According to statistics, at present, the number of accounts of fund investors in China has exceeded 654.38+0.9 billion. When the public handed over their hard-earned property to fund companies, the huge contrast aroused their doubts: in the first half of the year, the profit of China fund industry decreased 168% year-on-year, while the management fee income increased 19% year-on-year. The situation of "huge losses for the citizens and stable profits for the fund" has pushed the charging mode of Public Offering of Fund to the forefront again: Why should the citizens bear the losses alone? Is the fixed rate reasonable? Who decides the interest rate? According to the semi-annual report of Xinhua News Agency, the total loss of the fund in the first half of this year was 439.753 billion yuan, which was a huge contrast with the profit of 642.476 billion yuan in the same period last year. In the same period, the management fee income of 60 fund companies totaled 654.38+04.906 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 654.38+09%. At present, the management fee is accrued in Public Offering of Fund according to a fixed proportion. Generally speaking, the annual rate of partial stock active investment funds is mostly fixed at 1.5%, the annual rate of QDII funds investing in multiple overseas securities markets is 1.5% to 1.8%, and the fixed income funds are 0.6% to 0.8%. From the institutional point of view, it seems too simple to compare the increase of management fees with the loss of funds, but from the perspective of ordinary people, it seems unfair that fund managers lose the money of ordinary people, but the management fees are many. Liu Lei, a senior fund manager of a fund company in Beijing, said that at present, the establishment mode and charging mode of funds in China have isolated the relationship between the income of fund companies and the income of citizens to the maximum extent, with the aim of preventing fund companies from operating illegally for high returns. In reality, this system design has a limited effect on preventing illegal operations, but it leads to a low degree of interest correlation between fund companies and citizens. The billing model has three disadvantages. Fund companies are called "professional investors". However, under the fixed rate system, their first pursuit is scale. In the first half of the year, Jiashi 300, the largest index fund in China, ranked first in losses, which once again reflected the reality that scale is not equal to income. However, for fund companies, scale is income. Liu Lei said: "Fund companies generally' value the old' and issue new funds at no cost, instead of trying to do the old funds well." The fund industry's pursuit of "scale first" is obviously incompatible with the needs of the people. The insiders believe that this unreasonable situation is mainly due to the unreasonable way of extracting fund management fees. Zhong Heng, a researcher at Morningstar Rating, said that for a long time, the management fees of Public Offering of Fund in China have been accrued at a uniform and fixed rate, which is affected by many factors and is not fully marketized, which is not conducive to the formation of the mechanism of survival of the fittest in the industry. Chen Binbin, doctor of law, pointed out that there are three disadvantages in the current fund management fee accrual model in China: first, the citizens can only passively accept the terms of the fund contract and have no right to sue the fund company for the rationality of the management fee; Second, the distribution system of negative profit and no loss makes most fund managers tend to adopt conservative investment strategies, deposit as much raised funds as possible, and gradually erode the principal of fund holders through time; Third, the direct beneficiary of the scale benefit of fund assets is the fund manager, not the fund holder. Under the huge loss of the rate reform policy, a large number of people called for changing the fund management fee into a floating rate. A few days ago, a survey on whether management fees should be charged for fund losses showed that 95% of investors thought that management fees should not be charged for fund losses, and 89% of investors thought that a floating rate charging model should be adopted. Before 1998, China had implemented the floating rate management fee model, which led to the fund's unilateral pursuit of net value growth, and some even took improper measures such as pushing up the stock price at the end of the year to improve the net value, which was later abolished. In the first half of 2008, the fund industry suffered the biggest loss in history, and the floating rate once became the focus of debate. When the losses reappeared this year, similar disputes reappeared. Chen Penbin and others think that in view of the defects in the administrative control of fund management fees in China, we should treat both the symptoms and root causes as soon as possible. As far as "treating the symptoms" is concerned, the most urgent and important issue at present is the adjustment of fund management fees. We can learn from the experience and lessons of previous pilots, learn from the mature "conditional performance reward mechanism" in the world, and introduce the accrual model of paying equal attention to profit and loss; The policy of "tackling the root cause" is to legally require fund companies to increase their management fee income only by enhancing the interests of fund holders, and at the same time give the basic people the right to represent the fund management fee.