The conflict of interest between fund managers and investors is the root of all kinds of irregular behaviors in fund information disclosure. At present, the legal representatives and related operators of fund enterprises only regard the fund as a tool to gather and invest capital, and only pay attention to the pursuit of their own interests, without really defining their trustee status in the legal relationship of the fund. In practice, they often pretend to be asset owners, failing to establish a sense of responsibility and responsibility to protect fund investors, and failing to implement fund operation and operation for the interests of investors. On the contrary, they distinguish their own interests from those of investors.

In the process of securities investment fund management, the interests of fund investors are dividends determined by fund performance, while the interests of fund managers are manifested as fund management fees. Theoretically speaking, if the performance of the fund is good, the more performance dividends the fund investors get, the more fund shares they buy. The larger the fund scale, the more fixed management fees and performance incentive fees fund managers can get. So the interests of fund investors and fund managers are the same. However, due to the uncertainty of the market, in order to gain more benefits for themselves, fund managers often violate the "loyalty obligation" as trustees and do things that harm the interests of fund investors. These illegal gains are much higher than the normal gains of fund managers who operate in good faith, which induce irregular behaviors in the fund market again and again, and ultimately harm the interests of investors.

(2) The supervision of fund information disclosure is not strict. Although China's fund market started late, the information disclosure system has always been the focus of scholars and practitioners. The Securities Investment Fund Law provides detailed regulations on how funds disclose information and what constitutes improper information disclosure. For example, the law lists in detail the fund information that should be disclosed according to law, and requires fund managers to ensure that the disclosed information is true, accurate and complete. However, the system is not an armchair strategist, and static institutional norms will only show vitality in people's active behavior. Facts have proved that simple legislation can not curb all kinds of irregular behaviors in fund information disclosure. To prevent moral crisis in fund information disclosure, strict law enforcement is inevitable. The purpose of strict law enforcement is to strengthen the binding force on the behavior of market participants, increase the cost of those who violate laws and regulations, so that the possible benefits they get due to violations of laws and regulations cannot make up for their costs, so that market participants can't do, can't do or don't want to do it, thus truly achieving the purpose of regulating the behavior of market participants. At present, the irregularities in the market information disclosure of China securities investment funds are becoming more and more serious, but the relevant departments have not shown great concern and due vigilance. Although some brokers were investigated by relevant departments for violating laws and regulations, only a few were actually punished.

(III) Defects of Fund Information Disclosure System In recent years, China's information disclosure system has undergone a series of improvements, but there are still some problems. For example, in the subject of information disclosure supervision, the actual laws and regulations regard the CSRC as the supervisor for the supervision of fund managers' information disclosure. However, the CSRC is not in the actual operation process of securities investment funds, so it can't get the first-hand information in time. It can only sort out and analyze the statements of fund managers, evaluate and confirm whether its operation and finance are within a reasonable crisis range, and take corresponding measures for the related problems found. This kind of off-site supervision not only needs to consume huge economic costs, but also the information unilaterally reported by fund managers is difficult to guarantee absolute truth. The imperfection of this supervision method leads to insufficient information disclosure of China's fund industry, and the crisis caused by it cannot be completely controlled, which has long been criticized by investors.

The relevant laws and regulations on information disclosure of securities investment funds in China are the basis for fund managers to implement information disclosure. Whether the legal norms are perfect or clear directly determines whether the information disclosure can achieve the ultimate effect of protecting the interests of investors. Once there are loopholes or ambiguities in the system design, it will give fund managers an opportunity to exploit legal loopholes and harm the interests of fund investors. Article 23 of the Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure of Securities Investment Funds is a provision on temporary information disclosure of major events of funds. Although there are 28 articles, there is no necessary constraint on the actual operation of information disclosure. For example, item 16 is "material related transactions of the fund", but there is no clear and fixed identification standard for "material related transactions", and the fund manager holds the standard of "material related transactions", which is in a strong position relative to investors, resulting in the disclosure of related transactions is very arbitrary, which is not conducive to protecting the legitimate interests of investors. There are many unclear norms like this in China's current information disclosure system.