential costs, the fund is likely to take action to reduce the information content contained in the semi-annual information disclosure. Many fund managers are interested in portfolio information! Whitewash means changing the composition of the portfolio at the end of the reporting period.
Camouflage the real portfolio. There is no consensus on the extent to which the IMF is involved in window dressing activities. The attraction of "whitewashing" depends on the transaction cost of entering and leaving a security, including any execution cost related to the asking price and bid difference. This trading strategy may be meaningful for large enterprises whose stocks are actively traded in the circulation market. For small-scale and illiquid enterprise stocks, the transaction cost will exceed the benefits of cheating competitors.
Benefits of information disclosure Many scholars believe that these two costs will be covered by the potential benefits of information disclosure. One is that from the perspective of some fund managers, they are considering increasing the frequency of information disclosure; Secondly, it comes from the perspective of heron watcher who tries to formulate the policy of prosperous family.
A potential benefit of information disclosure is that the securities held by Kikwei will increase the demand for some securities. If investors buy securities because they believe that the fund manager has inside information, this may try to raise the price of these securities. Thereby increasing the return of the information disclosure leopard fund, that is, the information disclosure fund has gained the benefit of "running ahead". There is some evidence that the fund's "ahead" securities purchase can indeed bring benefits. But there is no basis to determine the potential benefits of "running ahead".
Another advantage is that some investors think that frequent credit disclosure is really valuable. Therefore, it is prepared to bear a higher burden or lower return to accept frequent information disclosure.
Frequent information disclosure makes it difficult for funds to implement strategies different from those in advertisements. The income of this information disclosure depends on the possibility of changing the strategy of the fund without the knowledge of shareholders, and also depends on the income of the strategy of deviating from the notice. Although the current regulatory authorities require disclosure every six months, some fund managers are willing to disclose the use of funds more frequently than the standard. The fact that many investors pay for the information of Momingst (a company that tracks the performance of funds and provides information to investors) shows that market participants think the information disclosed by funds is useful.
The third potential benefit of information disclosure is that information disclosure can convey the information of successful investment of enterprises in the past to prospective porcelain investors. This will attract them to buy funds.
To sum it up. It is difficult to quantify the benefits and costs of information disclosure, and it is difficult to draw a clear line between costs and benefits, which makes it more difficult to formulate information disclosure policies. Increasing the degree of public disclosure of fund information will undoubtedly increase the transparency of fund information to fund investors and help investors better understand the investment situation of funds; But at the same time, it also increases the difficulty of putting the fund into operation. The increase in cost will ultimately affect the performance of the fund and the interests of fund investors.
The ideal information disclosure policy should be moderate, which should not only help fund investors understand the necessary information about fund investment, but also protect their rights and interests; We should also fully consider the unique cost of fund information disclosure. Only in this way can it be conducive to the smooth implementation of the fund investment strategy and ultimately meet the interests of fund investors.