Wenchengwai Pang Min
Editor Liu Jianzhong
"Lying flat" is the name given by the outside world to China Olympic Park (3883. HK)。
In fact, Aoyuan struggled for two months before it was determined that it could not repay its dollar debt. In the meantime, the three major rating agencies have continuously downgraded their credit ratings, and various negative news and self-help actions are intertwined. But in the end, two offshore debts with a total principal of 688 million dollars expired, which became the last straw to crush the camel.
Aoyuan is an established real estate enterprise, headquartered in Guangdong, and one of the top 30 real estate enterprises in China. * * * has three listed entities, namely China Aoyuan (3883. HK), Aoyuan Health (3662.HK) and Aoyuan Meigu (0006 15. SZ)。
Since the second half of 20021,the double tightening of market and financing caused by regulatory changes, head housing enterprises and other factors has caused more real estate enterprises to fall into liquidity dilemma. The crisis gradually spread from the red and orange files in the "three red lines" evaluation system to the yellow files and even the green files.
Why do yellow enterprises that seem to be financially healthy also explode? Aoyuan is a typical sample. It is an indisputable fact that the external environment is deteriorating rapidly, but the mine disaster in Aoyuan is inseparable from its own weakness.
In the process of rapid expansion, the strength did not keep up with the ambition, which made Aoyuan accumulate many problems. Its development relies heavily on external financing, and the non-standard financing with high interest rate accounts for a relatively high proportion, and the problem of invisible debt is prominent. After stepping on the wrong industry rhythm in 2020, it is difficult for the soil storage to form a high-quality cash return. Caijing 11 also found some doubts in its 2020 financial report.
If the real estate market does not enter the winter instantly, the problems of Aoyuan will be gradually exposed. It's just that the process will be more gentle and hidden.
Why can't Qian Duoduo pay its debts?
Judging from the financial data alone, it seems that Aoyuan should not fall so soon.
According to the interim report of 20021,the interest-bearing debt of Aoyuan due within one year is about 52 1.7 billion yuan, while the book cash and equivalents are about 68.32 billion yuan. After deducting the limited funds of 654.38+05.96 billion yuan, there is still about 52.37 billion yuan left, which can completely cover its short-term interest-bearing debts.
This is the same problem faced by many housing enterprises: there are tens of billions of funds lying on the books, but there are billions of debts that cannot be repaid.
The comprehensive interview of Caijing 11 found that the main reasons are as follows:
First, there are many ways for real estate companies to adjust their watches. Housing enterprises often withdraw funds in various ways at key nodes such as the middle of the year and the end of the year, and then withdraw funds after the time, resulting in inflated book funds.
Second, the supervision of pre-sale funds has become stricter as a whole. There are not many funds that housing enterprises can use to return to their capital.
Third, the annual report disclosed by listed companies is the situation after the merger, and the funds may be mainly concentrated in subsidiary projects, which can really be recovered by the parent company to pay off debts.
The funds actually available to these enterprises are far less than those disclosed in the books.
It is worth noting that Aoyuan's book cash and equivalents account for about 20% of the total assets, ranking first among the top 50 housing enterprises, with an average of about 1 1. 12%. (The top 50 enterprises are the top 50 listed real estate enterprises in Kerry 202 1 sales list in the first half of the year, hereinafter referred to as "the top 50 real estate enterprises").
This data reflects from the side that the funds actually stored in the Olympic Park are more than their own body volume. But why are you still unable to pay your debts? "Eleventh Finance" asked Aoyuan for advice, and Aoyuan said it could not reply at present.
Although the crisis in the Olympic Park was only exposed to the public in June, the crisis had already sprouted in the first half of 20021last year, and the self-help action had already begun.
The cash flow statement shows that in the first half of 20021,there was a net cash inflow of RMB 2 billion from operating activities, RMB 21200 million from investment activities and RMB1220 million from financing activities. Compared with previous years, the change is obvious.
These figures roughly outline the overall situation of the Olympic Park in the first half of 200212002: strive to return blood and reduce land acquisition; Investment activities are greatly reduced, and funds may even be withdrawn; The financing pressure is huge, and the money melted out is far less than the money returned.
Li Xiao (pseudonym), a middle-level employee in a certain area of Aoyuan, told the reporter of Caijing Eleventh that the group was short of funds and had a clue as early as 20021. The most obvious thing is that the standard of land acquisition is getting stricter and stricter. Since 20021,Aoyuan has been more and more cautious in land acquisition, acquisition and merger, and has very strict requirements on project development cycle, payment calculation, maximum cash flow and other indicators, especially paying attention to cash flow calculation.
"When we originally reported ten plots of land, there were always one or two that were a bit eye-catching. When we bid for twenty or thirty plots, there is always one. But obviously, this ratio is getting lower and lower, "Li Xiao said. He also mentioned that throughout 202 1, the whole company was struggling to pay back the money, and the discount was strong, and the price was exchanged for the quantity, and the sales assessment requirements were very strict.
According to the rough statistics of Caijing Eleventh, among the land reserves disclosed by the Olympic Park, there were about 100 new projects in 2020, while in the first half of 2026, only 1 0 was added.
Aoyuan lost too much blood on the financing side. Among the top 50 housing enterprises, there were 18 enterprises with net cash outflow from financing activities in the first half of 2002/kloc-0, and the net outflow from Aoyuan was 65.438+0.22 billion yuan, only higher than that of Sunshine City (-65.438+0.29 billion yuan) and R&F Real Estate (-65.438+0.88 billion yuan).
The operation end is limited, and Aoyuan tries its best to save it at the investment end. In the first half of 2002150, only five companies had net cash inflows from investment activities. The net inflow of Aoyuan is 2010.20 billion yuan, which is much higher than the second-ranked Midea Real Estate (654.38+0.654.38+0.20 billion yuan).
In the second half of the year, the Evergrande crisis triggered a series of chain reactions, and the consumer market and the capital market were very sensitive to the negative information of housing enterprises. "Confidence" is becoming more and more precious and fragile. 1 1 At the beginning of the year, Fitch pointed out in a report to downgrade the credit rating of Aoyuan that although Aoyuan issued 654,380.8 billion yuan of domestic bonds in July 2002 1 year and placed 399 million Hong Kong dollars of shares in June1year, there was basically no financing channel in the capital market.
Self-hematopoietic capacity is limited, so it takes time to stop blood transfusion and sell assets. Faced with two large dollar debts due on June 5438+ 10, Aoyuan struggled for some time and finally broke out. The above two US dollar debts totaled about 4.4 billion yuan, which were due on October 20, 65438/KLOC-0 and October 23, 65438/KLOC-0 respectively.
"If it wasn't June 5438+this year 10 just expired, but it was half a year to a year late, Aoyuan might still survive. Under the current circumstances, even relatively high-quality housing enterprises may not be able to survive if they encounter super-large-scale debts due. " A private real estate investor's evaluation of "Financial Eleventh". "Of course, the poor foundation of the Olympic Park itself is definitely a problem," he immediately added.
A weak dark horse
Aoyuan stepped on the wrong pace of the industry, and in the top-down stage, it still took mergers and acquisitions as the main means, expanded greatly, and laid out a large number of old reform projects that sank the market and deposited funds.
In 20 15, the contracted sales of Aoyuan reached 654.38+052 billion yuan, ranking 68. From 20 16, it expanded at a high speed. In 20 19, Aoyuan finally ushered in its own bright moment-sales exceeded 1000 billion, entering the top 30.
After 20 16, high turnover and high leverage have become common rules of the game in the real estate industry. Most housing enterprises are expanding at a high speed, and Aoyuan is just one of them. In most cities of China, the house price has almost doubled from 20 15 to 20 19. If there is no corresponding expansion at this time, it means that the enterprise can't see the general trend clearly. The above investors said.
However, by 2020, on the eve of policy tightening, the Olympic Park will continue to expand aggressively.
In 2020, the Olympic Park will add about 2010.5 million square meters of soil, with a year-on-year increase of 25%, and the expenditure on land acquisition will reach 45 billion yuan, exceeding the budget by 35 billion yuan. In terms of cash flow, in 2020, the net cash outflow from Aoyuan investment activities was 42.5 billion yuan, and the net cash inflow from financing activities was 47.6 billion yuan. The scale of these two indicators ranks second among the top 50 housing enterprises.
In order to develop these projects, capital investment will be needed one after another. In August of that year, the regulatory authorities began to use the "three red lines" to limit the leverage of housing enterprises; 65438+At the end of February, the "two red lines" restricting the housing-related loans of banking financial institutions were released, and the financing sources of housing enterprises were further tightened. These policies and the subsequent chain reaction have rewritten the old rules of the game of housing enterprises.
After the tightening of financing, housing enterprises can not continue to borrow new and old routines, but also rely on real business activities. However, the hematopoietic capacity of Aoyuan itself is relatively weak. Fitch pointed out in a report on June 5438+ 10, 2020 that Aoyuan's business has a high penetration rate in low-tier cities. Compared with real estate enterprises with the same rating, commercial real estate business accounts for a relatively large proportion, which is more vulnerable to the downside risks of the industry.
At that time, Fitch rated Aoyuan BB, just like Xuhui and Longguang. The average contract sales price of Aoyuan is about RMB 10022 per square meter, which is lower than that of 500 yuan Zhong 13 yuan and 17000.
On the whole, the layout of soil storage in the Austrian Garden is low, wide but not deep. According to the data compiled by Han Yizhiku at the end of the first half of 2020, the soil storage area of Aoyuan is about 37.6% in first-and second-tier cities and 62.4% in third-and fourth-tier cities. (Caijing 11 adjusted the classification of some second-tier cities. In addition to Guangdong, where the base camp is located, the cities in other regions are not deeply cultivated. Among more than 90 cities where the Olympic Park is stationed, more than 80 cities have soil reserves of less than 2%.
Fitch also mentioned that in 2020, Aoyuan commercial real estate products will account for 23% of the saleable resources. Compared with residential real estate, commercial real estate has a lower conversion rate and is more susceptible to the economic cycle.
An insider told Caijing 11 that Aoyuan has taken many projects in the third, fourth and fifth tier cities, but the quality of commercial projects is not high and the payment is slow. In addition, Aoyuan County Group and Lv Wen Group have taken dozens of projects in many small counties. Although the land price is low and there is not much capital, there is still a certain leverage ratio. Due to the sluggish market, it is impossible to obtain mortgage loans, and the follow-up sales-payment cycle of these projects is longer.
In addition, in recent years, Aoyuan has vigorously promoted the old reform business, and the number of projects has rapidly increased from 16 and 438+08 at the end of 1965 to more than 60 by the end of 2020. These old renovation projects are mainly concentrated in Greater Bay Area, with high quality and predictable gross profit. But the problem is that the old reform cycle is long, and funds need to be deposited in the early stage, and it is even more impossible to return blood to the company in a short time. According to the data of Aoyuan Group, a domestic bond issuer, at the end of 2020, the old reform fund accounted for about one-third of its minority shareholders' rights and interests, which was about 654.38+03.6 billion yuan.
The above-mentioned people in Aoyuan believe that the development of Aoyuan has been too radical in the past few years, but the capital, management and product strength are not strong enough to keep up with the rapid expansion of business and there are many internal loopholes.
The first is the organizational structure. Before March 20021year, Aoyuan was divided into two groups: real estate and commercial real estate. These two groups are relatively independent, fighting on their own and competing with each other like horse racing. Although the horse racing mechanism helps to expand, the establishment of two teams makes the personnel structure complex and redundant, which increases the communication cost, reduces the operational efficiency and increases the financial risk. "You doubled in two years, I have to double. Everyone's land acquisition has become very radical, and the efficiency of capital use is inevitable. " The source said.
Secondly, the project management is extensive. Merger and acquisition is an important means to expand the Olympic Park. However, the lack of attention to the market feasibility study and extensive preliminary judgment make it easier for the Olympic Park to step on the merger and acquisition project.
Li Xiao's feeling is that many times, people in the market research department failed to stick to their own judgments and positions, but kept giving way to the investment and development departments and regional leaders.
Some projects should not be acquired from the market point of view, but they were finally won. Even in order to make the calculated value look good, the estimated sales cycle of the marketing department can be changed from 18 months to 14 months, and the selling price can be changed from 15000 to 17000 months. "At the time of radical expansion, housing enterprises have this problem to some extent. However, two or three of the 20 projects are like this and can still operate. If there are 10 projects, the company can't move. " Li Xiao said.
In addition, in the past few years of radical expansion, Aoyuan has been constantly recruiting people, but the people who come in are mixed. Li Xiao thinks that some colleagues of the same type and level are of high quality, such as pilots, but many colleagues have not even got their driver's licenses. Not to mention the mixed-in speculators, corruption, the project itself can not make money, but can make a lot of money. The quality of personnel is wrong, which leads to many times that the business cannot be maintained at a unified high level.
Intangible debt
How big is this hole? You can't just read books. Beneath the water, invisible interest-bearing debts have long been undercurrent. These hidden debts often enter the public's field of vision when there are problems.
For example, in June last year, 5438+065438+ 10, Aoyuan Group was exposed to default on trust loans of 65.9 million yuan. This trust named "Shenwan Lingxin Assets-Aggregate Asset Management Plan No.2" is a product of Aggregate Series, and will expire on June165438+1October 12. The other three products in this series will expire in February of the year 65438+.
The underlying asset of this asset management plan may actually be the current payment between Austrian companies.
The reasons are as follows: According to public information, Huiju No.2 is mainly used to "transfer the accounts receivable creditor's rights held by suppliers to the merged company of Aoyuan Group at a discount", and Aoyuan Group provides joint liability guarantee. Huiju No.2 was borrowed by Qiheng Logistics Co., Ltd. in Zhuhai Free Trade Zone, and Guangzhou Hongkai Real Estate Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Aoyuan, holds 60% equity of Qiheng Logistics, which means that Qiheng Logistics is actually a company controlled by Aoyuan.
According to the public judgment documents, on June 6, 2026, 6 1, 1, 2022, 1, 1 2,2022, Shen Wanlingxin applied to the court for non-litigation property preservation of about 207 million yuan and 96 million yuan respectively.
For another example, in June 5438+February, when Aoyuan wealth management products broke out, it was disclosed that the company's related funds and wealth management products totaled about 6 billion yuan, and the wealth management products managed by third-party companies were about 2.4 billion yuan.
At the beginning of 2020, some short sellers issued a report, which analyzed in detail the problems of Aoyuan's stock clearing and self-financing. It pointed out in the report that the rights and interests of the non-controlling shareholders of Aoyuan are mainly composed of Guangzhou Aoyuan Equity Investment Fund Management Co., Ltd., Zhuhai Ding Sheng Equity Investment Fund Management Co., Ltd. and different trust, insurance and investment companies. Among them, Guangzhou Aoyuan Equity Investment Fund Management Co., Ltd. is Aoyuan Company and is suspected of being responsible for its own profits and losses. There are indications that the heyday of Zhuhai is also related to the Olympic Park.
It is a tacit "secret" for real estate enterprises to disclose stocks, bonds and self-raised funds. With the continuous outbreak of housing enterprises, these once secret operations are gradually exposed.
There are two main hidden dangers of real debt: first, the calculation of debt ratio index is easy to be distorted, which affects the judgment of company risk; Second, the financial expenses that should actually be used as interest expenses are not reflected in the income statement, which affects the judgment of the real profit level of the enterprise.
The minority shareholders' rights and interests of China Aoyuan account for about 66% of the total shareholders' rights and interests, which is at a high level in the industry (the average value of the top 50 is about 45%), while its minority shareholders' profit and loss ratio has always remained below 20%. People have always questioned this. Aoyuan's explanation is that there will be a cycle of 2-3 years from project input to settlement, and it is expected to improve in 2020. But from the data point of view, this improvement is not obvious.
A variety of financing methods reflect Aoyuan's thirst for funds. Aoyuan's own financial strength is not strong, its development is highly dependent on external financing, and non-standard financing with high interest rate accounts for a relatively high proportion. Referring to the rating report of United Credit, at the end of 2020, the domestic bond issuer Aoyuan Group's trust and other financing accounted for about 47%. In the past few years, the average financing cost disclosed by Aoyuan was 7.2%~7.5%, which was higher than that of peers. In 2020, the average financing cost of 50 real estate enterprises monitored by Han Yizhiku is about 6. 1 1%.
Li Xiao felt helpless. Facing the non-standard financing interest rates of 13 and 14, the operation of real estate projects is like walking a tightrope. Ideally, the net interest rate can reach 5%~8%, but if you are not careful, the profits will be eaten up or even lost. Housing enterprises with high proportion of their own funds and low financing interest rate have higher potential profit space and more room for manoeuvre. However, for housing enterprises with weak foundation, rapid expansion and hunger for funds, only by continuously increasing their turnover and covering five or even ten pots with a pot cover can the rate of return of their own funds be improved, but the risks will also be superimposed.
Suspicious 2020
Eleven finance found that there are still some doubts about Aoyuan.
First, in the past two years, the payment amount calculated by this company based on book data is far from other disclosure calculations.
Generally speaking, the actual increase of advance receipts in the current year can be obtained by adding the current change of advance receipts to operating income. For real estate companies, this figure is roughly the same as the money collected in that year, and there will be some errors, but the difference will not be too big.
As can be seen from the following table, in 2020 and the first half of 20021,the payment amount and payment rate from the sale of the rights and interests of the integrated Olympic Park are quite different from the results calculated in the report.
Even considering that Aoyuan disposed of some subsidiaries during this period, this difference is still unacceptable. Take 2020 as an example. At that time, Aoyuan Watch Company received about 7.5 billion yuan in advance. Even with this 7.5 billion, there is still a gap of nearly 30 billion (844-474-75=295).
There are several possible explanations for this difference:
First, the contracted sales of Aoyuan are artificially high. For housing enterprises, contract sales is the most direct and loudest signboard. Raising the ranking, even hitting 100 billion yuan, means fame and honor, and also means more financing opportunities. On July 20 19 and March 2020, China Aoyuan was shorted twice, and all the short sellers questioned the authenticity of its sales.
Second, the real repayment rate or equity ratio of Aoyuan is lower than the disclosed data.
Third, the current financial statements may not accurately reflect the overall situation of the Olympic Park. Assuming that all the data disclosed by Aoyuan are true and credible, taking 2020 as an example, the full-caliber payment amount of Aoyuan in that year is about11300 million yuan, and the estimated payment amount within the scope of its merger is about 47.4 billion yuan. In other words, if the equity ratio is not considered, as much as 65.6 billion yuan of payments in the Olympic Park occurred off-balance-sheet.
In 2020, the number of joint venture projects that Aoyuan participated in increased from 65,438+00 in 2065,438+09 to 90, and the guarantee provided for joint venture companies increased from 8 billion yuan in 2065,438+09 to 24 billion yuan.
According to the above-mentioned insiders of Aoyuan, sometimes, the apparent reduction of liabilities is actually passed on to the partners, and the company provides corresponding guarantees in the name of the partners. The investors interviewed also pointed out that this is the operation that real estate companies will take when reducing on-balance-sheet liabilities.
This means that the financial statements of Aoyuan may not accurately reflect its overall situation, and its real debt scale is becoming more and more mysterious.
Second, Aoyuan "disposed" a number of subsidiaries to a company that may be related.
In 2020, the gross profit margin of China Aoyuan dropped sharply, but the net profit rate increased slightly, mainly due to its non-operating profit and loss. Among them, the exchange gain and loss was 65.438+0.84 billion yuan, and the profit from the sale of subsidiaries was 65.438+0.22 billion yuan, accounting for about 22.54% of the pre-tax net profit of the year.
Caijing 11 found that many disposal transactions of China Aoyuan Disposal Subsidiary were made by the same company, and this company is inextricably linked with Aoyuan.
The annual report shows that China Aoyuan disposed of 50 subsidiaries in 2020. There is a holding relationship between these companies. If the controlled companies are excluded, there are 34 companies left, of which 6 companies have no transaction consideration. We took the remaining 28 companies as the main subsidiaries they sold that year. After the disposal of these 28 companies, Aoyuan still holds 5 1% and above, 19, accounting for nearly 70%.
Generally speaking, holding 5 1% or above means that you have control over this company and need to consider including it in the scope of merger. Naturally, it is not a sale of subsidiaries. However, many real estate companies will explain that they cannot "control" the company alone on the grounds of the company's articles of association in order to realize the "listing" of their subsidiaries. Aoyuan also gave the same reason this time.
However, I'm afraid this is not the case. As can be seen from the following table, the acquirer "Guangzhou Yi Sheng Real Estate Co., Ltd." (hereinafter referred to as "Guangzhou Yi Sheng") invested in ten subsidiaries of Aoyuan in that year. At that time, Guangzhou Yi Sheng was founded less than one year ago, and its legal representative, Wu Pengfei, was the legal representative of Zhuhai Ding Sheng. Guangzhou Aosheng Investment Co., Ltd. was also established in 2020. Now it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Aoyuan, and one of its first directors is Wu Pengfei.
In addition, Caijing 11 did not find any information about the changes in the shares of the three companies, nor did it know who their shares were sold to in that year. At present, these three companies are still held by Aoyuan 100%.
According to the bond issuance data of Aoyuan Group, by the end of 2020, Aoyuan's rights and interests in real estate projects involving many listed companies were still 65,438+000%.
Caijing 11 consulted China Aoyuan on the above questions, but Aoyuan said it would not reply for the time being.
Road to self-help
After the mine explosion, lawsuits followed. According to public information, Aoyuan Group, the main body of its domestic real estate business, has executed three cases with a total execution amount of about 265,438+64 million yuan.
Pan Hao, an analyst with RealData, pointed out that Aoyuan is similar to other housing enterprises in crisis. In the whole liquidity system, first of all, one gear is stuck. Due to the lack of confidence in lubrication, the fault is continuously transmitted to other linkage gears, and finally the system completely fails.
Now, Aoyuan needs to revitalize this system.
After it officially announced the overseas debt restructuring, it was reported in the market that a Yang Kang real estate state-owned enterprise in Shandong intends to become the controlling shareholder of China Aoyuan, and companies such as Guangdong Yuehai Land and Yuexiu Real Estate are also investigating the projects of China Aoyuan in Guangzhou and Zhuhai. Up to now, the company has not announced any significant substantive progress.
According to REDD news, a state-owned enterprise of Yang Kang Real Estate rumored by the market is Zhongyu Real Estate, a subsidiary of Yiyang Group in Guo Xin.
Aoyuan and Yin Zhong Real Estate will establish a cooperative relationship in 2020. Shenzhen Industrial Development Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Aoyuan, holds 40% shares in Yin Zhong Real Estate. Yin Zhong holds 5 1% equity of Jinan Sunshine Baiyi Real Estate Company, and Jinan Sunshine 100 International New City is a new project in the land reserve of Aoyuan in 2020. In the same year, the Olympic Park also added "Jinan Zhongyu Plaza" and "Jinan Zhongyu Royal Garden" and other projects.
Several interviewees said that the decision-making process of state-owned enterprises is generally complicated, and this potential war investment seems to be still uncertain. In addition, selling individual assets may be more efficient than selling stocks as a whole. Generally speaking, the risk of equity acquisition is greater, especially when there is a problem with the company's credit, financial institutions and war investors need to comprehensively and carefully check the underlying assets and find out all kinds of hidden debts. Therefore, they are often more willing to directly acquire quality assets.
At present, for housing enterprises in crisis, selling assets is also a difficult game. The above-mentioned investors mentioned that some acquirers will push the discount to a very low level during the negotiation, even slightly higher than the interest-bearing liabilities of this project. For example, for a project that can sell 2 billion yuan, among the 1 billion invested, 700 million is a development loan, then the acquirer will start to quote from 800 million. Housing enterprises that do not want to sell assets cheaply often cannot accept such conditions.
For Aoyuan, it may face another potential pressure, that is, to reduce liabilities by disposing of assets. Fitch pointed out that housing enterprises with relatively low minority shareholders' rights and interests can reduce their leverage by disposing of project equity. As mentioned above, the minority shareholders' rights and interests of Aoyuan are relatively high, which reduces its financial flexibility.
In any case, all housing enterprises entering ICU need to release good information to the outside world to maintain fragile confidence and get a break.
The writer is a researcher and intern at Caijing Industrial Research Center.