On November 8, 1996, Qinchi Group defended its title of bidder with a sky-high price of 320 million yuan. What is completely different from the reaction of the first bid winner is that the public opinion circles are more skeptical about Qin Chi. In order to absorb the advertising cost of 320 million yuan, Qin Chi must complete sales of 1.5 billion yuan in 1997, and the production and sales must be within More than 65,000 tons. How does Qin Chi plan to digest the huge advertising costs? How much production capacity does Qin Chi have? Will advertising costs be passed on to consumers? Consumer visionaries and theoretical circles are full of doubts.

In early 1997, a newspaper compiled and distributed a set of three newsletters, disclosing Qinchi's actual production capacity and the fact that it purchased Sichuan wine for blending. This set of reports was widely reproduced and attracted great attention from the public opinion circles and consumers. Because Qinchi did not take timely public relations measures and relied too much on advertising effects, consumers quickly expressed their distrust of Qinchi amid criticism from the news media. Qin Chi's market situation began to deteriorate across the board.

In 1997, although Qin Chi's advertising was still overwhelming, sales revenue dropped sharply by 300 million yuan compared with the previous year, and profits and taxes fell by 60 million yuan. From January to April 1998, Qinchi Winery's sales dropped by 50 million yuan compared with the same period in 1997. At the end of 1996 and early 1997, the company ramped up its production of liquor and had a backlog of 200 wagons. In 1997, only half of them were sold, and only 4 or 5 of the more than ten production lines in the factory were opened. The loss for the whole year was a foregone conclusion. It was once glorious. The Qinchi model has become a fleeting bubble. That year, Qinchi's sales were not the expected 1.5 billion yuan, but 650 million yuan. The next year, it dropped to 300 million yuan. From then on, it failed to recover and eventually disappeared from the media's sight.

Today’s Qinchi may have realized the mistakes it made back then and carried out some reforms. It is still surviving in the land of Qilu today. Maybe the Qinchi model has long become a classic teaching material in people’s eyes. Maybe Qinchi It is extremely difficult to revive a pool, but we are still happy to see a company that has made a big mistake come back to life.

In July 2000, according to the "Legal Daily" report, a supplier of metal wine bottle caps accused Qinchi Winery of defaulting on a loan of more than 3 million yuan. The regional intermediate people's court ruled that Qinchi lost the case and ruled Auction of the registered trademark "Qinchi".

In May 2004, at the Shandong-Zhejiang private-state-owned enterprise cooperation and development negotiation meeting, Qinchi Winery was "sold as a whole as assets" and no one cared about it.

In December 2009, the Jinan Office of China Great Wall Asset Management Company issued a debt marketing announcement stating that the company planned to transfer the debt of more than 20 million yuan held by Qinchi Winery. Quoted from Wu Xiaobo's "The Great Defeat"