China Orient Asset Management Corporation: correspondingly receiving the non-performing assets of China Bank.

China Cinda Asset Management Corporation: It receives some assets from China Construction Bank and China Development Bank.

China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd.: Received the corresponding part from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.

China Great Wall Asset Management Company: Receiving the non-performing assets of China Agricultural Bank.

There is no difference now, and there is also a transfer of asset packages between them.

Extended data:

Dealing with non-performing assets of banks

I. Non-performing assets and government debts of state-owned banks

It seems to be an indisputable fact that the "bad debts" of China's banking system, especially the state-owned banking system, account for a high proportion of total bank loans. We don't have accurate figures in this respect, so we can only make an estimate based on various information. In order to estimate the risk to the greatest extent and avoid underestimating the seriousness of the problem, the most serious estimate is adopted, that is, it is estimated that non-performing assets account for 25% of the total bank loans.

State-owned enterprises are heavily in debt, of course, first of all because of institutional problems. Under the trinity state-owned economic system of state-owned enterprises, state-owned banks and government intervention, the "bad debts" owed by the state-owned economy as a whole to society will always appear in various forms (financial subsidies, triangular debts, unpaid wages, junk stocks, junk debts, inflation, etc.). , not detailed analysis here).

However, in the special form of bank bad debts, a specific reason is that since the 1980s, the China government has gradually transferred the financial responsibility of the state finance to the banks. This is reflected in the following aspects:

1. Since the "change from appropriation to loan", the government has almost stopped its capital investment in state-owned enterprises. The establishment and development of enterprises mainly rely on bank loans (approved by the government, of course), whether it is fixed capital or working capital. Many so-called "state-owned enterprises" actually have no state financial input from the beginning.

2. When the enterprise loses money, the government almost no longer gives financial subsidies to the enterprise, but the state-owned banks postpone debt repayment or increase debt. The reasons for the loss can be varied, which can be poor management or social burden (for example, the state has taken away various labor insurance funds that should have been left behind, and so on). ).

It can also be a decision-making mistake at the higher level (some enterprises should not be built at all), but as long as there is a loss, the previous method of financial subsidies is changed to the method of additional loans from banks, which is a basic direct reason for the increase in bad debts of banks.

In other words, the bad debts of banks actually play the role of "financial subsidies". Operating state-owned enterprises without state financial capital injection and subsidies will inevitably lead to a large number of non-performing assets of state-owned banks. This is the internal logic of the trinity of state-owned economy. When thinking about the relationship between state-owned enterprise debt and financial risk.

Financial liabilities should be comprehensively investigated, and the bad debts of state-owned enterprises to banks should be regarded as "quasi-government debts", while the bad debts of state-owned enterprises and government liabilities should be regarded as "national debts". This analysis can first explain two problems.

On the one hand, it is why China's state-owned economy is so large and its government debt is particularly low (the balance of government debt only accounts for about 8% of GDP).

Baidu encyclopedia-bad assets