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After 12 years of breakthrough, relying on low-cost milk to enter 1 billion yuan a year and then turn to high-end, did Junlebao tear off the Sanlu label?

Author/Shao Lanjie

Editor/Sun Jing

"Hebei Dairy has stood up". After 9, Zhang Tao's hometown was Baoding, Hebei Province. He still remembers that when he bought milk in the school cafeteria in junior high school, Junlebao wrote these striking characters on the bottle.

"After the melamine incident in 28, many students raised cattle at home, and the milk had to be dumped, because no one collected milk, so when we saw these words, we really wanted to buy them. At that time, the milk in Junlebao was not very delicious, but it would be a few cents cheaper than the brands outside the province. "

Twelve years later, standing in front of the shelves of convenience stores in Beijing, Zhang Tao didn't even recognize that a bottle of high-end fresh milk with a price of more than 1 yuan came from Junlebao.

Junlebao, which started with cost performance and is already preparing for IPO, is trying to tear off the label of "low price". This ill-fated dairy company actually has many labels on it, but the most difficult thing to get rid of is the historical label-as a native dairy company in Shijiazhuang, Junlebao still has to explain its relationship with Sanlu frequently.

the price "stands up" first

has Hebei dairy industry stood up? It's hard to say yet, but the price in Junlebao has stood up.

a 45ml bottle of Yue Xianhuo costs 12.9 yuan. When Zhang Tao found out from the small print of the bottle's production information that this product came from his hometown of Junlebao, he was surprised. Although he still supports his hometown brand, the reality is that he can't afford to buy Junlebao, so he can only put 95ml of fresh milk with less than 1 yuan next to him into the shopping basket.

Figure/vision china

In the past year, Junlebao concentrated on high-end products: from November 219, it first introduced the fresh milk product Yue Xianhuo with INF technology (.9 second ultra-instantaneous sterilization), and then entered the field of A2 milk powder and organic milk powder, and upgraded its yogurt brand "Pure Enjoy" to no added formula.

Every time you make a move, you bring Junlebao's products to a new price belt. Junlebao, which you ignored in the past, is now beyond your reach. Under the guidance of these products, Junlebao entered the shelves of the first-tier cities in the north, Guangzhou and Guangzhou, which was difficult for it to reach before.

Junlebao has always occupied a place in the dairy market with low-temperature yogurt with high cost performance. In 214, when Junlebao decided to enter the field of milk powder, it continued to take the cost-effective route. At that time, domestic milk powder was in the development stage of high-end and high price, and a can of ordinary milk powder cost two or three hundred pieces. Junlebao, on the other hand, cut into the milk powder industry by means of online and telephone direct sales and free direct supply from manufacturers. The products were all priced at 13 yuan (9g) from the first to third paragraphs, and shouted, "13 yuan/can is just an international normal price."

Just as Xiaomi challenges the existing pattern of domestic mobile phones with the attitude of "price butcher", Junlebao's move is quite a spoiler. Intriguingly, on April 23rd of that year, official website was hacked only 11 days after Junlebao milk powder went on the market.

"Junlebao's milk powder had been sold to 99 yuan/cans at that time." Wang Jia, a channel worker of a milk powder enterprise in a province in North China, worked in the milk powder industry for seven or eight years. When I saw Junlebao flash this trick, I could only sigh with emotion in my heart, "They really don't take the usual road". But soon, in less than a year, Junlebao milk powder entered the offline channel, which is no different from other milk powders.

Wang Jia told AI Finance & Economics that the milk powder market in Junlebao has developed rapidly, because the ex-factory price of products is low, leaving a large profit margin for dealers and stores. He observed that Junlebao cut into the milk powder market and directly squeezed the space of a large number of unknown third-and fourth-line brands of milk powder.

"Junlebao has made great efforts in container delivery, promotion activities and resource support, and invested a lot in advertising." Wang Jia often visits the market, and besides his own products, he is also very concerned about the trends of the industry. He found that before the introduction of high-end organic milk powder, each can of Junlebao milk powder had increased by 3 to 4 yuan.

However, after Junlebao introduced the high-end organic product "Youcui", Wang Jia observed that the actual price of milk powder was not that high. "In offline stores, the retail price of 8 grams of Youcui milk powder is 329 yuan, and stores generally buy six get one free, which translates into a price of 282 yuan, but in fact, stores are generally sold to consumers in 2 yuan."

"For example, if you buy an air conditioner, the price of Oaks has risen to almost the same as that of Gree. Which one do you buy?" Wang Jia believes that one reason why high-end milk powder in Junlebao can't be sold at high-end prices is that the inherent impression of brand positioning and product price has been formed by taking the cost-effective route for a long time.

Wang Xinlei is a milk powder agent in the capital city of central China. He believes that Junlebao's development route is to do the rural market first, then the villages and towns, and finally enter the cities. As a whole, it is a strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside. "In many rural and township channels, when consumers want to buy high-end products, the first choice is not Junlebao."

Inherent impressions are deeply rooted, but Yue Xianhuo has not encountered such cognitive problems. "I reluctantly bought a bottle, which is really fragrant." In a random interview with AI Finance & Economics, a year after Yue Xianhuo was launched, most consumers didn't realize that it was made in Junlebao. Indeed, from the product packaging, the word "Junlebao" is completely invisible on the front of the bottle, but only appears in the production information behind the bottle. Another product, "Pure Enjoy" yogurt, also takes the main brand "stealth" route.

Of course, this brand strategy is not uncommon in dairy enterprises. For example, Mengniu's high-end fresh milk "Daily Fresh Language" is hard to find the relationship between the brand and Mengniu. From the perspective of brand strategy, when a big brand enters a new category, it is a common option to "start over" in brand naming, but for Junlebao, this choice seems to contain the intention of tearing off the old label.

The mystery of identity

Only sometimes, "invisibility" can't escape some picky consumers. When Li Yuanyuan first bought Yue Fresh in the supermarket, it was when he saw the word "Junlebao" in the production information that he closed his hand and replaced it with a ternary fresh milk. "Isn't Junlebao the former Sanlu?"

The melamine incident in 28 was a fatal blow to all brands in china dairy, but Junlebao, a native brand in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, was hit even harder-the place of birth became the original sin, and Junlebao was simply "lost at the starting line".

Figure/vision china (Wei Lihua, founder of Junlebao)

Over the years, Wei Lihua, founder of Junlebao, has responded to this question on different occasions. From his story, we can sort out Junlebao and Sanlu's past lives.

In 1995, Wei Lihua set up Junlebao from the Hebei Provincial Department of Agriculture, and started selling yogurt, and did a good job. In 1999, Sanlu, the largest dairy company in Shijiazhuang at that time, wanted to expand its business from baby milk powder to liquid milk, so it took a stake in Junlebao under the brand name of Sanlu and acquired 33% of the shares. Since then, on the yogurt package purchased by consumers, "Junlebao" has become "Sanlu Junlebao". However, in terms of production, sales and milk source, both companies operate independently. "Sanlu is the parent company. It makes its baby milk powder and we make our yogurt."

After the melamine incident in 28, Wei Lihua repeatedly stressed that there is no problem with yogurt, no matter whether it is national sampling inspection or commercial sampling inspection. After that, Junlebao repurchased the equity held by Sanlu in cash and returned to an independent state.

where did Sanlu go after the accident? This problem is rarely mentioned. At the first auction of the bankruptcy of Shijiazhuang Sanlu Group, Beijing Sanyuan and Hebei Sanyuan formed a joint auction body, and the auction was successful with 616 million yuan. However, since then, it is rarely seen that Sanyuan was dragged down by the shadow of Sanlu, but Junlebao was not so lucky, and the label of its Sanlu affiliated company was always hard to get rid of.

However, after independence, Junlebao soon won the favor of Mengniu. In 21, Mengniu acquired 51% equity of Junlebao for 469.2 million yuan, becoming the largest shareholder in Junlebao, and its share in the domestic yogurt market will increase to over 3%. Junlebao also wants to use Mengniu, a big tree, to go out of North China and to the whole country.

this honeymoon period lasted for 9 years. In July, 219, Mengniu sold 51% equity of Junlebao for 4.11 billion yuan in the name of focusing on developing high-end brands. Together with the special dividend, Mengniu received a total of RMB 4,579.8 million and earned about RMB 4.1 billion.

but it is well known in the industry that this transaction has exceeded the free will of both parties. Mengniu was taken over by Shijiazhuang Penghai Venture Capital Fund and Shijiazhuang Jungan Enterprise Management Co., Ltd., the former with the background of Hebei SASAC.

Song Liang, a dairy analyst, has previously revealed to AI Finance & Economics that Junlebao is a piece of meat for Mengniu regardless of revenue or net profit, and cutting meat is not that simple. "Mengniu actually didn't want to let go of Junlebao, but after the Sanlu incident, Hebei needed a company to undertake the mission of dairy industry revival. Junlebao was affiliated with Mengniu and was not independent enough. I started talking as early as 214, but I started talking about this matter in 216 and talked about it for at least three rounds. "

In April, 219, the Work Plan for the Revitalization of Dairy Industry in Hebei Province issued by the Leading Group for the Revitalization of Dairy Industry in Hebei Province mentioned Junlebao Dairy for many times, saying that it was necessary to cultivate leading dairy processing enterprises, make them bigger and stronger, and "support the listing of the main board of Junlebao Dairy Group and expand financing channels (Hebei Securities Regulatory Bureau is responsible)."

Now, the "Hebei Dairy Stand Up" printed on the bottle of Junlebao many years ago will really come true. In March, 22, Shijiazhuang Junlebao Dairy Co., Ltd., the operating entity of Junlebao, experienced industrial and commercial changes, with Gaoyan Capital and Sequoia Capital impressively listed, and Sequoia became the largest institutional shareholder with a shareholding ratio of 15.26%. By July, after being reported to be listed in Hong Kong, Junlebao kept silent. "Regarding listing, the company has no relevant plans at present."

However, it is generally believed in the industry that everything is ready in Junlebao, except for a gong.

scale alone is not enough

there may be a reason why Junlebao is cautious about listing. The recent secondary market pays more attention to the future space of a company when giving its valuation.

if we refer to the revenue ranking of listed companies in china dairy in 219, once Junlebao is listed, its revenue may be behind Yili, Mengniu and Guangming, and Feihe will be ranked fourth.

Considering that the revenue growth rate of Yili and Mengniu has been maintained at more than ten points for three consecutive years, the growth rate of Bright Dairy in 219 is only single digits, and the revenue in 218 is even declining. The growth rate of Junlebao at more than twenty points is relatively high. According to public information, the sales revenue of Junlebao in 217 was 1.2 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of nearly 25%; In 218, the sales revenue was 13 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 28%; In 219, the sales revenue was 16.3 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 25%.

Figure/vision china

What is the sales scale of Junlebao among China dairy enterprises? Maybe we can compare the data of our peers. According to public information, the sales announced by Feihe, which mainly makes milk powder, were 7.5 billion yuan and 11.5 billion yuan in 217 and 218, respectively, while the figures for the same period in Junlebao were 1.2 billion yuan and 13 billion yuan respectively. However, Feihe's prospectus adjusted the disclosure caliber to "revenue" (in general, sales include some revenue that has not yet reached the confirmation conditions), which was 5.9 billion yuan and 1.32 billion yuan in 217 and 218 respectively, and 13.722 billion yuan in 219.

in terms of overall sales, the data of Junlebao and Feihe in 22 should be relatively close, and both are at the critical stage of hitting 2 billion yuan. However, the latest market value of Feihe is 157.94 billion yuan. According to the price of Mengniu's sale of Junlebao shares in 219, the overall valuation of Junlebao is more than 8 billion yuan. Although there are differences in the valuation of the two markets, the gap is still a bit obvious.

The gap between them may lie in the ability to make money. Junlebao has been focusing on cost-effective products for a long time, and its profit margin is limited. When Mengniu sold Junlebao, it also mentioned that it would focus on developing its core business and expanding high-end dairy brands with high growth and profit prospects to strengthen its overall financial situation. On the financial statement side in 218, Junlebao contributed about 9.4 billion yuan to Mengniu's revenue, accounting for 13.62% of Mengniu's revenue in 218; However, the after-tax net profit was about 37 million yuan, accounting for only 9.58% of Mengniu's after-tax profit of 3.24 billion yuan.

according to public data, the net interest rates of Junlebao in 217 and 218 were 2.5% and 3.2% respectively, which were lower than those of Mengniu's main business. Based on the data of Mengniu in 218, the net interest rate of Mengniu will increase from 4.64% to 4.86% after stripping off the influence of Junlebao. In other words, after Mengniu "cuts meat", the income end will decline in the short term, but the profit end will not change significantly, but the net interest rate will increase.

This can also explain why Junlebao has frequently enlarged its efforts in high-end products after leaving Mengniu. The ready-made "homework" is that Feihe, which is positioning high-end milk powder, achieved operating income of 13.722 billion yuan in 219, up 32.% year-on-year, but its net profit increased by 75.5% year-on-year to 3.935 billion yuan, with a net profit margin of 28.6%. Aoyou Dairy, which is positioned in high-end and ultra-high-end milk powder, can also achieve a net profit of 13.1% in 219. Although not as good as flying cranes, it is already several times that of Junlebao.

Junlebao, who wants to play the gong in the capital market, really needs a growing number to tell the new story of "Hebei dairy industry has stood up".