1. The legal means are not perfect and there is no restriction of laws and regulations. 1994165438+122 October, just after the news of "327" national debt interest rate hike came out, the price of national debt futures in Shanghai Stock Exchange showed 5 yuan amplitude, which did not attract attention, and many irregularities were not dealt with promptly and fairly. In the early trading of the "327" national debt, the expectations of the nations were wrong. When there is an irreparable huge book loss, it will only disrupt the market and make a mess of things. On the second day of the incident, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued the Emergency Notice on Strengthening the Supervision of Treasury Bond Futures Trading, and the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Treasury Bond Futures Trading. At last, China has the first national debt futures trading regulation that binds China. But it's too late. 2. The margin requirement is unreasonable and the speculative cost is extremely low. Before the "327" incident, the Shanghai Stock Exchange stipulated that the customer margin ratio was 2.5%, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange stipulated that it was 1.5%, and the Wuhan Trading Center stipulated that it was 1%. The setting of margin level is the core of futures risk control. 500 yuan's margin can buy and sell 20,000 yuan of government bonds, which undoubtedly magnifies the potential benefits and risks of the manipulator by 40 times. Such a low margin level is far from the international standard, even worse than that of domestic commodity futures at that time, which undoubtedly makes market speculation more intense and excessive speculation is inevitable. 3. Lack of standardized management and proper early warning and monitoring system. The price limit system is a common system in the international futures industry, but before the incident, the Shanghai Stock Exchange did not take this basic means to control the price fluctuation, and the spread reached the range of 4 yuan, and the exchange did not have an early warning system. At that time, the cash flow of China government bonds was very small, so the open position of a certain variety of government bond futures should keep a reasonable proportion with the cash market flow, and set it in the computer matching system. Judging from the fact that a large number of "327" contracts were sold at the end of February 23, it is obvious that the exchange lacks real-time monitoring of each order, which leads to tens of millions of empty orders being sold through the computer matching system in a few minutes, which disrupts the market order and exploits the loopholes in market management.