Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. has taken back the trademark ownership of Wang Laoji, and also got a brand mental resource that has become powerful. However, Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. has not taken away all the brand assets of Wang Laoji: product formula, manufacturing technology, production capacity, channel network, sales team, media resources and brand operation ability. These important components of brand assets still remain in Hongdao's hands.
Hongdao said that he suffered a heavy blow, and the loss of Wang Laoji's Jiaduobao was tantamount to being hamstrung. What choice can Hongdao have? Hongdao has no second choice, and there will be no second choice. Only by activating last stand, a brand of Jiaduobao, can Jiaduobao herbal tea continue to be the number one brand in China.
how does jiaduobao herbal tea play against guangyao wanglaoji, who has almost become synonymous with herbal tea drinks? In addition to telling consumers that Jiaduobao is authentic herbal tea and grafting the well-known "fear of getting angry" slogan, can we only wait for the increasingly fierce "ground attack" of Guangyao Wang Laoji?
The market does not believe in tears, and sympathy does not mean consumption. In order to compete with Wang Laoji, a brand new product, Jiaduobao must use channels to intercept the brand's market tactics and win time for the re-emergence of Jiaduobao brand-Jiaduobao must block Wang Laoji, Guangzhou Pharmaceutical, out of the channel or inhibit the sales of Wang Laoji in the channel, reverse the natural selection trend of consumers and make Jiaduobao herbal tea accepted by consumers.
Channel warfare has become a heavy weapon for Jiaduobao to defeat Wang Laoji of Guangyao. This is not willing, should not, but have to fight back for the Jedi, last stand.
can channel warfare intercept brand power? Can the market compete with the mind?
If the opponent is an enterprise like Procter & Gamble, Sibao, which is famous for creating terminal interception, can only end in a gloomy way, because Procter & Gamble not only has the ability to suppress the brand, but also can learn from Sibao's Chinese marketing tactics, and win the battle with stronger firepower.
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical is not Procter & Gamble. In addition to Wang Laoji's trademark ownership and Wang Laoji's "intangible assets" of brand awareness and inertia consumption, Guangyao is still a novice in herbal tea formula, taste, production capacity, channels, sales team and media resources.
Some people say that channel interception is just three tricks: bribery (buying a store), black money (relationship) and shopping guide (sea of people tactics), which is unfair competition. It seems that the competition between brands and minds is very high and sunny.
this is not only an extreme view that enlarges individual illegal business operations into universal behaviors, but also a manifestation of adopting double value standards: isn't the media behavior of building minds also a war for scarce resources (golden media, prime time)? Those powerful enterprises, especially multinational brands, all adopt the media strategy of "saturation bombing" to grab their eyes and minds. Isn't this also an "unfair" competition for late-developing enterprises and weak brands?
Starting from Coca-Cola and Master Kong, as early as 15 years ago, the beverage industry in China established "selling services" as the basic rules of the game for channel competition.
In the era of Jiaduobao, Wang Laoji learned from and integrated the marketing modes of Coca-Cola and Master Kong for supermarkets and small shops, and the operation modes of beer and liquor for hotels and night shows, and established a channel operation system of deep co-marketing, that is, the salesmen and shopping guides of Jiaduobao were responsible for visiting the terminals covered by various dealers, taking orders, distributing goods, sorting goods, animating, promoting sales and shopping guides.
this channel operation mode is a huge sales service system that involves a lot of personnel (commonly known as crowd tactics), a lot of training, a lot of vivid investment, and integration with distributors. Without this channel (market) service system, it is impossible to penetrate the market and increase sales only by the brand awareness bombarded by bright products or advertisements.
Nongfu Spring's beverage products other than natural water are forced out of the market by Wahaha and other cottage products because they rely too much on modern retail channels and fail to establish a perfect and continuous market service support to serve the third-and fourth-tier market terminals.
In every retail terminal, there is a battle of "1 meter kill" every day: for the best display, the largest layout and the most conspicuous poster position, salesmen and shopping guides must visit the terminal frequently, establish good relations with shopkeepers, and even have face-to-face disputes or face-to-face competitions with competing salesmen.
The golden poster position in front of a small shop will be repeatedly covered by the product posters of three or five salesmen every day. What drinks are put in the refrigerator and freezer is the key to whether the products can be sold in summer. Can these be achieved by creativity, advertising (media) and brand awareness in consumers' minds?
the above terminal distribution is only the basic skills of channel operation. There are even more fierce weapons in channel warfare, which may be unheard of by "brand fundamentalists" who put their minds, positioning, creativity and advertisements on the altar of tribute, that is, refined and powerful channel operation system, and Bona Ruicheng summarized its essence as "eight positive and eight strange" market separatist channel warfare.
Eight rectifications are eight ways for enterprises to stabilize their own channel positions, including stabilizing core varieties, brands, distributors, secondary distributors, terminals, sales teams, shortening the order process and seizing core terminals. Eight wonders are the suppression or disintegration of competing products sales, including destroying varieties, demands, price plates, promotions, regions, teams, systems and rhythms.
The channel tactics of "Eight Positive and Eight Strange" don't need to be used completely, as long as they are used at a critical time, in a suitable area and for a specific target combination, it will have a huge containment effect: holding an order meeting or promoting sales before the order meeting of competing products; Implement display buyout or promotion buyout for iconic terminals and high-volume terminals; Dislocation promotion: invest resources to strengthen terminal buyout when opponents strengthen consumers, such as opening the cover offensive; Time difference promotion: strive to disrupt the opponent's promotion rhythm; Disintegrate the opponent's distribution network, force or induce the opponent to conduct all direct sales, and increase its operating costs; Targeted poaching: Disintegrate the excellent sales managers of rival enterprises or distributors.
Beverage sales have distinct seasonality. As long as the best-selling terminal (the key terminal with the largest sales volume) is "occupied" in the best-selling season, no matter how many competing products are promoted, it will be a waste of money and a fuss. When the peak season passes, the products with excessive pressure will become temporary products, and the channel dealers will ask the dealers and manufacturers to return the products. The products with this situation are studying with the prince this year, only to see that they are busy without sales-how many herbal teas are already in this situation, such as Bawang Herbal Tea, which uses shampoo thinking to operate drinks.
will jiaduobao give up these effective tactics of "channel blocking brands" in China market competition? Doesn't Jiaduobao need to use the space intercepted by channels to gain time for the growth of Jiaduobao's new brand? Channel versus brand is an inevitable choice for Jiaduobao herbal tea.
There is no pedantic question about which is more important, channel or brand. Only what kind of weapon does Jiaduobao need to take to defend its sales first position. On the contrary, it is the same for GPHL. There is no question of who is more important, mind or market, but how to turn Wang Laoji, a mental resource, into real product sales. It is by no means to find a small factory for OEM, find a big distributor and put in hundreds of millions of advertisements, and everything will be fine.
The competition between Hongdao Jiaduobao and Guangyao Wang Laoji's red pot herbal tea is a contest between giants, not a single lead, but a real triathlon: channels, products and brands must be hard. In the past 2 years in China market, no enterprise, brand and product with "hard mouth and soft legs" (eye-catching advertising and weak ability to distribute goods) has been defeated by an enterprise with strong market (channel+product+brand) operation ability.
the right way of the market is vicissitudes. Who is on the right path and who is lucky to speculate; Who is cultivating the market and who is reaping the rewards is the watershed and touchstone of the hegemony between Hongdao Jiaduobao and Guangyao Wang Laoji.