After Vitality 28 super-concentrated laundry detergent came out in the early 1980s, it once set off a whirlwind of "Vitality 28, Shashi Daily Chemical" in the detergent market. It has considerable popularity in the market. It is said that Vitality 28 The trademark value is as high as 1 billion yuan. But this is the image of the company before it went public. After the company went public, it "abandoned the old and embraced the new" and successively launched Boll series products based on Vitality 28. Bol concentrated laundry detergent, Bol 1:4 concentrated laundry detergent, Bol hand washing powder, Bol plus fragrance laundry detergent, Bol plus enzyme laundry detergent; Bol tableware dishwashing liquid, Bohr disinfecting tableware dishwashing liquid, Products such as Boer's antiseptic dishwashing liquid, Boer's laundry soap, Boer's dual-purpose laundry soap and other products have come out one after another. But the result is that in the fierce competition in the detergent market, not only is the Boer series difficult to be recognized by consumers, but it also makes the original Vitality 28 brand lose its reputation. This monkey-picking-the-bag-grain-only-picking-without-regarding approach to new product development is intended to satisfy the novelty-seeking mentality of some consumers, but in fact, most of the dynamic 28 brand effects and intangible assets accumulated over the years are lost.
Internationally, some successful multinational companies do not rely on constantly changing product names to please consumers. Instead, they consolidate and improve the quality of products that have become famous brands, so that they can accumulate profits over the years. The value of intangible assets is maximized, allowing the same brand image to penetrate into the hearts of generations of consumers. There are no exceptions such as Coca-Cola, Gillette Blades, Mobil Oil, etc.
Due to strategic mistakes in product development, Vitality 28 has gradually been unable to withstand the intervention of multinational companies in China's detergent market and fierce competition from domestic peers in recent years and has been defeated. Both produce detergents, but White Cat adopted the strategy of maintaining old famous brands and achieved success. In recent years, White Cat has successfully achieved low-cost expansion by taking control of local companies and then managing them according to its own model. White Cat (Chongqing) Co., Ltd., located in Wanxian City, had only a few thousand tons of detergent production capacity per year before taking control of White Cat in 1996. Now its production capacity has reached 60,000 tons; White Cat (Liaoning) located in Fushun Co., Ltd. just started operations in 1998, with annual sales reaching 100 million yuan. After Huohuo 28 went public, it implemented the so-called "second venture" of "abandoning the old and pursuing the new", and its main business became increasingly difficult. In 1998, the company's main business profit dropped by 47.19% compared with the previous year; in the first half of 1999, the company's main operating income was 62.32 million yuan, a decrease of 32.23% compared with the same period of the previous year, with an operating loss of 27.75 million yuan. As the largest shareholder of Vitality 28, Jingzhou State-owned Assets Administration Bureau holds 45.43% of the share capital and is in an absolute controlling position. When Vitality 28 allotted shares at the end of 1997, according to relevant documents, Jingzhou State-owned Assets Administration should subscribe for 4 million shares at 5.80 yuan per share, and should subscribe for the allotment of 23.2 million yuan. The Jingzhou Municipal State-owned Assets Administration promised to pay the allotment money with state-owned dividends owed by the joint-stock company over the years, and the shortfall would be paid in cash. However, until the date of the company's 1999 interim report for audit, the above-mentioned allotment money had not yet been received. Although the money for the allotment has not been received, in the announcement of share changes after the allotment, the state shares have increased from 50.297 million shares before the allotment to 54.297 million shares after the allotment. Moreover, the Hubei Accounting Firm used the Ehuishigouyanzi (98) No. 4 audit and verification to falsely claim that the 90,165,141.20 yuan of funds raised from the allotment had been fully raised.
The so-called allotment of 4 million shares with cash is actually a scam set up by the Jingzhou Municipal State-owned Assets Administration Bureau under the instruction of the board of directors of Vitality 28 Company. On November 29, 1997, the board of directors of Vitality 28 issued a clarification announcement on the allotment of state shares, and attached the opinion of the Jingzhou State-owned Assets Administration on reiterating the allotment of state shares of Vitality 28 (Group) Co., Ltd. The "Opinions" reiterated: 1. The Municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Bureau's attitude towards the allotment of state-owned shares has not changed, and it is still implemented in accordance with the "Report on the Allotment of State-owned Shares of Vitality 28 (Group) Co., Ltd." No. 52 of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Bureau [1997]. 2. Agree with the plan of the board of directors of Shashi Vitality 28 (Group) Co., Ltd. and agree to place 4 million state shares in cash and distribute the rest to public shareholders.
3. Please strictly implement the opinions on the allotment of state shares of Huohuo 28 (Group) Co., Ltd. issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Bureau, State-owned Assets Enterprise Fa [1997] No. 86.
In addition, Vigor 28 borrowed 212 million yuan in the first half of 1999, but the cash flow statement shows that the cash received from the loan was only 30 million yuan. Where did the remaining 182 million yuan go? I am afraid that only the first The major shareholder Jingzhou Municipal State-owned Assets Administration Bureau can explain clearly; also, after the implementation of 10-1-yuan distribution in 1998, the final number of dividends for legal person shares and tradable shares decreased compared with the opening number, but the dividends for state shares did not decrease but increased. As the controlling shareholder of the listed company, the Jingzhou Municipal State-owned Assets Administration Bureau should have concentrated its main energy and tried every means to improve the company's production and operation, but the controlling shareholder of Vigor 28 was distracted and kept its eyes on the other 54.57 shareholders. He used his money bag to play all kinds of tricks to drain the salary from the bottom of the cauldron, and emptied the good fortune of a listed company. Before the announcement of the interim report, the State Securities Regulatory Commission required that "listed companies must be separated from their controlling shareholders in terms of personnel, assets, and finances," prohibited "one brand, two sets of teams," and listed companies must have their own independent production, supply, and sales systems. . As a result, the controlling shareholder can no longer cover the sky with one hand. Jingzhou Municipal State-owned Assets Administration Bureau is well aware of the profits and losses of Huohuo 28 in the past few years. In order to preserve the vested interests of the state-owned equity it controls, it has taken back all the state-owned assets that were originally authorized to operate by Huohuo 28 Group Company, and will All the past expenses of Vitality 28 Group were transferred to the listed company's account. In accordance with the decree of the Jingzhou Municipal State-owned Assets Administration, the board of directors of Huohuo 28 Company wrote off the debt of 134,711,096.25 yuan owed by Huohuo 28 Group on the grounds that "Huohuo 28 Group has no economic entity" and "the group company currently has no repayment ability" and became The most important reason for the huge loss of Vitality 28, however, the ins and outs of this huge debt were not explained to investors. The company's annual report reflects that at the end of 1998, the group owed only more than 50 million yuan in other receivables, while the arrears written off in the current period were 137.41 million yuan, plus the ending balance of 112.62 million yuan in the mid-term period of 1999, totaling 247.33 million yuan. , which means that other receivables owed by the group surged by nearly 200 million yuan in the first half of the year. The root cause lies in the intricate "mother-child relationship" between Vigor 28, a listed company, and Vigor 28 Group. The 1998 annual report shows that more than 98% of Vitality 28’s main business income was achieved through the group company. Not only that, the company raised more than 70 million yuan through a share placement in 1997, and all projects were entrusted to the group for construction. What exactly does the group company bring to the listed company? In addition to the huge amount of more than 130 million yuan written off this time, the group also owes the company 112.62 million yuan. If there is still a "write-off", Vitality 28's net assets per share will drop to less than 0.60 yuan!
In addition, due to "misuse of accounting systems", "incomplete approval procedures", "errors in accounting account processing" before the "three separations", Vitality 28 was forced to adjust multiple items in previous annual statements. . After adjustment, profits in 1998 have dropped significantly. For example, Vitality 28 transferred 20% equity of Vitality Mejishi to the group company at the end of 1998, and recognized an investment income of 10.11 million yuan, accounting for 18% of the total profit for the year. It was written back because of "imperfect approval procedures." Until now, this income has not been paid back. Not credited. It also adjusted the undercount of operating costs of 16.62 million yuan in previous years and withdrawn bad debt reserves of 26.68 million yuan. Recently, at the extraordinary general meeting of shareholders, Vitality 28 once again approved the transfer of the equity held by the company in "Hubei Vitality Mejishi Laundry Products Co., Ltd. 20" to the group company with an original investment value of 47.7825 million yuan. According to the 1999 interim report, because the transaction price was not approved, the listed company returned the fixed assets originally transferred from the group company to the group company, resulting in a reduction of nearly 64.44 million yuan in fixed assets; for the same reason, the listed company returned the projects under construction to the group company, resulting in a loss of Construction in progress decreased by 34.18 million yuan during the period, and the two items totaled 98.62 million yuan. According to the announcement of the board of directors, based on the actual situation, the board of directors decided to transfer three production lines worth 47.3525 million yuan after evaluation and confirmation to the listed company to offset the advance payment.
Fixed assets and projects under construction are transferred back and forth between listed companies and group companies. The value of the assets is getting smaller and smaller, but the group's debts are getting larger and larger. This is the fundamental reason for the huge loss of Vitality 28. Before the "three-part separation", group companies once became the protective umbrella of listed companies. After the "three-part separation", listed companies became the scapegoats of group companies. It can be seen that Vitality 28’s sudden huge loss is mainly due to this kind of listed company system that is neither a donkey nor a horse.