ten years ago, as speculative funds began to attack the Thai baht, a large-scale global financial crisis broke out in Bangkok. There are still heated debates about the causes of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, the measures taken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the lessons it brought us. From 1997 to 1998, most economies in South Korea and ASEAN experienced a series of banking and currency crises. These "tiger" economies in Asia grew rapidly, but they all maintained a fixed exchange rate system, thus encouraging external lending. They have also experienced sharp asset price inflation. The economic recession brought about by this crisis has made some countries pay a heavy price, and more than 1% of the per capita real output has gone up in smoke. Except for South Korea, the economic recovery after the crisis is rapid and strong. Nowadays, the annual economic growth rate of many economies in ASEAN is about two percentage points slower than that before 1997. There is an explanation that the last financial crisis only reflected that before the crisis, the economic growth promoted by capital inflows and excessive domestic liquidity in relevant countries was unsustainable. Obviously, this is part of the problem, but it can't explain the various results caused by the financial crisis in this region, such as China's amazing economic growth, while the Indonesian economy is almost stagnant. Another possibility is that the Asian financial crisis has dealt a heavy blow to ASEAN countries and weakened their growth capacity. However, there is limited academic evidence to prove this consequence, and in many ways, the Asian financial crisis has improved the economies of ASEAN countries. Undoubtedly, it has prompted these countries to strengthen banking supervision and other structural reforms. Now it seems that the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was not the cause of the plight of ASEAN countries, but a very dramatic symptom. In the 199s, the export situation of the "tiger" economy in Asia deteriorated seriously, resulting in a large current account deficit, which was easily affected by capital outflow. Part of the reason for this situation is the abnormally high linked exchange rate of ASEAN countries. This has led to the transformation of the "tiger" economic model in Asia. They gave up exporting finished industrial products to developed economies. ASEAN countries can still grow rapidly, but their economic growth rate is currently limited. It will be difficult for any ASEAN country to achieve export-oriented economic growth until the next generation struggles and neighboring countries become rich. Ten years later, the significance of the 1997 Asian financial crisis is beginning to become clear.