at present, the public chain of DPoS*** cognitive mechanism is mainly represented by EOS (grapefruit) and TRON (wave field). Let's take EOS, TRON and GXChain, which have already started node election, as examples to sort out and compare the node election mechanisms of various public chains.

it can be seen from the use of the general certificate that in the early stage of development, all public chains chose to create an organization (foundation) to promote the development of public chains, rather than completely decentralizing them. Among them, 9% of the total EOS certificates have been issued through public offering, and the chips are more dispersed.

the governance structure of each public chain can be divided into two parts, one is the online governance structure represented by nodes and alternative nodes; One part is the offline governance structure represented by the foundation, and the two parts are organically combined to complete the governance of the public chain.

The source of governance reward is different for each public chain. Since 9% of EOS' previous certificates have been issued through public offering, EOS chooses to issue 1%-5% of EOS every year as governance reward, which will also lead to EOS inflation. TRON and GXChain chose to have a foundation to provide this part of the governance reward. Because the foundation's pass card is limited, where the governance reward comes from after a few years has become a problem that the foundations need to consider in the future.

in the dpos governance mechanism, the outgoing node is mainly responsible for bookkeeping, and the standby node is the redundancy of the whole governance system, which ensures that there are enough spare nodes with sufficient quantity and quality to take over the work of the outgoing node in a short time. Therefore, in the governance reward, while ensuring the interests of the block nodes, it is also necessary to consider the interests of the alternative nodes.

in the dpos governance mechanism, besides encouraging nodes, it is also necessary to encourage community users with pass cards. Theoretically, the better the public chain is managed, the value of community users holding the pass will increase, which is already an incentive for community users who participate in voting. However, in the specific implementation process, it is found that the above incentives are not enough to motivate community users to vote enthusiastically (refer to the pre-voting stage of EOS node, the voting ratio is insufficient). Therefore, some new attempts made by TRON, in which users participate in voting, can share voting rewards equally with nodes to increase the enthusiasm of community users to vote.