Although Russia acquired Crimea in the Ukrainian crisis and expanded its territory again, its internal and external challenges are becoming increasingly severe and it has fallen into the most serious strategic dilemma since 2. Affected by the evolution of the international strategic pattern and the simultaneous decline of its own soft and hard power, Russia's international influence has further declined.

Economically, with the precipitous drop of international oil prices and severe western sanctions, the "troika" of investment, consumption and export, which promoted economic growth, all stalled, and the Russian economy fell into a deep recession. In 215, GDP may fall by four percentage points, and it is difficult to make a big improvement in 216. What is even more worrying is that the deformed economic structure formed for a long time is difficult to reverse. Russia is being left far behind in the wave of new energy and new industrial revolution in the world, and its position in the international division of labor system is being marginalized. Although the Russian economy will not "collapse", President Putin's vision of "entering the top five in the world economy in 22, with a per capita GDP of 35, US dollars and attracting foreign investment of more than 8 billion US dollars annually" has completely become a flower in the water.

in the political field, despite the seemingly high patriotic sentiment in Russia and the high support rate of President Putin, in fact, the political situation is undercurrent: the ruling elite is divided, the wealth and intellectual elite are drained, ethnic and religious contradictions are accumulated, the political and social consequences of economic deterioration are fermented, and the people are caught in the terrible political indifference and silence before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Under the basic system of electoral politics, the Duma election in 216 and the presidential election in 218 will become major nodes to test Russia's political and social stability.

in p>215, the core task of Russian diplomacy was to seek "breakthrough", but overall, the results were limited.

First of all, in promoting Eurasian integration, although Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have been brought into the Eurasian Economic Union, the geographical scope of the integration mechanism has been expanded, but it has not effectively promoted the free flow of goods, investment, people and services in the region, and has not achieved the sustained deepening of economic cooperation among member countries, and has not formed obvious trade creation effect. Affected by various factors such as the economic crisis and unreasonable rules, the internal trade of member States has dropped by nearly 3%, and several trade wars have occurred between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and the once-cancelled customs clearance has been resumed. At the same time, the increase in the number of member countries has not brought about further improvement in the cohesion of the alliance, and Kazakhstan and Belarus have accumulated a lot of worries and dissatisfaction with Russia. In terms of security, although the heads of CIS countries discussed anti-terrorism cooperation and other issues at the summit held in mid-October, and indicated that they would be more deeply involved in Afghan affairs, it is impossible to achieve practical results because of the huge differences in interests of countries. Russia's proposal to set up an air base in Belarus was also explicitly rejected by Belarusian President Lukashenko.

Secondly, the relationship between Russia and the West has fallen into the "freezing point" since the end of the Cold War, the distrust of Russia between the United States and Europe has rebounded sharply, and the confrontation between the two sides in the field of political security has obviously warmed up. Russia revised its "military doctrine" at the end of 214 and still regards NATO as the number one threat. Despite financial constraints, more than a quarter of the budget expenditure in 216 was allocated to military expenditure. Under the background that the pension increase does not exceed 4% and the inflation rate will be as high as 12%, the defense budget with a year-on-year increase of .8% shows that Russia is using more resources in the military field, which will further enhance the militarization level of the Russian economy and at the same time raise the "mobilization" readiness of society. After the Ukrainian crisis, NATO also adjusted its military strategy, regarded Russia as a strategic opponent again, and strengthened the integration of frontier military deployment and operational command system in Eastern Europe. Russia's air strikes in Syria have made NATO full of worries about the security of its southern wing, so it has strengthened its security cooperation with Turkey, Italy and other Mediterranean member States. While Russia launched air strikes against Syria on the east coast of the Mediterranean, NATO's Trident Contact exercise was held in the western Mediterranean. The unprecedented scale of the exercise highlighted NATO's concern and determination to deal with Russia. To be sure, although Putin met with US President Barack Obama at the G2 Summit in Antalya, Turkey on November 15th, and French President Hollande went to Russia on November 26th to discuss anti-terrorism matters after the terrorist attacks in Paris, it may weaken the intensity of confrontation between the West and Russia to some extent, indicating that the two sides will carry out some tactical cooperation, but it is impossible to fundamentally change the worries of the West about Russia and to promote a substantial recovery of relations between Russia and the West.

Third, although Russia has intensified its "eastward turn" and highlighted its cooperation with China, India, Viet Nam and other Asia-Pacific countries, it does not mean that Russia's identity and foreign strategy have completely turned to the East, nor can it make up for the losses caused by the deterioration of its relations with the West. On September 24th, Prime Minister Medvedev wrote an article entitled "Russia's New Normal and Global Challenges", with special emphasis on: "No one can cut off our natural connection with diverse European civilizations. In the future, Russian-European relations may be adjusted, but the strategic direction of cooperation, partnership development and the establishment of a unified economic space when conditions permit is unshakable! " This highlights the true thoughts of the Russian elite. At the same time, "turning eastward" is largely an emergency measure, and Russia lacks systematic strategic and realistic tools in its cooperation with eastern countries. It should also be noted that "turning eastward" is "diversified", which does not mean that all the focus of cooperation will be placed in China. As Medvedev said, "We should not only cooperate closely with China, Viet Nam, South Korea and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, but also deepen cooperation with the SCO and BRICS countries on all continents. It is wrong to interpret Russia's willingness to cooperate as a' turn'. "

fourthly, "one soft and one hard" on the issue of Ukraine and Syria is intended to "force peace" between the United States and Europe and change the dilemma of being "frozen" by the west. On the Ukrainian issue, Russia is unable to set off a big wave in the east, so it tries to make it long-term and become a "lever" to restrict Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies. Since the four-party talks between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine were held in Normandy on October 2nd, Russia has weakened its support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine to a certain extent, and recently reached an agreement with the Ukrainian government to restructure 3 billion US dollars in debt, trying to show its "soft posture" on the Ukrainian issue in exchange for the West, especially the European Union, to reduce or cancel sanctions against Russia. Russia's military action in Syria is "kill many birds with one stone": first, it carries out a "preemptive" military strike against terrorist forces to safeguard local security; The second is to maintain military bases in Tartus and Latakia, Syria, in order to seek strategic fulcrum for the Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean; Third, support Shiite forces in the Middle East, so as to maintain its strategic influence in the Middle East; The fourth is to force the United States to resume military contacts with Russia; Fifth, it is necessary to create geopolitical tensions in the Middle East to raise international oil prices, including launching cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea to Syria. More importantly, in recent years, huge natural gas fields have been discovered on the continental shelf of the Eastern Mediterranean. If these natural gas resources are developed and exported to Europe, it will bring great threat to Russia's natural gas supply to Europe, so Russia's military action is also a far-reaching consideration for the development of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean to a great extent.

The raid on Syria showed Russia's rich experience in international struggle, and the terrorist attack in Paris on November 13th also brought a slight turn for the better in Russia's efforts to improve the international environment. However, the shooting down of a Russian Su -24 fighter plane by Turkey on November 24th revealed that Russia's military action in Syria was full of risks and uncertainties. It can be seen that Russian leaders are trying to play a good hand after the Ukrainian crisis. But what is certain is that this diplomatic skill is more tactical, and it is unlikely to completely reverse the strategic decline faced by Russia, and its strategic environment and national development trend are unlikely to improve rapidly.